Turning Brownfields into Jobfields by Carl E. Van Horn et al.
 1
Turning Brownfields Into Jobfields 
 
A Handbook for Practitioners, Professionals, and Citizens on Making Brownfields 
Development Work  
--With Detailed Recommendations on Financing, Insurance, Partnerships, and 
Community Involvement 
 
By Carl Van Horn, K.A. Dixon, Greg Lawler and Dan Segal 
 
A Project of the John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development 
Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy 
 
 
Produced with the generous support of the Ford Foundation  
 
 2
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines brownfields as “abandoned, idled, or 
under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is 
complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination.”1 The redevelopment of these 
properties is gaining attention in policy and political circles as a promising strategy for  
revitalizing  America’s urban centers, and promoting job creation and economic activity. In 
addition, many observers and policy leaders tout brownfields redevelopment as a strategy for 
curbing suburban sprawl, protecting open space, and cleaning up the environment.  For a number 
of reasons, well supported, well-planned projects have the potential to fulfill these environmental 
and economic promises—to turn brownfields into jobfields. 
 
This report incorporates the experiences and insights of professionals and consultants working on 
brownfields projects in cities across America.  It describes the barriers to redevelopment, and 
how they can be overcome.  It describes in detail the financing challenges and options available 
to those seeking to develop brownfields, and outlines the advantages and disadvantages of 
environmental insurance products in the brownfields development process. It describes how 
brownfields redevelopment can create jobs and revitalize communities.  This report is a resource 
for supporters, funders, managers, policy leaders, and other stakeholders seeking a 
comprehensive guide to the real-world implementation of brownfields projects. 
 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that there are over 425,000 brownfields across 
the nation, posing a threat to public health and the environment, contributing to neighborhood 
blight, and draining local tax revenues.2 Brownfields are widespread; cities and rural 
communities of all sizes and industrial histories have contaminated properties that pose 
redevelopment challenges. In many of these cases, brownfields offer a powerful opportunity for 
economic development and job creation.  Across the country, stakeholders such as federal 
agencies, state and local governments, non-profit and community based organizations, and the 
private sector have embarked on brownfields projects and initiatives.  As a result, brownfields 
redevelopment activities have increased in the past few years, with a whole range of projects 
now taking place.   
 
Brownfields redevelopment can be divided into three categories.  The first category includes 
well-located sites that are lightly contaminated and can be redeveloped through private market 
transactions without public subsidies or other forms of external intervention.  Second, there are 
sites that are well located but have moderate to high levels of contamination, or other 
characteristics such as aging infrastructure or liability issues, and require public subsidy or other 
types of external intervention to attract the private sector.  The third category includes sites so 
severely contaminated or poorly located that a great deal of public support and expenditure will 
be required to clean and redevelop the property.   
 
This report focuses on sites in the second and third category:  those sites that have redevelopment 
potential, but require various levels of outside assistance in order to be successfully redeveloped.   
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Brownfields properties are a diverse group.  Some brownfields sites are owned by local, state, or 
federal governments.  Others are in private hands.  Still others are orphan sites.  Each site has its 
own industrial history and quality of infrastructure.  Site size can vary, from a half-acre former 
dry cleaner, to a 900-acre industrial park.  So, too, do contamination levels differ, from severe 
contamination to none at all.  What remains constant is the perception that sites are 
contaminated, and, because of that contamination,  will be more difficult to redevelop. 
  
The perception that brownfields sites are highly contaminated is the first in an array of barriers 
that discourage redevelopment.  In general, brownfields sites cost more to clean up and 
redevelop than suburban sites or open space.  Property owners, developers, and lenders fear the 
liability risk commonly associated with contaminated sites.  Under current federal law, liability 
at contaminated sites (from Superfund level sites to the most lightly contaminated brownfields) 
is joint, several and retroactive; that is, everyone in the chain of title can be held liable for 
contamination and the cost of its cleanup. Although steps have been taken on both a state and 
federal level to allay these fears, liability remains a significant barrier to brownfields 
redevelopment in many states, and perceived liability is a consistent barrier. 
 
Negotiating the maze of brownfields financing options can be an arduous task, for a number of 
reasons.  First, there is no central location at which to access information or applications for 
federal brownfields funding.  Funding options are scattered throughout the federal government 
among EPA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of 
Transpiration (DOT), Economic Development Administration (EDA), Small Business 
Administration (SBA) and others, and brownfields projects often necessitate utilizing a number 
of sources. Some federal departments have brownfields specific funding (ex.  HUD’s 
Brownfields Economic Development Initiative, or BEDI, grants) while others have simply 
imbedded brownfields in their already existing development programs.   Second, there is no 
central location at which to access information regarding state funding options.  Each state has 
developed a unique brownfields program that provides different types and amounts of support.  
Third, private financial institutions have yet to fully participate in brownfields redevelopment 
and continue to restrict lending on contaminated—or potentially contaminated—property.  
Finally, a hodgepodge  of tax credits and incentives exist on the federal, state, and local level that 
can be used for brownfields redevelopment, all with different eligibility requirements and 
restrictions.  Projects frequently utilize financing from multiple sources, and property owners, 
project managers, community based organizations, and developers have their work cut out for 
them when it comes to coordinating brownfields funding. 
 
Cost concerns and liability issues are not the only barriers that face development projects. Many 
brownfields sites support aging and obsolete infrastructure unsuitable to modern manufacturing 
techniques.  Frequently, brownfields parcels are too small to support cost effective 
redevelopment, and difficulties associated with land assembly prevent interested parties from 
forming larger, more viable properties.  Real estate factors such as site location, access to 
transportation routes, incidence of crime, physical decay in the area and the availability of a 
qualified workforce also serve to deter (or attract) redevelopment.   
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However, despite these formidable barriers, brownfields activity has increased substantially, and 
has gained prominence on the national political agenda. There are many reasons to be optimistic 
about brownfields redevelopment. 
 
Some people may wonder what makes brownfields redevelopment so important that potentially 
large sums of money should be spent to clean up contaminated properties.  It’s good for the 
environment, certainly, but how else will it help the communities and cities in which these sites 
are located? 
  
Successful brownfields development can address a number of critical urban and regional 
problems. Some benefits are environmental. Brownfields redevelopment  protects open space 
and farmland, and helps combat suburban sprawl.  Cleaning up contaminated sites removes 
hazardous chemical materials from the environment, reducing air, water, and soil pollution.  
Remediating brownfields also removes potential health threats from a neighborhood, and helps 
communities address problems of incompatible land uses in residential areas.  The urban 
environment is improved when brownfields sites are redeveloped. 
 
Brownfields are also an issue of social justice and environmental equity.  Many brownfields sites 
are located in low income or minority neighborhoods. Polluting industries and businesses were 
frequently allowed to locate in these areas, despite the potential health and safety threat posed to 
local residents.  Lacking the financial resources or political clout, poor, often minority residents 
were often forced to live next door to facilities that would not have been allowed to locate in 
other, more affluent areas.  Low-income and minority communities historically bear the brunt of 
environmental pollution and unsafe living conditions.  The time is long past for contaminated 
sites in these communities to be cleaned up properly and redeveloped into non-polluting, 
appropriate end uses.   
 
Progress is being made toward this goal in San Diego’s Barrio Logan neighborhood, a 
predominantly Hispanic, low-income residential community in San Diego.  Barrio Logan is also 
San Diego’s third largest hazardous waste generating community.  More than twenty-three 
million pounds, nearly a fifth of the county’s hazardous waste, is generated by the industries on 
Barrio Logan each year.3  In the early 1970s, the city changed the residential zoning of Barrio 
Logan to accommodate industrial development in the neighborhood.  Chemical manufacturing 
and metal plating facilities moved into the area, but residents did not move out.  
 
With the help of  two community based organizations and assistance from the city of San Diego, 
residents of Barrio Logan began working to move these dangerous industries out of the 
neighborhood, clean up the contaminants left behind, and redevelop the properties into more 
compatible uses, such as housing.   “Concerns about contamination are what is driving the 
process,” explains Skip Berend of the City of San Diego. “This project is all about incompatible 
land use.” 
 
Brownfields redevelopment provides communities—especially low income or minority 
communities—a unique opportunity to participate in and take ownership of  neighborhood 
development.  They recognize and envision what brownfields redevelopment offers to their 
community:  new jobs, new housing, new commercial or retail space, new open space and public 
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amenities.   In communities throughout the country, local residents have taken ownership of the 
process in order to ensure that any redevelopment activity is in line with their vision, their plan 
for their neighborhood.  They are empowered to stand up for their own interests and form 
partnerships with local government and commercial redevelopers in order to realize their goals.  
From Trenton, NJ to San Diego, CA, brownfields redevelopment is no longer just cleaning up a 
contaminated parcel of land and building something:  it is a process of community development, 
growth and empowerment that revitalizes neighborhoods and creates vibrant, livable 
communities. 4 
 
In Chattanooga, Tennessee, the cleanup and redevelopment of the city’s waterfront has ignited a 
citywide commitment to sustainable development. In the process of going from one of the 
country’s most polluted cities in the 1970s, to one of its most livable today, the city created a 
program called Vision 2000.  Vision 2000 was “an open invitation to the entire community to set 
new goals for Chattanooga's future.”5  In 1984 and again in 1993, a series of public meeting were 
held at which hundreds of residents generated ideas and goals for their community. They 
produced a  “Community Portfolio” that has guided redevelopment and revitalization efforts ever 
since.  According to the Chattanooga Chamber of Commerce, Vision 2000 was one of the first 
and most comprehensive community-wide goal setting processes in the country. 
 
Cleaning and redeveloping brownfields properties benefit urban communities in the nation’s 
cities in particular.  Long in a period of decline, many American cities are experiencing a 
renaissance.  Redevelopment of contaminated properties has been part of that renaissance.  
Brownfields sites provide business and industry with the opportunity to locate near customers, 
potential employees and transportation routes. Improved urban infrastructure and amenities help 
cities maintain residents and attract new ones.  Local municipal governments benefit when 
brownfields parcels return to the tax ledger. Most importantly, brownfields redevelopment 
creates jobs, and attracts additional economic activity.  The potential for projects to generate 
hundreds of  jobs is one of the most compelling arguments in support of  brownfields.   The fact 
that many of those jobs will be created in low income areas (urban and rural) traditionally left 
behind by economic growth and development makes the case for brownfields redevelopment that 
much more persuasive.  Brownfields redevelopment helps ensure that no one is left behind in 
today’s economic expansion. 
 
Job creation takes place at three points during the redevelopment process.  As outlined by Paula 
Doogan in her report “Working on Brownfields,” jobs are created during the assessment and 
remediation stage, the new construction stage and the reuse stage.6 As discussed above, many 
brownfields sites are located in low income communities, areas most likely to be suffering from 
unemployment and the lack of economic opportunity.  Therefore, brownfields redevelopment 
doesn't just create jobs, it creates jobs where they are needed most.  It creates a variety of 
permanent and temporary jobs that require both higher and lower skilled workers, depending on 
the stage of redevelopment and end use.  It creates opportunities for low skilled workers, for  
inner city youth, for dislocated workers, and for others.  Workforce development is a key issue 
for almost all cities and communities, regardless of their ultimate vision for brownfields sites. 
States Doogan,  “No brownfields cleanup project exists in a vacuum.  All are part of economic 
development and environmental cleanup undertakings that aim to bring renewed economic 
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activity, improved living conditions, and healthier fiscal situations—in short, JOBS—to their 
communities.”   
 
The Quarry Retail Project in Minneapolis, Minnesota, redeveloped a highly contaminated forty-
two acre former limestone quarry into the site of a national supermarket chain and other big box 
retailers in an attractive urban, pedestrian friendly setting.  Besides removing a significant and 
severe environmental hazard from the neighborhood and bringing in much needed retail services, 
the project has created over 2000 jobs. Before redevelopment, businesses at the site employed 
234 people.  Now, the site employs 2000 people. To ensure that a significant percentage of these 
employment opportunities went to local residents, the City of Minneapolis set employment goals 
for the project. The city Affirmative Action Director reviews hiring, and can suspend spending 
on the project if it does not meet the hiring requirements. The project  committed to twenty 
percent minority hiring, and achieved a level of  twenty-five percent. The project has met all the 
city’s hiring goals. Several retailers provide job training, and the city makes funds available for 
training, as well.  
 
Brownfields have garnered a broad range of support from a diverse group of stakeholders.  These 
include federal agencies, state and local governments, community-based organizations, and a 
scattering of private financial institutions.  EPA has shown national leadership in encouraging 
brownfields redevelopment, and launched a sizable effort designed to “prevent, assess, safely 
clean up and sustainably reuse” brownfields. EPA is addressing development on several fronts, 
including financing, liability, and education.  Across the country, even the mass media have 
portrayed brownfields redevelopment as a positive effort. 
 
EPA now offers grant and loan opportunities to cities, states, and tribes that are redeveloping a 
brownfields site or working to set up a brownfields program.  EPA continues to work to clarify 
its guidance on liability and cleanup issues. EPA has instituted a new program to link 
brownfields to job training and workforce development. And EPA is working with states to 
develop Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs) to facilitate brownfields redevelopment and 
encourage the private sector to get involved. The majority of states have now developed VCPs or 
other brownfields programs to address issues of clean up standards, liability and financing.  By 
providing financing, building state partnerships, and clarifying liability, EPA has made a 
significant commitment to brownfields redevelopment. 
 
To encourage additional federal participation and support, the Clinton Administration and EPA 
have coordinated an inter-agency working group to promote brownfields redevelopment. As 
described by EPA, the National Partnership Action Agenda is intended to:  
 
improve communities by building partnerships between public and private organizations 
to link environmental protection with economic development and community 
revitalization. The Brownfields National Partnership seeks to protect public health and 
the environment, clean up contaminated properties, build economic viability, and create 
job opportunities.  It includes more than 100 commitments from more than twenty-five 
organizations including more than fifteen Federal agencies. These commitments represent 
a $300 million investment in brownfields communities by the Federal government and an 
additional $165 million in loan guarantees. The resulting action will help cleanup and 
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redevelopment at up to 5,000 properties, leveraging from $5 billion up to $28 billion in 
private investment, supporting 196,000 jobs, protecting up to 34,000 acres of 
“greenfields” and improving the quality of life for as many as eighteen million 
Americans living near brownfields. 7 
 
Although these forecasts may be overly optimistic, they do show a significant commitment to 
brownfields by the federal government. Participating federal agencies include HUD, EDA, DOT, 
General Services Administration (GSA), the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration 
(NOOA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Labor 
(DOL) and the Department of Energy (DOE). Some agencies, such as HUD, maintain grant 
programs that are specifically targeted for brownfields.  Others agencies, such as DOT, provide 
money for brownfields as part of their normal grant and loan programs. Some agencies offer 
technical assistance and training, while others are working to clarify liability issues or develop 
state brownfields programs.  
 
In addition to state and federal government initiatives, a great deal of activity is taking place at 
the local level and in the private sector.  Community-based organizations have taken a lead role 
in the redevelopment of brownfields sites in a number of cities, including Pittsburgh, San Diego 
and Birmingham. Community Development Corporations (CDCs) wear many hats, serving as 
project managers, financial intermediaries, developers, and community organizers. They often 
take on projects the private sector avoids, and fill gaps left by local government and federal 
initiatives.  CDCs draw attention to contaminated sites and overlooked neighborhoods. They 
contribute planning and organizing expertise to the redevelopment process.  
 
Most importantly, CDCs strive to ensure that redevelopment is driven by the needs and desires of 
the local community by creating an inclusive, community-based process.  CDCs facilitate the 
direct participation of local residents in the decision making process, and serve as a liaison 
between the local community, local government officials, and private industry.  CDCs help 
empower their constituents and members to take ownership of the brownfields process.  
Community support and participation are a hallmark of brownfields projects with CDC 
leadership or participation.  The successful completion of many brownfields projects can be 
attributed in large part to support and participation of the local community. 
 
Still, CDCs face financial and technical limitations in their capacity to facilitate brownfields 
redevelopment.  A number of non-profit and for-profit organizations have emerged in the past 
few years as intermediaries that provide financing, remediation, and technical services to 
brownfields stakeholders.  Non-profit organizations such as The Phoenix Land Recycling 
Company, the Development Fund, and the California Center for Land Recycling work to provide 
the bridge of financial and technical support many projects require.  Brownfields intermediaries 
are providing critical support to redevelopment efforts throughout the country. 
 
To a lesser degree, banks and insurance companies are developing and offering a number of 
policies and financing options to developers and buyers of brownfields sites.   But participation 
by the private financial sector lags behind what is needed if brownfields redevelopment as 
envisioned by many leaders and policymakers is to be fully realized. 
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The private sector has not embraced brownfields redevelopment for a very simple reason.  
Brownfields projects are not easy.  The redevelopment of contaminated properties is a complex, 
sometimes time-consuming, often frustrating experience. There is no getting around the fact that 
it is simply easier—and in the short run, at least, cheaper—to develop uncontaminated 
properties.   Even for brownfields advocates, some projects are disappointing.  Some projects fail 
to live up to all their economic and community-building expectations.  Brownfields 
redevelopment will not single-handedly save cities and revitalize poor communities.   
 
But brownfields redevelopment is important.  It is important to the low income communities that 
must live with contaminated property in their neighborhoods, threatening their health and safety 
and  contributing to neighborhood blight and deterioration. It is important to community based 
organizations who work to empower local residents and create vibrant, economically healthy 
communities.   It is important to urban and rural municipalities struggling to increase tax 
revenues, retain and attract  residents and businesses, create jobs and economic opportunities, 
and clean up the environment. Brownfields is important to suburban communities trying to limit 
sprawl and protect open space and farmland.  It is important to any person concerned with the 
environment, public health, land use, economic growth and development, job creation, and 
community development.  
 
This report is based on extensive research, phone and in-person interviews with over 200 
brownfields stakeholders and policy experts,  ten case studies of successful brownfields 
redevelopment projects throughout the country, and site visits to three of those projects.8 The 
first chapter identifies and discusses the principal obstacles to productive brownfields 
development.  In the second chapter, we highlight and explain those factors that are critical to 
success. Through interviews with numerous brownfields stakeholders, research, case studies and 
site visits, we analyze the effects of a range of factors on the outcomes of redevelopment 
projects.  Examples from the case studies are used to support the discussion of barriers and 
factors of success.    
 
The third chapter offers an in-depth discussion of financing options available to brownfields 
investors.  This chapter examines both public and private funding initiatives, and discusses how 
much of this funding has been applied to brownfields, and what the potential is of targeted more 
funds to brownfields redevelopment in the future.  This section also contains a discussion of 
financial intermediaries and the role they play in brownfields redevelopment.  Each subsection 
concludes with a recommendation on how the funding mechanism can be expanded or improved. 
 
The fourth chapter addresses the issue of insurance in the brownfields development process.  
This chapter discusses the type of insurance products, their advantages and disadvantages, and 
their availability to the brownfields stakeholder. 
 
The report concludes with a set of  recommendations that will facilitate the redevelopment of 
brownfields sites.  These recommendations include changes to the regulatory structure governing 
brownfields redevelopment, increased availability of insurance and financing options, support for 
brownfields intermediaries, and creation of a national brownfields development corporation.  
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BROWNFIELDS AT WORK:  SITE STUDIES AND LESSONS 
 
For decades, steel was the primary industry in Pittsburgh.  The steel mills of Pittsburgh 
dominated the city’s riverfront and employed thousands of people from the surrounding  
neighborhoods and communities.   But the eventual decline of the U.S. steel industry  forced the 
closings of mills throughout the city and the country, leaving behind defunct facilities and 
moribund, potentially contaminated properties.  In 1986, LTV Steel Company of Pittsburgh 
joined the exodus and closed its South Side Steel Mill. 
 
The LTV Steel South Side Works site is a 130 acre parcel of land with approximately one mile 
of frontage on the south side of the Monongahela River.  The site is centrally located within the 
city of Pittsburgh and close to most of the city’s major employment and residential areas. The 
surrounding residential community is known as the Southside, an attractive, somewhat worn, 
predominantly blue collar neighborhood. The residents are active advocates of their community. 
  
There is a decades long history of activism in the Southside, and the neighborhood supports 
several community-based organizations, including the Southside Local Development 
Corporation (SSLDC). In 1985, SSLDC organized a community meeting to discuss concerns in 
the neighborhood.  From this effort the South Side Steering Committee was formed to develop 
long-range strategies for neighborhood redevelopment.  The community decided that a separate 
planning body should be formed. The Southside Planning Forum (SSPF) was created, consisting 
of representatives from the Southside Community Council, Southside Business Alliance, 
SSLDC, Friends of the Southside Branch Library and other community representatives.  Serving 
as the umbrella organization for all the Southside neighborhood groups, the Planning Forum 
meets monthly and operates by consensus.   
 
When LTV Steel closed its doors the community took a proactive approach to redeveloping the 
site. LTV Steel itself went to SSLDC to seek advice regarding what to do with their site.  In 
1991, several community meetings were held to solicit opinions and input, and over 100 
residents took part. Their first action was to develop a set of recommendations regarding 
redevelopment and end uses of the site. With the help of  SSLDC and with funding from LTV 
Steel, the community developed a set of ten recommendations.  Their intent was to guide the 
redevelopment process and ensure that the needs of the area residents were fully considered.  The 
ten recommendations, as outlined in A Community-Base-Planning Evaluation:  LTV Steel’s 
South Side Mill Site (now incorporated in the South Side Neighborhood Master Plan), are: 
  
 1.) Planning for the site should be consistent with the South Side Neighborhood Plan; 
  2.) The property should be zoned as a Special Planned District to promote flexible         
 development while also assuming maximum public review; 
  3.)   Development should not overburden local streets or available public services; 
  4.)   There should be a high level of public participation; 
  5.)   Planning for and development of the LTV site should respond more to long term          
 objectives than to short term opportunities; 
  6.)   Mixed use development is encouraged to provide flexibility, respond to market           
 opportunities, assure expeditious development, and entail variety in keeping with the   
 existing community; 
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  7.) Development of the property should be directed to markets that complement rather than 
 duplicate those existing in the community; 
  8.) Development of site should be master planned, paying attention to the out parcels to the 
 south of East Carson St. so that development is to scale and character with its 
 surroundings; 
  9.) The riverfront should be treated as an amenity for public access; 
10.) Interim uses are strongly discouraged. 
 
The Planning Forum adopted these recommendations and they served an important role in 
guiding the redevelopment process.  Throughout the city, other communities engaged in 
redevelopment efforts have adopted these recommendations. 
 
The local community knew what it wanted for the site, but it also knew that there would be some 
daunting obstacles to overcome. First and foremost, who would pay for the cleanup and 
redevelopment of the site?   The city of Pittsburgh has an extensive redevelopment agenda, and 
nobody knew how much money and resources the city would commit to the LTV site. 
Second, there were infrastructure and real estate problems.  Part of the site is located in a 100 
year flood plain, and any redevelopment in this area would require careful planning.  Also, the 
foundation of the former steel mill remained buried on site, and would have to be removed or 
built over. Third, local residents were concerned about increased traffic and congestion that 
would result from redevelopment.  In addition, problems existed with the state of the bridges in 
the local area that span the Monongahela, compromising access to  the area and contributing to 
traffic congestion.  Finally,  the city began to develop its own plan for the site, plans that clashed 
harshly with the communities redevelopment vision. In 1992, the Urban Redevelopment 
Authority (URA), the primary development agency of the city, entered into an agreement with 
HFS Hospitality  to bring riverboat casino gambling to the area.  This plan was contingent upon 
state legislative action legalizing gambling.    
 
An immediate and vociferous outcry arose from local residents.  In 1993, the mayor and URA 
presented the idea of casino gambling to the community in a public meeting attended by over 
300 city residents.  Local residents denounced the plan. In the face of community opposition, and 
the uncertain future of legalized gambling in the state of Pennsylvania, the city’s Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) turned to the Southside community for development 
alternatives. “The political reality is that the community has to be involved,” stated Roberta 
Stackawitz of the Southside Community Council. “The community wanted to be involved and 
they stood up and said so.”   
 
To coordinate planning, the LTV Steering Committee was formed. Members include three 
community representatives, the Planning Forum chairperson and SSLDC’s executive director.   
The Steering Committee’s job is to serve as a liaison between the city and the community.  A 
major community education process takes place over the next two years.  In addition, Sasaki & 
Associates are contracted to develop a Master Plan for the South Side community. 
 
City planners, SSLDC and the developer, met every two weeks to work on strategy and planning. 
In addition, the Southside Planning Forum entered into an agreement with  URA regarding reuse 
of the site. To ensure community participation in the process, the agreement specified: 
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1.) A planning process that included conceptual plans, socio-economic assessment, traffic 
analysis, market analysis, a master plan, selection of the highest and best development 
program, a preliminary land development plan, request for qualified developers, 
developer election, and a final land development plan for each district; 
 
2.) A planning team that included representatives from the community, URA, City Planning, 
and other appropriate individuals, public or private.  The planning team would have a role 
in selecting and monitoring consultants and developers,  preparing the preliminary and 
final land development plans and negotiating and preparation of  Disposition Agreements 
with URA; 
 
3.) A public participation process that included the following:  participating in the planning 
team, dissemination of information to Planning Forum members, community meetings, 
education sessions, community consensus on the master plan, acknowledgement of the 
Neighborhood Plan, participation of the planning team at Forum meetings when needed, 
and adequate financial and technical assistance  to the Forum to participate in the process. 
 
In 1996, the South Side Works Master Plan was adopted by the Southside Planning Forum.  The 
plan outlines a phase mixed-use development that will occur over a number of years.  The site 
will feature more than 300 new housing units, 250,000 square feet for retail, 180,000 square feet 
for flex/distribution and entertainment and 1.6 million square feet for offices and research and 
development.9 The development will provide a high quality pedestrian environmental with brick 
sidewalks, crosswalks, parks and trail improvements along the Monogahela riverfront.  Riverboat 
casino gambling, not surprisingly, is not part of the Master Plan. 
 
After the city acquired site in 1994, URA prepared to assess the area. To facilitate the process, 
the site was divided into parcels based on location and potential contamination (URA did not 
have a clear idea of what level of contamination existed at the site). The Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) agreed to allow approval on a parcel by parcel 
basis.  In addition, DEP negotiated a buyer/seller agreement between the URA and the buyer of 
the first remediated parcel, allowing redevelopment to begin on the site.    
 
In Pennsylvania, Act II regulates the cleanup of brownfields sites, and establishes a range of 
cleanup criteria based on end use (in Pennsylvania, brownfields redevelopment is regulated 
under three separate acts that together constitute the Land Recycling Program: Act 2 is the Land 
Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act; Act 3, the Economic Development 
Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability Protection Act; and Act 4, the Industrial 
Sites Environmental Assessment Act).10 DEP worked closely with the city in order to ensure that 
cleanup was in accordance with state requirements.  Fortunately, the site was not found to be 
heavily contaminated.  The primary contaminants included  tar tanks, PCBs, and heavy metals, 
and specific remediation techniques were employed according to the contaminant and anticipated 
end use. Because residential units are planned for part of the site, these areas had to meet 
statewide health standards for cleanup.  In addition, PCB “hot spots” were excavated.  Pathway 
elimination was used to attain a site-specific standard for an area of former tar tanks at the 
upstream end of the property. The cleanup plans developed by URA and DEP were supported by 
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the Planning Forum and the Steering Committee.  A No Further Action letter was issued by DEP 
for the site. 
 
Financing a project of this size generally requires access funds from a variety of sources. URA 
obtained funds for  assessment and remediation primarily from the city capital budget. The city 
also received a grant from the state Industrial Site Reuse Program to finance cleanup activities at 
the site.  In 1997, URA spent approximately $1 million to remove sub surface foundations from 
certain areas of the site.  
 
Funds for redevelopment  will be raised as portions of the site are sold to developers, who will 
then finance their own redevelopment operations.   In early 1999, URA’s Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF) proposal was approved, and URA predicts that they will collect up to $25 
million of real estate taxes over the next twenty years from proposed development.11 Overall, 
URA expects to spend $9 million on road improvements, $18 million for bridge repair, $4.8 
million on public utilities, and $6.2 million on parks.  URA expects to spend $15 million at the 
site, raising $25 million from TIF, and acquiring additional funds from state and private sources. 
 
Local communities and CDCs also need financial assistance if they are to fully participate in the 
redevelopment process.   LTV Steel provided approximately $10,000 to fund early efforts by 
SSLDC and the local community to develop policy and planning recommendations for the site.  
URA provided SSLDC with a $35,000 grant to manage the master planning process. 
 
Why did this project get off the ground, despite the barriers to redevelopment and the challenge 
of financing a project of this size and scope? First, and perhaps most importantly, the project has 
the support and participation of the local community. The Southside area has a history of active 
neighborhood groups, and the local community had been looking at redevelopment options for 
the LTV site long before the city became involved. These groups-SSLDC, the Southside 
Planning Forum, and others-had the foresight to do some strategic assessment of their own and 
begin the master planning process. Many elements of their work were incorporated wholesale in 
the final Master Plan, and they were active participants of the entire planning process.  Now that 
dirt is actually being moved on the site, the local community continues to be involved.  The early 
success of this site has lead the city to consider funding organizations like the SSLDC in other 
Pittsburgh neighborhoods 
 
Second, the Urban Redevelopment Agency played a critical role.  URA coordinated the city’s 
efforts to acquire and redevelop the site.  By buying, assessing and remediating the property,  
URA stepped in where the private market failed.  It is doubtful that a private entity would have 
bought and developed the site otherwise. In addition, URA was open to the high level of 
community involvement in the Southside.  “The community was an asset to this project,” stated 
Marc Knezevich of the URA. 
 
Both the participation of the local community and the work of URA were important elements of 
success.  But it was the strong partnership among URA, the local community and the developer 
that really made the project work.  Once the original developer was convinced of the need to 
consider the needs of the local community, they were willing to work with both the community 
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and URA to come up with a Master Plan that satisfied all stakeholders. All the involved parties 
were willing to work together to achieve consensus.   
 
Two redevelopment projects at the site have been completed to date, including a distribution 
center and pharmacy space for the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Purchasing 
Department.  Conflict has arisen over the design of the new distribution center, with some local 
residents feeling that it does not fit into the landscape.  In addition, there is some argument over 
the type of residential units planned for the site, with some in the community believing the units 
should be for-sale, as opposed to rental, units.  But meetings with URA and the local community 
continue, in order to maintain dialog over these issues.  URA is commencing with road and 
bridge repair, and additional redevelopment deals are being negotiated. 
 
As of June 1999, developers are breaking ground on three additional projects, with all public 
approvals completed.  SSLDC held a town meeting at the end of May 1999 to review the 
progress of redevelopment. “The neighborhood is quite pleased with the progress,” reported 
Carey Brennan, Executive Director of SSLDC.  A few problems have arisen at the site.  For 
instance, one of the developers ran into a title problem with the purchase of their portion of the 
site. Apparently the railroad, in this case CSX, has easements up to fifty feet on either side of the 
existing track in case they need to expand.  This has eaten into the developable property.  
Negotiations are underway, and it will be interesting to see what happens, as this could be an 
issue on a number of brownfields sites. 
 
Over 6000 new jobs are expected to be created by the redevelopment process.  SSLDC is 
working with URA to ensure that a significant number of local  residents are hired. 
 
The Southside community easily could have stood by and watched as the city made all the 
decisions regarding the LTV site and brought casino gambling to their doorstep.  Instead, the 
community took action.  They  established several goals for the project, including job creation, 
open space, housing, commercial development and retail. They fought for the things their 
community needed.  The community, city government and private developers developed a strong 
partnership that operates on consensus and cooperation.  Of course, the relationship between the 
parties is not always free of conflict. But the local residents have taken ownership of this process, 
and  they are committed to appropriate, community-friendly development in their neighborhood. 
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The redevelopment of Pittsburgh’s Southside is just one example of both the problems and the 
potential of brownfields redevelopment.  Almost every city, large and small, has its own 
brownfields challenges. 
 
In 1998, the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) recognized brownfields redevelopment as their 
top national priority.  According to USCM president Paul Helmke, brownfields “represent 
missed opportunities to attract new businesses and create additional jobs…we simply cannot go 
on destroying our farmland and greenspaces while neglecting these abandoned or underutilized 
properties.” 12 
 
As part of their commitment to brownfields redevelopment, USCM surveyed elected officials 
and their staffs in 126 U.S. cities regarding brownfields and brownfields redevelopment.13   
Survey respondents said that an estimated 16,531 brownfields sites existed in their cities, with 
122 cities estimating a total of 47,384 acres of brownfields property.14  The survey  also found 
that over 100 respondents believed that redeveloping brownfields properties would result in 
additional tax revenues of $205-500 million, and create an estimated 236,000 jobs.15   Clearly, 
mayors across the country believe there is much to gain from brownfields redevelopment, in 
terms of tax revenues, job creation, and farmland and open space preservation.   
 
Brownfields has garnered a broad range of support from leading government and nonprofit 
agencies, analysts, and community leaders, both as a “smart growth” strategy and as a tool for 
job creation and urban revitalization. At the EPA, their brownfields initiative is a sizable effort 
that includes several programs  designed to “prevent, assess, safely clean up and sustainably 
reuse” brownfields.  The federal government has coordinated an inter-agency working group to 
promote brownfields redevelopment.  The majority of states have developed Voluntary Consent 
Programs to address issues of cleanup standards, liability and financing. Various community 
development groups and non-profit organizations have served as brownfields project sponsors or 
financial intermediaries. Banks and insurance companies are beginning to offer a number of 
policies and financing options to developers and buyers of brownfields sites.   Engineering and 
consulting firms have developed specialized brownfields services.  
 
Today, the field of players with a vested interest in successful brownfields redevelopment is 
significant and continues to grow. A brownfields industry is emerging.  But barriers still exist 
that stymie brownfields projects and encourage the development of suburban and rural 
“greenfields” areas.   
 
THE BARRIERS 
 
Through our survey of the brownfields literature and interviews with over 200 brownfields 
stakeholders, the report found seven leading barriers to successful brownfields redevelopment.  
The  obstacles cited most frequently include the following:   
 
1.) Lack of financing, in particular, lack of money for the up front costs of assessment and 
remediation; 
2.) Fear of liability, both lender liability and liability in a third party action; 
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3.) Real estate issues, such as location, transportation routes, infrastructure, marketability, 
crime levels, and skilled workforce; 
4.) Small parcel size and the difficulties of land assemblage.  This includes the inability of 
local municipalities to assemble and redevelop sites mothballed by “Deep Pocket” 
owners who prefer to leave a site idle than to risk liability risks or incur high cleanup 
costs; 
5.) Fear of the unknown regarding levels of contamination, threats to public health and cost 
 of cleanup; 
6.) Stigma associated with environmentally contaminated properties; 
7.) Lack of information about available brownfields programs and sources of financing, both 
public and private. 
 
This does not necessarily constitute a ranking of  obstacles to brownfields.  Whereas lack of 
financing,  liability concerns and real estate issues were identified as major barriers most 
frequently by those interviewed for this report, no fixed hierarchical position can be assigned. 
For instance, a survey of New Jersey municipalities revealed that the major barriers to 
redevelopment in that state include the stigma associated with environmentally suspect 
properties, fear of liability and lack of financing.16 For each project, municipality and region, 
barriers combine in different ways to negatively influence the redevelopment of brownfields.  At 
some sites, all these barriers are a factor. 
 
Most interviewees pointed out that project characteristics (and therefore barriers to development)  
are both site and region specific.  Brownfields in the Northeast and Midwest region often are  
former industrial sites, with obsolete manufacturing facilities. The industrial history of the 
Pacific Northwest and West Coast is such that redevelopment is often more an issue of 
“brownfields prevention” at sites that have not yet reached the state of abandonment 
characteristic of the traditional industrial properties. But we have identified those common 
factors confronting a range of projects that most cities will need to address to establish a line of 
viability for brownfields development. 
 
Financing Brownfields 
 
“Money is needed for everything,” stated one brownfields project manager.  Most stakeholders 
cited inadequate funding for all project phases as a major barrier to brownfields development.  
They singled out lack of money for assessment and remediation as particularly difficult hurdles 
to overcome.  These “up front” costs are sometimes daunting enough to send the private 
developer to a greenfields, force community development groups to consider other development 
projects, and lead local government to conclude that the cost of redevelopment is too great.   
Many developers do not have the patience to wait while initial funds are obtained. Private 
developers favor properties that have been assessed and remediated in order to avoid these very 
costs (and the initial uncertainty surrounding pre-assessed properties);  banks, too, favor loans to 
such properties.17 But at all phases of a project, securing timely and adequate levels of financing 
is essential to successful completion.   
 
Almost all projects face a financing challenge of one kind or another.  Obtaining adequate 
redevelopment funds has been a challenge for the Barrio Logan community in San Diego. 
Located south of downtown San Diego and thirteen miles north of the Mexico border, the Barrio  
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Logan neighborhood faces the San Diego Bay towards Coronado Island and abuts the city’s 
Marina District. The Barrio Logan area is a predominantly low-income, Hispanic neighborhood 
designated as a Federal Enterprise Community and also as a State Enterprise Zone. The 
neighborhood includes several active chemical storage/manufacturing and metal plating facilities 
located in very close proximity to houses.  These “emerging brownfields” blight the community 
and pose a threat to public health. 
 
These properties, unlike many brownfields, are owned by private entities who are either 
operating a business on,  or accruing rental income from, the site.  Local residents are working 
with the city to relocate these hazardous neighbors and clean up their community.  But the 
remediation and redevelopment of one site has been delayed due to lack of  money to pay for 
acquiring the parcel.  The city of San Diego has made efforts to buy the property, and is working 
with HUD to secure the necessary funds.  But failure to secure the proper financing could 
seriously delay or kill the project.  
 
In addition to HUD, many types of  public and private sector financing are available for 
brownfields redevelopment. These funding mechanisms will be discussed in detail later in this 
report. 
 
Liability 
 
“The mere threat of cleanup liability under Federal and State Superfund laws has historically 
inhibited the reuse of brownfields.” 18  As explained by USCM in their 1998 report, 
 
The existence of many brownfields sites can now be traced to the strict liability 
provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), a federal law more commonly known as Superfund.  CERCLA was 
enacted in 1980 to stop the irresponsible  discharge of pollutants to the environment by 
holding entities to a very strict liability regime, making owners fully responsible for any 
and all costs to rid Superfund-caliber properties of contamination.  This strict liability 
regime, over time, has affected virtually all properties-including brownfields-by making 
them potentially subject to CERCLA’s authority even though their level of contamination 
is less than Superfund sites.  This liability threat drives many potential developers and 
businesses away from these brownfields as potential sites for investment.  Too often, 
instead, private and public parties look to “greenfields” as preferred locations for new 
businesses and other development.  As a result, our nation is consuming farmland and 
green spaces at an alarming rate, while leaving brownfields abandoned in just about every 
city and county in the nation.19 
 
Almost everyone interviewed for this report named fear of liability-both lender and third party 
action-as a factor inhibiting the success of brownfields.    But this opinion was qualified in many 
instances, by those who observed that the liability issue has changed significantly in the past few 
years.  At the federal level, the passage of the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit 
Insurance Act of 1996 offered limited liability protection to lenders who finance remediation 
projects, and helped ease the liability fear of many lending institutions. A report issued by HUD 
in 1998 noted that liability concerns were more pronounced in stakeholders who had little 
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experience in brownfields redevelopment.  Those with experience did not view liability as such a 
major concern.20 
 
The liability questions that remain generally concern those of the prospective purchaser, innocent 
landowner and adjacent property owner.  While these liability issues have been examined by 
Congress, Congressional conflict over Superfund reauthorization has limited efforts to change 
liability (the program continues to function through special appropriated funding while 
reauthorization of the law is negotiated by Congress).   Questions remain, too, for those smaller 
developers or buyers who are unversed in the intricacies of lender and cleanup liability.  
 
Deep pocket owners, corporate land owners for whom mothballing a site is often preferable to 
any type of redevelopment, also remain wary of being held liable for any contamination found on 
their property. Due to their ability to simply “sit” on a site, deep pocket owners cause a particular 
problem for brownfields redevelopment.  Inaction by the owner means sites that may pose a 
health threat to the local community are not cleaned up. Inaction deprives local government of 
the ability to redevelop a property that could be important to a larger revitalization program.  
Inaction prevents the parcel from being redeveloped for a more suitable use. Inaction contributes 
to neighborhood blight.  Deep pocket owners are an issue for many cities and counties across the 
country. 
 
Liability issues are also being addressed in state Superfund laws and Voluntary Cleanup 
Programs (VCPs).  VCPs vary from state to state, but all offer some type of  “sign off” on state 
liability.  Usually in the form of Comfort Letters, Covenants Not To Sue, or No Further Action 
letters, state regulatory authorities grant an owner, developer or purchaser protection from future 
state legal action regarding contamination at the site.  
 
For instance, New Jersey has modified state brownfields regulations to resolve complex liability 
issues. Lending institutions are no longer held liable  for contamination when providing financial 
support to industrial redevelopment projects. Under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and 
Control Act local government entities that acquire property through foreclosure, condemnation 
or similar means are not liable for past contamination. New Jersey also protects developers of 
property in qualified municipalities from liability for third party costs if they did not cause the 
past contamination, and they have cleaned up the site in accordance with DEP regulations.21 
Some state Superfund laws offer similar protection.  However, state exemptions from liability do 
not offer  protection against  federal liability, or a third party action. Some states, such as Illinois, 
have gone so far as to eliminate the concept of joint and several, retroactive liability from their 
State Superfund laws, in favor of causation liability.   
 
So whereas liability is still a concern, and a major barrier to redevelopment,  tools are available 
to address the issue.  Indeed, more than one person interviewed for this report suggested that de 
facto redlining is taking place in urban areas, with liability  currently being used by banks and 
developers as an excuse for not getting involved in brownfields and the urban redevelopment 
process (of course, the truth of such an assertion demands careful study).  And where liability 
remains a concern, certain mechanisms exist to further reduce risk.  The insurance industry has 
developed a number of policies that target brownfields transactions.  Currently,  there appears to 
be more sellers than buyers for such products. “Municipalities almost never get involved in 
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insurance, and the smaller developer or buyer cannot afford it,” said one insurance executive.  
From several interviewees, the opinion was the same:  redevelopment insurance is a new, 
emerging market whose role in brownfields redevelopment is still uncertain.  Insurance options 
and products will be discussed in further detail later in this report. 
 
Location, Location, Location 
 
Real estate issues are a third major barrier to successful brownfields redevelopment  (private 
sector people often named them as the major barrier).  Location, access to major transportation 
routes, infrastructure, crime levels, and skilled workforce all serve to affect the marketability of a 
particular project, and rate high on the barrier checklist, particularly for the private sector. A 
survey of New Jersey municipalities revealed that ten percent of New Jersey brownfields have 
significantly impacted the land and property surrounding the site.  In three percent of the cases, 
the impact extends for more than one quarter mile from the brownfields.22  The survey also 
found that the neighborhoods surrounding many of these sites suffer from crime and blight, such 
as deteriorated housing and infrastructure, and the chances of them being targeted by private 
business for redevelopment is limited.  
 
“Real estate issues, far more than fear of liability or environmental regulations, are the biggest 
impediment for the private sector,” declared one respondent.   Are the real estate characteristics 
of the site  such that  the cost, time and risk of environmental assessment and remediation can be 
recovered?  If the answer to this question is yes, chances are the property will be redeveloped, 
with or without government brownfields initiatives or state VCPs.   
 
In Bridgeport, CT,  the Bryant Electric site was a tough sell, at first. The six acre site is located in 
the city of Bridgeport’s West End business district in an area zoned primarily for industry and 
commercial use. But the presence of a large, obsolete manufacturing facility made marketing the 
site extremely problematic.  It could not be used for modern day manufacturing, and demolition 
would be an expensive proposition.  In addition, the turn of the century building had an historical 
designation that complicated the redevelopment process. 
  
The site owner Westinghouse Corporation (now CBS)  knew it had to demolish the building.  
“Infrastructure was the  key to the original inability to market the site, and the demolition of the 
building was the key to moving the project forward,” stated Ed Lavernoich of the Bridgeport 
Office of Economic Development..  A deal was brokered whereby the city agreed to perform 
demolition activities in exchange for Westinghouse remediating the site. A portion of the  
property has since been cleaned up and redevelopment is underway. 
 
The Bridgeport project illustrates another crucial real estate issue that serves as a barrier to 
redevelopment:  time.  The real estate industry, particularly commercial real estate development, 
operates under particular time constraints that brownfields redevelopment projects often have 
difficulty meeting.  In Bridgeport, after initial barriers to redevelopment, the city, the site owner, 
and the local business association worked together to get the site infrastructure demolished and 
the property assessed.  However, the project had not surmounted all its hurdles.  Regulatory 
issues related to the federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) delayed cleanup at 
the site, despite the best efforts of city and state environmental officials. A potential developer of 
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the site was forced to look elsewhere when the site failed to receive an official sign-off on 
cleanup.   
 
The Bridgeport project raises concerns regarding the time it takes to redevelop some properties. 
Ed Lavernoich, a planner with the Bridgeport Office of Economic Development, described the 
effect this can have on community support.  “Everyone in the neighborhood supports the project, 
but they think it is taking too long.  People get frustrated with the speed at which federal money 
is approved and issued.  Neighborhoods get impatient.” 
 
Members of the community echoed this sentiment. “Parcels of land need to be ready to go,” 
stated Jim Carbone of the West End Business Association.  “Projects can not take this long.” In 
addition, Carbone expressed the opinion that environmental regulatory agencies could be more 
flexible in their approach to brownfields redevelopment.  “EPA and DEP are major stumbling 
blocks to getting anything done,”  said Carbone. “State and federal regulations tie the hands of 
the city.  The process must move faster and regulations should be streamlined.”  
 
This is not to say that this project has failed.  On the contrary, the first parcel has been 
redeveloped and is now the site of a commercial bakery.  Additional redevelopment projects are 
being negotiated, and the city continues to work with EPA to get final approval for the remainder 
of site cleanup. It does mean that time factors, in addition to other real estate issues, can erect 
quite a large barrier to brownfields redevelopment, and is an issue of which brownfields 
stakeholders should be aware. “Time has shown that the Bryant effort is more admirable for the 
persistence and sophistication of city leaders in overcoming obstacles posed by the need to 
coordinate diverse brownfields variables than as a demonstration that complex sites can be 
readily transformed to house major industrial reuse.”23 
 
Many sites being redeveloped by the private sector are those with the right real estate 
characteristics and manageable remediation requirements.  Many respondents noted that these 
sites are being “cherry picked” for redevelopment by the private sector, leaving the more 
marginal sites behind.   
 
Parcel Size and Assemblage 
 
Brownfields sites are marginalized for a number of reasons, one of which is parcel size.  The 
small lot size of some sites, and the difficulty of assembling these lots into  more marketable 
acreage (due to ownership issues, tax liens, and the like), was cited by many people as a major 
barrier to brownfields redevelopment.  Determining the owners of orphan sites, gaining title or 
agreement to develop the property, and the extra cost and time of these steps incur: these 
transactions pose serious disincentives to private sector development.  The problem of land 
assembly is further exacerbated by deep pocket owners who refuse to sell or redevelop parcels 
that have been targeted as part of a larger redevelopment effort.  Although a mothballed site may 
offer significant redevelopment potential, recalcitrant deep pocket owners can lock up these sites 
indefinitely. 
 
Assembling viable parcels and resolving ownership issues is a challenge for the Gateway Project 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Gateway Project is a very large, very ambitious undertaking.  A 
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number of factors have encouraged the redevelopment effort, including the shortening of several 
highway viaducts that had compromised the access and visibility of the site, its proximity to the 
city’s central business district, shortage of developable land in parts of Salt Lake City, 
designation as a Brownfields Showcase Community, and the upcoming 2002 Winter Olympics 
(hosted by Salt Lake City). However, a project of this scope is never without problems.  
According to the project’s Master Plan, there are approximately 325 property owners, with a 
majority of the parcels over an acre in size.  Assessing and remediating these parcels, obtaining 
the cooperation of landowners, and assembling large property parcels will be a significant 
undertaking.   
 
The Stigma Effect: Fear of Unknown Costs and Contamination 
 
Many developers balk at the fear of the unknown represented by potential contamination and the 
costs of its remediation. Decades of controversy over Superfund and cleanup of contaminated 
sites have fed a widespread perception that these projects carry massive hidden costs and risk.  
 
Frequently, brownfields are  not as polluted as they are perceived to be, but the inability to 
quantify that pollution adds another element of risk to the development process.  Some buyers 
and landowners fear that if they do an assessment, a significant level of contamination will be 
discovered for which they can be held liable.  Or they fear they will agree to a cleanup, only to 
have the cost of that cleanup skyrocket as unanticipated contaminants are revealed.  Deep pocket 
owners, who want to avoid paying for cleanup, often prefer to simply sit on their properties, 
rather than determine the level of contamination. So long as the level of contamination is 
unknown,  the stigma of being a environmentally suspect property can not be applied, nor any 
associations with Superfund made.  Fear of having properties stigmatized in this fashion has 
sometimes led to resistance to state efforts to create lists of brownfields properties (nobody wants 
to be on “the list”), or to avoid the term brownfields entirely.  In Dallas, for instance, no site can 
be called a brownfields without the permission of the owner.  Owners who allow their sites to be 
classified as brownfields become eligible under the Dallas brownfields programs for certain 
types of assistance, but many owners have resisted the brownfields designation nonetheless. 
 
In North Birmingham, Alabama, extending Finley Avenue is very important to the long term 
viability of the North Birmingham Industrial Redevelopment Project. The project area is a 900 
acre site characterized by a combination of active industrial facilities, derelict and abandoned 
buildings, dilapidated housing and vacant space. The site is close to center of town, the 
Birmingham International Airport, and several interstate highways and rail lines.  A mixed use 
redevelopment is planned, consisting of light industrial, commercial, residential and open space. 
Originally, the site was believed to be highly contaminated, and this perception  prevented 
redevelopment efforts in the past.  The extension of Finley Avenue, a main thoroughfare that 
crosses part of the site, has long been delayed due to perceptions that the area was too polluted to 
redevelop.  
 
It has since been discovered that contamination at the site is far less than had been feared, and 
the city has developed plans to extend the road.  The city examined each parcel for possible 
contamination by performing a historic survey of the site’s prior uses.  The idea was to do a 
rough assessment of the entire site, and then go back and concentrate on the “hot spots.”  Early 
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assessments performed by the city indicated the site was far less contaminated than had 
originally been perceived.  “There was a certain degree of contamination, but there were no ‘fatal 
flaws’ at the site,” explained John Gemmill, formerly of the city’s Office of Economic 
Development. The most common contaminants at the site were heavy metals, arsenic, and 
petroleum products left over from the site’s industrial past.  Fortunately, no contamination was 
so severe as to require a major “dig and haul,”  and most contamination will be contained on site.  
Many areas of the site do not appear to be contaminated at all, although a full assessment of all 
900 acres has not been completed.  “The main environmental problem at the site is cleaning up 
its reputation,” said Gemmill.  
 
An Information Gap 
 
For even the most motivated buyer, seller, or developer, projects will not succeed if information 
regarding cleanup standards, the regulatory process, financing, and state and federal brownfields 
programs is not easily available. Smaller municipalities, community-based organizations and 
developers in particular, may have less experience with redevelopment projects. On a federal 
level, there is no centralized location where people can access information about federal 
brownfields financing and programs.  On the state level, many states have comprehensive 
Internet-based brownfields information, in terms of state regulations, requirements and 
financing.  But few states have adequate information about what is taking place at the local level.  
Many community based organizations working on brownfields have little knowledge of what 
other organizations are doing, and no systematic way of finding out.  Best practices and lessons 
learned at one site are not made available for the next site.   
 
 The town of Astoria, Oregon recently completed their first brownfields redevelopment project, 
and a large portion of the initial work was in learning what brownfields development in Oregon 
was all about.  Said Paul Benoit, the Community Development Director of Astoria, “just learning 
how the Department of Environmental Quality works took time—finding out who to call, who to 
talk to, where to find the information we needed.”  Easily accessed information is not always 
available to developers, property owners, and municipalities.   
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TWO: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF 
BROWNFIELDS 
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With formidable barriers to successful brownfields redevelopment barring progress, how do 
stakeholders overcome obstacles and unlock the chain of brownfields development?  Analysis of 
our case studies revealed the following factors as being essential assets for success: 
 
Municipal Support 
 
Case studies from the Northeast Midwest Institute’s Lessons from the Field24  cite the support of 
local government as critical to successful brownfields development, and our research yielded a 
similar conclusion. Municipal support is probably most significant in terms of the financing 
process, as local governments can leverage resources to fund development, as well as put the 
resources of local development, planning, and economic agencies to work on brownfields.  
Municipalities can offer tax incentives, implement GIS surveys,  work with state agencies 
regarding regulatory requirements, and perform a host of additional activities that facilitate 
redevelopment.   
 
Pittsburgh coordinates brownfields redevelopment through the city’s Urban Redevelopment 
Authority, as part of the mayor’s ambitious redevelopment agenda.  In Birmingham, the mayor 
has likewise committed the city to redeveloping the North Birmingham Industrial Area, and 
increasing the amount of available industrial land in Birmingham. In Trenton, NJ, the city has 
made a strong commitment to brownfields and urban renewal,  and provides financial resources 
and personnel through the Neighborhood Preservation Program.  In St. Paul, Minnesota,  the St. 
Paul Port Authority has a focused and entrepreneurial brownfields staff that sets the standard in 
terms of job creation. The St. Paul Port Authority requires that a full seventy percent of jobs 
created by redevelopment go to local residents. Clearly, having city government in the 
brownfields corner is a wise strategy.  But the ability of local government to effectively 
participate in brownfields projects is contingent upon developing the internal capacity to manage 
a brownfields projects, a capacity which does not always exist.  
  
Community Involvement 
 
“Active and substantive community involvement is critical to the success of a project,” stated 
many people interviewed for this report.  Varying degrees of emphasis was placed on the value 
of community outreach and participation, but nearly all agreed that redevelopment projects 
would experience a great deal of difficulty without community support.  One exception was a 
remediation firm VP who felt that brownfields should be considered strictly from an economic 
view, that EPA  and others have just further complicated the process by “dragging in” issues of 
community outreach and environmental justice.  However, it may be that to look at brownfields 
as strictly an economic issue is to not understand economic issues. 
 
Community involvement that begins at the early stages of the project minimizes later conflicts 
and misunderstandings between the local community and the developer. Decisions regarding 
cleanup standards, end use and project development must be made with the active involvement 
of the affected community.  At the end of the day, it is the local community that has to live with 
the project.  
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Even private sector redevelopment needs to invite the local community into the process, if only 
for the economic advantage it confers. Establishing a good working relationship helps build a 
well disposed pool of supporters, customers or tenants. Failure to do so can result in a shopping 
center no one wants to shop at, or housing that no one wants to live in, or commercial services no 
one wants or needs. 25  
 
The importance of community involvement has been accepted by many brownfields 
stakeholders.  EPA builds community outreach requirements into its grant and loan programs, 
and a large number of state VCPs also require varying degrees of public notification and 
community involvement.  Even private developers are starting to be more accepting of the need 
for community involvement, although some still feel it adds an extra layer of complexity to a 
process that is complex enough as it is. They raise the valid question of how much public input is 
appropriate in a private development deal, but are not blind to the advantages of having local 
residents on the side of  the project.    Not surprisingly, community development representatives 
were the strongest advocates for the need for decision making at the community level.  
“Communities must take ownership of the process,” stated one city planner.  A successful 
brownfields project marries economic issues with community development issues, and as such 
can play an important role in the overall process of urban revitalization.   
 
We found a number of effective strategies for community participation.  In the case of the 
Oregon Mill Site Conversion Project, the Rural Development Initiative (RDI) organized 
residents of each mill conversion project community into Local Action Committees (LAC), 
community-based redevelopment teams that meet regularly to discuss end use options and 
planning strategies.  LACs are comprised of  a wide range of stakeholders, including civic 
groups, government agencies, private sector companies, non-profit organizations, and 
environmental interests, who help to determine the best and highest use of the land.26  
 
LACs help balance the need for jobs, economic activity and quality of life issues such as 
pollution, traffic and noise.   They are formed in each project community, and throughout the 
process, mill owners go to the LAC for approval and consultation. “This project illustrates the 
importance of mobilizing local residents when reusing brownfields sites,” explained Hanan 
Bowman, Project Manager at the Rural Development Initiative. “The redevelopment plans are 
being shaped completely by each community, rather than being introduced by outside entities.  
The master plans for each site have incorporated the recommendations of the Local Action 
Committees.  Presenting a community that is organized, informed, and articulate will facilitate 
marketing of the sites to potential developers and companies.” 
 
According to Bowmen, many residents and local community groups are familiar with RDI and 
their work.  And they understood  the concept of LACs and advisory groups.  What local people 
did not always understand was the process of determining end use.  They questioned whether 
they had any say in what a mill owner could do with  private property, or whether they had the 
right to tell an owner what to do with his or her land.  RDI facilitated relationships between 
residents and mill owners and, as a result, two things happened: site owners learned that they 
need community support to redevelop their property, and the community learned it had a right to 
participate in end use decisions.   
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When the Circle F factory in Trenton, NJ first closed down, area residents were not too 
concerned.  They were not aware of possible contamination, and took little interest in the site.  
As time passed, the property became derelict and served as a hang-out for drug dealers and 
others.  Area residents wanted the site cleaned up, but did not know they had the power to do 
anything about it.  Residents barely knew each other.  As Barbara Grasso of the Circle F Civic 
Association put it, “We were just a bunch of people living on the same street.” 
 
In 1991, Doug Hughes, Director of the city’s Neighborhood Preservation Program, came to 
Circle F.  The Neighborhood Preservation Program targets areas in Trenton that have problems 
and lack organization.  Hughes’s job was to empower the Circle F neighborhood.   
He began by passing out a questionnaire to all residents asking for “all the things wrong with 
their houses,” (as one resident phrased it),  and developing a home maintenance and repair 
program.   “The residents thought he was crazy,” said John Grasso of the Civic Association. “We 
did not know who he was or what he wanted.  We had never heard of the Neighborhood 
Preservation Program.”  Hughes explained how the program worked, and helped area residents 
form the Circle F Civic Association. “You need to ask people what would serve them best, “ 
stated Hughes. “Local residents need a stake and ownership in the process.”  He helped them to 
articulate their wants and needs for the neighborhood. He taught residents how to present an 
issue to City Hall.  They started with neighborhood improvement projects such as new 
sidewalks, and new trees. Then they tackled the Circle F factory.  “Doug came to us and asked us 
what we wanted to do with the factory site,” explained John Grasso.   
 
Residents met to discuss possible end uses for the site.  They felt that there was not enough low 
income housing in Trenton.  However, they believed that senior citizens would fit best into their 
neighborhood.  They reached a consensus that the portion of the site owned by the City would be 
redeveloped into senior low income housing.  With help from Hughes, they prepared to meet 
with the City Planning Board to present their idea. “Part of the process is explaining to residents 
that they have as much right to be at the table as anyone else,” said Hughes.   Thirty residents 
attended the Planning Board meeting.  The Planning Board, after much discussion, accepted the 
idea of senior low income housing for the site.   
 
From that point on, the Civic Association was involved with every step of the process. They 
were kept abreast of assessment and remediation issues. After an extensive search for a 
neighborhood-friendly developer, the Civic Association selected Lutheran Social Ministries 
(LSM), a local company. Residents felt it was extremely important to have a developer that 
would not only develop the property, but manage it, as well. And they wanted local people who 
would be willing to make a long term commitment to their neighborhood.  “LSM was very open 
to residents,” stated Barbara Grasso.  The Civic Association selected a local architect who 
designed a  housing complex that would blend in with the neighborhood, and encourage 
interaction between the seniors and the residents.  The result is an attractive 70 unit housing 
complex, with a community center and a large front porch area on street level where the 
neighbors can meet and greet.   
 
Residents expressed concern regarding the industrial portion of the site and over the type of 
tenant that might move in.  In the end, the site was leased to Merlin Industries, a pool cover 
manufacturer.  The production process is clean and quiet and employs a number of people from 
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the local area.  Residents say they have had few or no problems or complaints with Merlin.  Both 
Merlin and LSM were conscientious about minimizing disruption and disturbance during 
redevelopment, and the lines of communication were always open.   
 
Residents talk of the tremendous improvement in the quality of life in the Circle F neighborhood, 
and praise the efforts of Doug Hughes, LSM and City Hall.  The project empowered them to 
change their neighborhood for the better.   
 
In Minneapolis, MN, residents of neighborhoods near the Quarry Retail site long worked to bring 
a large supermarket to their area.  When early redevelopment proposals for the site were 
presented by the city, local residents sent city planners back to the drawing board.  A Retail Task 
Force was formed by the local community, and they worked with the city and the developer to 
come up with a redevelopment plan that enjoyed broad support.  A strong public/private 
partnership was forged between residents, the developer and the city, with the local community 
involved in every step of the project.   
 
Examples of this nature are numerous, and make it clear that involving the local community in 
redevelopment  is frequently an important component of successful projects. 
 
Partnerships 
 
Community participation, private sector cooperation and the support of  local government are 
important factors in and of themselves.  But projects that combine all these elements as part of a 
cooperative effort have the greatest chance of success.  Strong partnerships among local 
government, local communities, non-profits, and the private sector boost the rate of success, for a 
number of reasons.  A greater number of financial and technical resources can be accessed 
through a joint effort between public and private entities. Task management becomes easier, as 
each partner can assume different  responsibilities and concentrate on separate issues. Most 
importantly, conflicts over end use, cleanup or design, can be addressed far more easily when 
stakeholders have developed a cooperative relationship to achieve a common vision for the site.  
Many successful brownfields projects happen within the context of a strong partnership between 
the aforementioned stakeholders, including the ten case studies outlined in this report.  
Particularly for sites too marginal to be developed exclusively by the private sector, strong 
public/private partnerships are the defining factor of  successful brownfields redevelopment.      
 
Public/private partnerships are also important to workforce development.  As previously 
discussed, redevelopment creates job opportunities.  Working with the private sector and local 
government, community-based organizations can identify the types of jobs the project will create 
(remediation, construction, commercial, retail, etc.) and the skills needed to fill those jobs.  
Community-based organizations then can  develop job training strategies and work with project 
partners to match local residents to employment opportunities and obtain hiring  commitments 
for local residents as part of the redevelopment package.27 
 
The participation of non-profits is increasingly common on brownfields redevelopment.  Indeed, 
the role of the non-profit intermediary in the brownfields redevelopment process deserves special 
consideration.  Many demands of the brownfields market have not been met by the government 
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or private sector, and organizations such as  The Clean Land Fund, the California Center for 
Land Recycling, and the Consumers Renaissance Development Corporation (to name a few) 
have stepped in to occupy niches left vacant by other stakeholders.   
 
These programs provide technical assistance, financing, risk management, information, and 
advocacy and a host of related services to the owners and developers of contaminated property.  
“With a diverse set of tools and approaches, these groups are working with public and private 
sector partners to facilitate the brownfields process.”28  The advantages of a brownfields non-
profit intermediary, as outlined by Clean Sites and the Phoenix Land Recycling Company, are 
numerous, including:29 
 
• Projects are not driven by the need to maximize a profit margin, enabling non-   
 profits to consider sites the market might avoid. 
• Non profits are eligible for public and private grant funds to help finance activities. 
• As a public charity, nonprofits can develop a social policy  agenda and emphasize 
community development in their programs. 
• Nonprofits are more flexible than government agencies, making them better able to 
respond to the needs of the market. 
• The ability of nonprofits to buy options and own property provides a mechanism for 
communities to control reuse in ways zoning cannot, which can help balance the public 
and private needs at a site. 
 
Clearly, the positive impact nonprofits can have on brownfields redevelopment is considerable 
and strategies to build nonprofit capacity require further consideration.   
 
In Oregon, the Rural Development Initiative (RDI) works with its other partners in the Oregon 
Mill Sites Conversion Project to redevelop old timber mill sites. RDI serves an important role as 
both a financial and development intermediary for each site.  By securing federal and private 
dollars, RDI assists mill owners with the task of financing the up front costs of assessment and 
wetlands delineation.  By coordinating the assessment process, RDI is able to reassure mill 
owners concerned about liability for contamination.  By coordinating community participation 
and input, RDI helps the communities articulate the best end use for their site. 
 
In California, two non-profit organizations, local residents and the city of San Diego together are 
coordinating efforts to remove and redevelop the chemical plating and manufacturing facilities 
that infest the Barrio Logan neighborhood. “For years the community has tried to get the city to 
remove the polluting businesses from the area, especially the plating shops,” stated John Lemmo 
of the Environmental Health Coalition.  
   
The Environmental Health Coalition (EHC) and the Metropolitan Area Advisory Council 
(MAAC) are working with local residents to create a safer, more livable community.  EHC is a 
community based organization—founded in 1980 to  provide technical and organizing assistance 
to populations adversely affected by toxic chemical—that has worked in the Barrio for years, and 
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most residents are members or supporters. MAAC is a local developer that in 1994 built the 
Mercado Apartments, the first new housing in the Barrio in decades. The city will be responsible 
for assessing, remediating, and clearing the property.  MAAC will act as the developer. EHC is 
responsible for community outreach and participation. 
 
From the beginning, EHC and MAAC held public forums to determine how the community 
wanted brownfields properties redeveloped. These meetings revealed that new affordable 
housing was the most pressing need in the community. To maintain community participation and 
input, EHC has assigned five community organizers to the area.  Each organizer is assigned fifty 
families, and is responsible for keeping them informed about what is going on.  The goal of EHC 
is to rectify the incompatible land use problem that plagues the area and bring zoning in line with 
the economic, health and social needs of the community. “EHC and the community are now 
using the brownfields issue to relocate the plating shops and redevelop the area for residential or 
commercial use.” said Lemmo.   
 
EHC has worked with MAAC Project for many years.  MAAC is serving as developer for this 
project, and will be responsible for building the housing units. MAAC is a familiar and well-
liked face in the neighborhood, responsible for building the successful and well administered 
Mercado Apartments.  At each facility they build, MAAC assigns a Resident Services 
Coordinator who is responsible for coordinating programs such as day care and job training with 
residents.  In addition, MAAC provides child care at each of their projects.   Because of their 
previous work in the Barrio, they are on good terms with the community.  And despite a 
language barrier and a history of being ignored by the city, the residents of Barrio Logan  are not 
a passive group.  They are highly empowered and motivated, and are full partners in the 
brownfields process. 
 
Location, Location, Location…(Again) 
 
Just as poor location, crumbling or obsolete infrastructure, limited access to transportation routes 
and unsafe neighborhoods are real estate issues which serve as a barrier to brownfields 
redevelopment, the right real estate issues can aid immeasurably to project success.  A well 
located site, with access to major transportation routes and other necessary amenities enjoys a 
greater likelihood of successful development, for  reasons which are not hard to understand.   
 
In Birmingham, Alabama, the redevelopment of the North Birmingham Industrial Project was 
predicated, to a large degree, on the site’s excellent location. The site is close to center of town, 
the Birmingham International Airport, and several interstate highways and rail lines. Trucking 
routes from all over the state converge at this site, and many of the new businesses planned for 
the site will serve the trucking industry. “The site is right where it needs to be,” said Annie 
Davis, a local resident and volunteer on several community-based organizations.  “All we have 
to do is get it cleaned up and ready to go.” 
 
The Quarry Retail site in Minneapolis, MN was targeted for redevelopment primarily because it 
was well located with access to major transportation routes. Despite the fact that the site was 
contaminated, and presented definite redevelopment challenge, its excellent location convinced 
city officials and the developer that the site’s advantages outweighed its disadvantages.  In 
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Birmingham, the North Birmingham Industrial Development Project is ideally suited adjacent to  
several major highways and minutes away from the Birmingham International Airport.  Truck 
access is especially important for this area, as much of the redevelopment will center around 
distribution and manufacturing.  Location of the site is extremely important to the long range 
success of the redevelopment effort. 
 
EPA Support 
 
Ground zero for brownfields activity is the EPA, led by its Brownfields Economic 
Redevelopment Initiative.  The Initiative, as stated by the EPA, “is designed to empower states, 
communities, and other stakeholders in economic redevelopment to work together in a timely 
manner to prevent, assess, safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields.”30   To achieve 
that objective, EPA has launched a sizable effort that approaches brownfields redevelopment on 
several fronts, including liability and cleanup issues, financing, job development and training, 
community development and participation, environmental justice, and sustainable 
development.31 The first, and the most well-known initiative, is the Brownfields Assessment 
Demonstration Pilots.   
 
Since 1995, EPA has designated approximately 230 cities, towns, counties, and tribes as 
Brownfields Assessment Demonstration Pilots (Pilots). Pilot program participants receive up to 
$200,000 each for a two year period to fund brownfields redevelopment.  Pilots are awarded on 
both a national and regional basis, with National Pilots selected through a competitive 
application process, and Regional Pilots picked by the EPA Regions which use their own 
selection criteria.32  (Privately held sites are not eligible for the pilot program). EPA specifies a 
set of activities on which pilot grants can, and cannot, be spent.   In general, pilot money can be 
used to fund preliminary redevelopment activities, such as site assessments, program 
development, community outreach, and planning.  Funds can not be used for actual cleanup 
activities such as site remediation or demolition.  Pilot funds can be applied to redevelop a single 
property, or start a citywide brownfields program. 33   
 
The pilot program is arguably the most effective EPA initiative to spur brownfields 
redevelopment. Many people interviewed for this report cited EPA pilot grants as the impetus for 
developing a particular site or initiating a brownfields program. In more than one instance, EPA 
involvement was deemed “crucial” to the success of brownfields efforts. In addition, the media 
often played up the awarding of pilot grants, raising the program’s visibility.  In response, EPA 
has continued to expand the pilot program. EPA expects to award up to100 Assessment Pilot 
grants during fiscal year 1999.34  EPA pilot grant funds have been important to several of the 
case study projects examined in this report, including Bridgeport, San Diego, Dallas, Salt Lake 
City, Trenton, Chattanooga, Birmingham, and Oregon.   
 
In addition to funding brownfields pilots, EPA continues to work on clarifying liability issues for 
lenders, property owners, and prospective purchasers.  The intent is to increase the number of 
people willing to invest in brownfields.35 
 
Recognizing the powerful job creating potential of brownfields redevelopment, EPA recently 
awarded eleven cities with Brownfields Job Training and Development Demonstration Pilots.  
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The intent of EPA’s workforce development program is to provide local residents with the 
training they need to fill job opportunities created by brownfields redevelopment. Each city will 
receive  funds up to $200,000 over two years, to be used to develop job training programs for 
affected residents. Eligible applicants include colleges, universities, nonprofit training centers, 
community job training organizations, states, cities, towns, counties, U.S. Territories, and 
Federally recognized Indian Tribes, and must be located within or near one of the 230 
brownfields assessment pilot communities. According to EPA, the goals of the pilots are “to 
facilitate cleanup of brownfields sites contaminated with hazardous substances and prepare 
trainees for employment in the environmental field, including training in alternative or 
innovative treatment technologies.”36   
 
EPA works to form partnerships with states, tribes, municipalities, and other federal agencies to 
encourage a broad spectrum of brownfields activity. EPA has assisted several states with 
developing Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCP).  VCPs establish a set of rules and regulations 
governing the cleanup of  brownfields properties, and generally contain mechanisms to address 
issues of liability and legal responsibility. Rules vary from state to state, as do the types of 
funding, technical assistance and liability relief. The majority of states have established programs 
to encourage brownfields redevelopment. 
 
EPA has also joined with the Clinton Administration in an initiative called the Brownfields 
National Partnership Action Agenda.  This initiative is designed to encourage brownfields 
redevelopment by building partnerships among federal agencies, community development 
organizations and the private sector. As part of that effort, EPA and the Clinton Administration 
have designated 16 cities Brownfields Showcase Communities.  These communities, among 
them Trenton, Dallas, Chattanooga and Salt Lake City,  will have access to additional federal 
resources and funds, and “provide a pattern for future interagency cooperative efforts in 
addressing environmental and economic issues.”37   
 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
 
According to EPA, more than thirty-five states now have voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) 
under which private parties that voluntarily agree to clean up a contaminated site are offered 
some protection from future state enforcement action at the site, often in the form of a "no 
further action" letter or "certificate of completion" from the State.38 “The level of certainty state 
VCPs bring to the process has been critical” declared one respondent.   EPA does note, however, 
that State law does not supersede EPA’s authority under CERCLA.  To establish a VCP, a state 
will negotiate a Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOAs) with its regional EPA, 
specifying which sites will be covered and what liability protection will be offered.39   Those 
states without VCPs have, for the most part, instituted similar brownfields programs.  Some 
states have gone further and developed financial assistance programs, and  incentives to 
encourage the private sector to invest in brownfields.40 As a result, state activity on brownfields 
has increased over the past several years.  A study conducted by the Association of State and 
Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO) compared state activity from the 
years 1980-1992 to activity from the years 1993-1997.  They found that states have completed on 
average almost twice as many removals (removal of contaminants), and completed seven times 
as many sites during 1993-1997 than in the previous twelve year period.  In addition, states have 
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identified and are working on three times as many contaminated sites now than during the 
previous twelve year period. The report surmises that “the large increase in completions can be 
attributed to the growth of state programs, the advent of state Voluntary Cleanup Programs, and 
the development of state cleanup standards (i.e., clearly defined “endpoints”).41 
 
State Highlights 
 
In New Jersey, brownfields sites are found in over 150 cities including Newark, Camden, and 
Trenton.42 The state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has launched major 
programs to encourage smart development of contaminated industrial sites.  The Industrial Site 
Recovery Act (ISRA), as amended in 1996, provides for a cleanup program that includes:43  
 
• offering low-interest loans for cleanup to private parties, including responsible parties and 
developers;  
 
• providing flexibility for private parties to remediate sites on a schedule outlined in a non-
binding Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the state;  
 
• setting risk-based cleanup standards based on planned end use;  
 
• allowing engineering and institutional controls in place of permanent remedies, in some 
cases;  
 
• providing finality in the form of no further action letters.  
 
In addition, ISRA streamlined the site remediation regulatory process, resulting in the submittal 
of over 550 applications in the program’s first month.  It currently receives about thirty 
applications per month, and the agency is overseeing cleanups at thousands of contaminated 
sites.44  
 
New legislation signed in January, 1998, by Governor Christie Whitman boosted state 
brownfields activity by offering developers “protection from liability for third party claims if 
they did not cause the past contamination and they have cleaned up the site in accordance with 
DEP regulations.”45  Further, the Brownfields and Contaminated Site Remediation Act created a 
fund to reimburse developers for up to seventy-five percent of their redevelopment costs.46 The 
Act also allows municipalities to grant local property tax exemptions.47   
 
With these incentives in place, redevelopment costs in NJ are approaching the traditionally low 
cost of greenfields development.48  The state is overseeing cleanup at over 6500 sites, and under 
the Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund has issued $20 million in low-interest loans  
and grants to municipalities.49 Grants may be used for assessments and investigations, while 
loans are designated for remediation.  Municipalities, businesses and individuals  are all eligible 
for Fund money, provided they are not receiving similar funds from another source.50  Although 
the rate of successful redevelopment varies from city to city (Elizabeth is notable for its success; 
Camden still struggles to get the process on track), overall New Jersey’s brownfields 
development is gaining momentum and is well-positioned for the future. 
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Brownfields redevelopment in Pennsylvania is coordinated through the Pennsylvania Land 
Recycling Program, created in 1995 by three separate pieces of legislation: Act 2 is the Land 
Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act; Act 3, the Economic Development 
Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability Protection Act; and Act 4, the Industrial 
Sites Environmental Assessment Act.51 The Land Recycling Program identifies risk-based 
standards for cleanup, simplifies the approval process, and limits future liability when cleanup 
standards are achieved.  
 
In fact, the Act gives a full statutory release of liability to anyone who meets one of the three 
cleanup standards. The standards are outlined in Act 2,  and include 1.) Background: Restores a 
site to its condition before the contamination occurred; 2.)  Statewide Health: Regulations  
developed to establish statewide health standards for containment for each environmental 
medium; and, 3.) Site-Specific: This approach is a more detailed process that involves 
developing a risk assessment based on the conditions and human exposures at the site.52 
 
The Land Recycling Program also provides several financing options to developers of 
contaminated properties.  According to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP), Act 2 establishes the Industrial Sites Cleanup Fund. This $15 million fund is 
designed to help innocent people (those who did not cause the pollution) conduct voluntary 
cleanups;  grants or low-interest loans are provided to cover up to seventy-five percent of the 
cost of completing an environmental study and implementing a cleanup plan.53  Act 4 establishes 
the Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Fund, a  fund that  allows the Department of 
Commerce to make grants to municipalities, municipal or local authorities, nonprofit economic 
development agencies, and similar agencies. The grants are to finance environmental 
assessments of industrial sites located in municipalities that have been designated as distressed 
communities by the Department of Commerce. Certain cities are eligible for grants to conduct 
environmental assessments and remediation activities. Up to $2 million will be provided 
annually to the fund from the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Fund.54 
 
In addition to clarifying cleanup standards and providing financing, the PA Land Recycling 
Program has incorporated other elements that contribute to the success of the program.  A strong 
community outreach component has been developed, with strict “plain language” public 
notification requirements of site cleanup standards and remediation.  To make DEP more 
responsive to applicants, the Land Recycling Act establishes a firm timeline within which that 
application must reviewed.  If DEP fails to review the application within sixty days, it is deemed 
approved and a release of liability is granted.  Setting quick turn-around time on an approval 
speeds up the redevelopment process and builds good customer relations between applicants and 
DEP.  It emphasizes the fact that the state looks upon redevelopment as a priority, and is willing 
to work with the brownfields stakeholder to get the job done, an important factor in the 
development and success of the Land Recycling Program.  The success of the program can be 
measured by the number of cleanups that occur.  As of September 1998, according to the 
Northeast Midwest Institute,  343 cleanups were done on 313 properties; 618 Notices of Intent to 
Remediate (NIR) were filed for 517 properties; cleanups have occurred in sixty of sixty-seven 
counties; and 15,000 jobs have been created.55 
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A review of each state’s VCP, or an analysis of VCP issues, problems and benefits, is beyond the 
scope of this report.  For the most comprehensive outline of  state brownfields programs, see The 
Matrix of Brownfields Programs By State, compiled by Charles Bartsch and the Northeast 
Midwest Institute (NEMW).  For an analysis of the economic impact of brownfields programs at 
the state level, see NEMW’s  Brownfields Program Impacts:  Reuse Benefits, State by State.56   
 
Risk-Based Corrective Action 
 
Another aspect of the state VCPs that has been important to the success of brownfields is the 
adoption of Risk Based Corrective Action (RBCA), which allows developers to tailor cleanup 
standards to reflect the end use of property.  Previously, all sites had to be remediated according 
to health-based, or residential, standards.  This level of cleanup had to be attained, even if the site 
was being redeveloped for industrial use, or the contaminants could be safely capped.  Not 
surprisingly, the cost of cleaning up sites to this standard far exceeds clean-up costs for 
industrial, commercial, and business uses.   
 
Parties seeking to redevelop a site for non-residential purposes were reluctant to pay the extra 
cost of a residential cleanup.  The use of RBCA has lowered the cost of numerous economically 
unfeasible projects, by reducing the cost and time of remediation. For example, the Quarry Retail 
Project in Minneapolis saved approximately $8 million in cleanup costs by capping certain 
contaminants instead of excavating them.   
 
In 1995, Oregon cleanup laws were changed to allow for the use of risk-based cleanup standards, 
enabling mill owners to tailor cleanup to match end use.  Remediation varied with the amount of 
contamination. Oregon also has a Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP), and sites in the 
Conversion Project have the option of participating in this program.  For many sites, 
contamination was so minor and did not require participation in the VCP.  In Astoria, the 
assessment revealed a high level of contamination.  In an effort to access greater resources for 
the property, the city encouraged the mill cooperative to enroll in the state VCP.  The mill 
cooperative paid the  Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) the requisite $5000 
to participate.  In return, DEQ reviewed and analyzed all existing information on the site, 
including the Phase I assessment.  From this, DEQ put together a briefing report about what site 
conditions and what issues would need to be addressed to remediate and redevelop the site.  “The 
city did not have the resources to bring in a lot of expertise or visibility to the site,” stated Paul 
Benoit, Astoria Community Development Director. “The city was just winging it.  That’s why 
we helped get the site into the VCP.” 
 
DEQ’s  Phase I and Phase II Environmental Assessments at the Astoria site revealed soil 
contamination resulting from previous plywood mill operations. The major contamination source 
was total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), and was concentrated in the area where the processing 
building had been.  Fortunately, no significant groundwater contamination was detected. 
According to the city of Astoria  “DEQ's removal assessment and removal action field 
investigation of the Mill Site included excavating twenty-seven test pits, installing nine 
groundwater sumps, groundwater sampling, light nonaqueous phase liquid (LNAPL) 
measurement, and surface water and sediment sampling from the log pond.”57  
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Due to the hazardous nature of the contamination, DEQ decided that removing the contaminants 
through soil removal and on-site treatment and recovery was the proper remedy. The remediation 
was completed in October 1996.  A developer expressed interest in the site and, together with the 
city, sought protection from future liability at the property.  To that end, the developer entered a 
Prospective Purchase Agreement (PPA) with DEQ.   According to Oregon State law, “the PPA 
limits the extent of liability of the prospective purchaser for the costs of environmental 
contamination cleanup and functions to insulate the owner and its successors from liability 
arising from contamination of the site in the past. A PPA also stipulates cost sharing and 
recovery provisions, on-going requirements for testing and access by DEQ, and mandates the 
involvement of DEQ in redevelopment planning activities, but not the actual redevelopment of 
the property.”58 The protection this agreement offers increases the “comfort level” of the 
developer significantly. 
 
However, some have raised red flags that RBCA may compromise the health and well being of 
communities in the interests of economic development, particularly low income and minority 
communities.  Some stakeholders fear that cleanup standards are being relaxed inappropriately in 
order to move projects forward. The issue of tracking institutional controls over capped 
contaminants is also a concern, and stakeholders are worried that EPA and others are not doing 
enough to track and safeguard end use requirements (that is, ensure that thirty years down the 
road, a site that was cleaned to industrial standards is not turned into a housing complex).  This is 
a real concern.  The promise of brownfields redevelopment will mean little if projects jeopardize 
the health and safety of  local residents.  
 
Early and active community outreach efforts are important in convincing the affected community 
that the containment and/or remediation being carried out within their neighborhoods is not a 
threat to health and safety. In addition, strong institutional controls over end use must be put in 
place at any site where pollutants have been contained or capped. Developing strict, effective 
institutional controls and strong enforcement mechanisms is absolutely crucial.  Institutional 
controls should be monitored by the local community and city governments, as opposed to the 
developer or buyer.  Also, as RBCA standards are applied to site cleanups, more rigorous 
assessments should be required; if contaminants are going to be left behind, the community has 
the right to know what is there. 
 
Project Managers/Advocates 
 
Lastly, many people suggested that the power of a strong project manager cannot be 
underestimated in moving a project forward.  Sometimes it takes one person, or group of 
persons, who are willing to jump through the regulatory hoops, fill out the grant and loan 
applications, ferret out innovative sources of financing, interface with the local community, and 
rally support from all quarters necessary to project redevelopment. Project managers can  work 
to ensure that the jobs created by redevelopment are quality jobs and that many of those jobs are 
earmarked for affected residents.  Project managers can coordinate job training activities to 
complement the jobs created at all phases of redevelopment.  A well motivated, well organized 
individual is “a brownfields’ best friend,” and the ideal brownfields advocate is one who is 
committed to the project both economically and ethically, with a continuing stake in the local 
community.   
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Even with all these elements in place, brownfields redevelopment will fail if adequate funding is 
not available.  Fortunately, a number of options exist, including state and federal programs and 
private sources. 
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THREE: THE MAZE OF BROWNFIELDS 
FINANCING  
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BROWNFIELDS AT WORK:  SITE STUDIES AND LESSONS 
 
Throughout the 20th century, heavy industry dominated the city of Birmingham, Alabama.  Iron, 
steel, and coal plants occupied much of the North Birmingham area, employing thousands of 
people and creating neighborhoods and mill towns throughout the area. 
 
In the 1950s, the heavy industry heyday of Birmingham ended, as foundries reorganized or 
closed and the heavy industrial base of the city eroded.  The surrounding mill towns—and their 
residents—experienced a similar decline.  Unemployment rose as hundreds of jobs disappeared, 
and the neighborhoods were littered with moribund factories, dilapidated housing and vacant 
lots.   
 
In 1992, the city of Birmingham conducted a survey of all its industrial property located in the 
state Economic Zone (EZ).  The city’s Office of Economic Development (OED) identified 
twelve areas for redevelopment, including the North Birmingham industrial area. 
 
To determine its redevelopment options, OED assessed the North Birmingham site. The city 
examined each parcel for possible contamination by performing a historic survey of the site’s 
prior uses.  The idea was to do a rough assessment of the entire site, and then go back and 
concentrate on the “hot spots.”  Early assessments performed by the city indicated the site was 
far less contaminated than had originally been perceived.  “There was a certain degree of 
contamination, but there were no ‘fatal flaws’ at the site,” explained John Gemmill, formerly of 
the OED. The most common contaminants at the site were heavy metals, arsenic, and petroleum 
products left over from the site’s industrial past.  Fortunately, no contamination was so severe as 
to require a major “dig and haul,”  and most contamination will be contained on site.  Many areas 
of the site do not appear to be contaminated at all, although a full assessment of all 900 acres has 
not been completed.  “The main environmental problem at the site is cleaning up its reputation,” 
said Gemmill.59  
 
The North Birmingham Industrial Site has much to recommend it, as well as some extremely 
imposing barriers to overcome.  In its favor, the 900 acre site is located close to the center of 
town, close to the Birmingham International Airport and several interstate highways and rail 
lines.  The area is the epicenter of trucking routes throughout Alabama and other parts of the 
South. As a result, the site is ideally located to support trucking and distribution industries and 
related services, in addition to other industrial and commercial use.  
 
The barriers to redevelopment are formidable. The first major stumbling block was the 
perception that the site was highly contaminated and therefore undevelopable.  The extension of 
Finley Avenue, a main thoroughfare that crosses part of the site, was long delayed due to the 
perceptions that the area was too developed to redevelop.   In addition, a large portion of the site 
lacks roads and other infrastructure.  The site is traversed by several active rail lines, presenting 
rail right-of-way issues and potential traffic problems due to numerous rail crossings. 
 
The site is divided into hundreds of parcels owned by hundreds of people.  Coordinating 
acquisition and land assembly will be a challenge throughout the life of the project. In several 
neighborhoods surrounding the site, the housing is in very poor condition, and some residents 
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will be relocated to other parts of the city to make room for redevelopment projects.  Relocating 
residents is always a delicate and difficult process.  The site also has a high crime rate, 
worrisome to potential business owners and investors.   
 
Finally, the site is located in a low income area, even to the point of severe economic distress in 
some neighborhoods.  A major financial commitment would be needed to redevelop the area, 
improve housing conditions, relocate some residents, clear properties, build and improve roads 
and other infrastructure, and remediate contamination.  Securing adequate financing from a 
number of sources would prove to be a challenge.  
 
The local consulting firm of Cecil Jones & Associates was hired to develop a site Master Plan 
and conduct a marketing survey. At the same time, the  city and the community councils 
organized a series of stakeholder meetings to come up with ideas about what the community 
wanted and expected for the site.  Each time the city submitted a plan or idea to the community, 
they would work together to reach consensus.  “The city knew the project has to come from the 
community,” stated Annie Davis of the North Birmingham community.   
 
In order to assess the housing needs of local residents, the Greater Birmingham Ministries 
(GBM) conducted a door-to-door survey of 141 North Birmingham residents.  According to 
GBM, residents cited churches, library, grocery stores and public transportation as the most 
positive aspects of their community.  Residents identified drugs, crime and overall quality of life 
as the most negative features of the area.60 
 
The initial survey of the city’s industrial properties was financed by a grant from the Economic 
Development Agency (EDA).  A second EDA grant of $50,000 financed the assessment of six 
industrial properties, including the North Birmingham site.  A third EDA grant of $185,000  
financed the planning process, including the Master Plan and the marketing survey. 
 
 In 1995, a public meeting was held at which the mayor officially launched the project. The 
Master Plan specifies the type of redevelopment that will take place in stages over the course of 
several years:  Distribution Center (Phase I), Business Park (Phase II), Retail Center (Phase III) 
and Central Industrial Park (Phase IV). 
 
In 1995, EPA awarded $200,00 to the city, one of the first brownfields pilot grants.  The pilot 
grant was used to establish the Birmingham Environmental Clearinghouse, a non-profit 
organization designed to address environmental issues and conduct community outreach and 
education. The Clearinghouse then established the North Birmingham Economic Revitalization 
Corporation (NBERC) to coordinate redevelopment at the site.  The board of NBERC is made up 
of local residents, bankers and business people and is responsible for making decisions on 
acquisition of property, the hiring of contractors and similar activities. It is one of a few 
community development corporations whose primary focus is industrial redevelopment.  
NBERC is also authorized to buy and sell property at the site, with funds raised from the sale of 
property used to finance the next purchase.  The Clearinghouse and NBERC work very closely 
together, with the Clearinghouse providing staff to NBERC when necessary. 
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The city of Birmingham had planned to use $500,000 in CDBG funds to acquire the first 25 acre 
parcel, but failed to get the application in on time.  Instead, NBERC worked with AmSouth 
Bank—a VP of which is on the NBERC Board—to provide $500,000 in financing to purchase 
the site.  NBERC has purchased additional parcels at the site, and will channel proceeds from 
future property sales to property acquisition.   
 
Remediation of the first twenty-five acre parcel was delayed due to inadequate funding.  The city 
had not been able to provide or coordinate the funding for cleanup at the site. Eventually, 
remediation was paid for by an outside company that was settling a fine with EPA, through a 
system that allows fine money to be used on unrelated cleanup activities.    From this transaction, 
$225,000 was made available for site remediation.  For future cleanups, money will be provided 
by the city, and funds will be raised  through the sale of parcels in the site.  Overall, the city has 
spent over $2 million on assessment, remediation and relocation of residents. 
 
The focus of this project is job creation and the redevelopment is expected to create over 2000 
jobs.  It is understood that a large portion of those jobs should go to local residents, although this 
has not been specified in a written agreement. The project area is within a state EZ and there are 
tax benefits to hiring local residents. In addition, each potential tenant will have a meeting with 
NBERC and local residents.  The company will have the opportunity to explain how many jobs 
they already have (if they are expanding) and how many will be created.   The Clearinghouse and 
NBERC  hope to set up job training and assistance for local residents as new industries move in.  
They intend to work with incoming businesses to ascertain what type of employees and skills the 
company will be looking for, so that local people can be trained and ready for hire by the time 
the company moves in.  
 
As of April, 1997, three new companies have located in the project area. KMAC, a company that 
sells industrial  byproducts, invested $300,000 of its own money in locating to the project zone; 
$150,000 of this amount went toward environmental assessments. Kenworth of Birmingham 
located on a ten-acre plot, investing $6 million of its own money.  Tire Engineering invested a 
total of $1 million to  redevelop a five-acre property.61 The first three companies to locate on the 
site have created approximately 200 jobs. 
 
In 1997, EPA awarded the Clearinghouse with a $100,000 Environmental Justice Grant. .  
According to the Clearinghouse’s Winter 1998 newsletter, the grant will be used to “empower 
communities along Village Creek to address and develop workable solutions to some of the 
problems plaguing Village Creek.”62 
 
Even prior to this project, Birmingham was recognized for its citizen activism.  The Citizen 
Participation Program was established by the city over twenty-five years ago.  The city is divided 
into ninety-nine neighborhoods, and neighborhoods are grouped together to form communities.  
Each neighborhood elects a Neighborhood Council, with an officer, president, vice president and 
secretary.  In addition, approximately twenty-three neighborhood representatives are selected to 
serve as community officers.  Elections are held every two years, and service is strictly 
volunteer.  The community officers meet monthly at City Hall.  Neighborhood councils also 
meet monthly.  Each group prioritizes the  needs of their neighborhood or community and then 
works with the city to try to get those  needs satisfied.  Neighborhood Boards  receive 
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approximately $4000/year to fund their activities.   Neighborhood councils help city government 
and the mayor to gauge public opinion and try to resolve problems throughout the city.   
 
The community is very excited about the redevelopment of site. Local residents had been told the 
area was going to be redeveloped before and nothing happened.  Even in this instance they were 
skeptical, until the EPA grant arrived and the Clearinghouse was established.  From the very 
beginning, people have been aware of every step of the project, and the Clearinghouse and local 
councils have worked to ensure there are no surprises for area resident.  Meetings and education 
forums are held on a regular basis, including a yearly education program in North Birmingham’s 
schools. “The Clearinghouse is here to empower the community and strengthen decision making 
at the local level,” said the Clearinghouse’s Howard Johnson.  “The biggest challenge lies in 
maintaining interest and participation in the project so people stay informed and involved.”  
   
The most contentious issue the community has had to address has been the relocation of  people 
living on the site.  A number of residents have been unhappy with this.  Even though they are 
living in sub-standard housing,  some just do not want to move. The Clearinghouse and the local 
community are working with the city to ensure that relocation and compensation are fair, and 
most relocated residents have been satisfied with the process.  The Clearinghouse will work to 
make sure this process, and the redevelopment process overall, continues to go smoothly. “The 
redevelopment plan is very sound,” said Strother.  “The road can be rocky at times, but the 
process is working well.” 
 
“Community organizations bring tremendous value to a project, “explained Gemmill.  “They 
know the history, the prior use and the politics of an area. ”  The activism of the local 
community, the Birmingham culture of community participation, and the presence of community 
based organizations such as the Clearinghouse and the North Birmingham Economic 
Revitalization Corporation have come together to create a redevelopment process that is high 
quality and truly inclusive. From this effort, the local  community is building a better 
neighborhood, attracting thousands of employment opportunities and creating a cleaner and 
healthier environment.  
 
Redevelopment is proceeding at the site, with the first projects completed, and several more in 
the works.  A change in the business climate is also taking place. The area had been redlined by 
the business community as a bad investment, and the city needed to prove that the area was 
economically viable.  Since it has convinced two credible businesses to locate on the site, the 
local business community is taking a stronger interest in the area.  NBERC continues to work on 
getting the corporate community to support the process.  
 
In June 1999, the fourth new redevelopment, American Metals Products, was completed and 
open for business. Sixty people have been hired, many of which live in the local area.    The 
Kenworth of Alabama project, a ten acre parcel, is moving forward.  The site will be redeveloped 
into a new truck dealership and service shop.  NBERC has purchased most of  the property, 
except for a number of houses that will be demolished.  It took several meetings to have this 
project approved and to secure the money to relocate the displaced residents, and the 
neighborhood was very involved with the decisions regarding this property.   Construction is 
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scheduled to begin in the Fall 1999.  The Clearinghouse is essentially out of money, but is 
working with the city to secure more funds.  It is likely that the city will come through.   
 
Some conflicts remain to be resolved.  There is still concern regarding the relocation of residents, 
and the Clearinghouse and community leaders must ensure that  relocation continues to be 
handled in a fair and equitable manner.  In addition, there is a great deal of concern regarding 
upcoming mayoral elections.  The current major, who has been a strong supporter of the project, 
is stepping down after several terms in office.  The future of the project could be jeopardized if a 
less supportive administration takes office.  Elections will take place in November 1999.  
 
Finally, efforts must be made to keep the community interested and involved.  “The size of the 
site is sometimes overwhelming,” explained Davis.  “And we need to let people know that 
improvements to one area benefit everyone.” 
 
Despite huge barriers and daunting challenges, this project is working, benefiting local residents 
and the business community alike.  This success can be attributed to several characteristics of the 
North Birmingham project. First, the site is ideally located for industrial and manufacturing 
redevelopment.  It is close to several interstates, the city center, the airport and truck routes.  
“The site is right where it needs to be,” said Davis.  “All we have to do is get it cleaned up and 
ready to go.” 
 
Second, there is a high level of community participation.  The city of Birmingham has a tradition 
of community activism through its Citizen Participation Program.  Local residents in North 
Birmingham were already well organized and empowered when planning for the project began.  
They were very well positioned to take part in the process and make their voice heard.  The local 
community  took ownership of the project  from the beginning, and they have been included in 
every phase of planning and redevelopment.  Maintaining this high level of support and 
participation is crucial to the project.  “The community has to stay involved,” explained 
Gemmill.  “They are the guardians of quality.” 
 
Third, the Clearinghouse and NBERC provided crucial support.  The complexity of the 
brownfields process is such that the Citizen Participation system would have been insufficient in 
educating the community, addressing environmental issues, and participating in redevelopment.  
The role of these organizations can not be overstated. 
 
Fourth, the city supported the redevelopment process.  Not only supportive, but willing to 
commit significant financial and personnel resources to the project.  The current mayor has made 
the redevelopment of North Birmingham a high priority, and it is extremely important that the 
next administration does the same. 
 
Fifth, the city, the local residents formed a strong partnership.  The working relationship between 
the city and the local community has been one of the keys to the success of this project.  Through 
the Citizen Participation Program, the city and local communities have established clear, 
institutional lines of communication that are crucial to project success.  
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These elements combined to make the early redevelopment  a success.  If these elements remain 
in place and both the city and local residents maintain there strong commitment to the project, 
future redevelopment  will be equally successful. 
 
First Stop For Financing:  EPA 
 
For many projects EPA is the first stop stakeholders make in the search for funding, especially 
through the pilot program. But with over 425,000 brownfields sites in the country,  the 
approximately 250 EPA assessment pilot grant awards are just a drop in the bucket.   For those 
projects fortunate enough to receive pilot money, restrictions on the use of that money can be 
problematic.  Pilot dollars cannot be used for remediation or demolition, activities that often 
require early financing.  In addition, these grants are not available to privately owned sites, and it 
was suggested by a number of those interviewed that $200,000 is not enough money to fund the 
initial stages of project development. 
 
EPA funds other important aspects of brownfields redevelopment.63  Communities located within 
or near one of the 121 pre-1998 brownfields assessment pilots can also apply for a Brownfields 
Environmental Job Training and Development Pilot.  As of 1999, EPA had awarded twenty-one 
Job Training Pilots, funded up to $200,000 each over two years.  These pilots are targeted to 
communities with brownfields and are used for environmental employment and training, 
including training in treatment technologies, of local residents.64 
 
The Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF) provides financial support to state, 
local and tribal governments to help them create revolving loan funds that would provide low-
interest loans to public and private entities for site cleanups.  Any  site that had been formally 
assessed before October 1, 1995, to characterize the nature and extent of contamination could be 
eligible for a loan.  Stakeholders were enthusiastic about the loan program and in FY 97 EPA 
allocated $8.4 million to this program.65  In 1998, Congress eliminated funding for this program, 
despite being the  exact type of funding that stakeholders say is needed.  In FY99, funding for 
BCRLF has been restored.   
 
Congress appropriated $91 million in FY99 to EPA for the brownfields program. This includes 
$20 million to award up to 100 additional assessment pilots, $35 million to award up to sixty 
BCRLF pilots, $3 million for targeted brownfields assessment work, $10 million for states to 
support voluntary cleanup programs, and $5 million for job training and workforce 
development.66  
 
 In addition to EPA, a variety of other federal sources that can be tapped in support of 
brownfields projects. These programs take many forms—direct payments, grants, loans, credit 
enhancements, technical support, etc.—and offer additional resources that can and should be 
tapped as part of comprehensive efforts to redevelop brownfields.  
 
As federal programs, each is targeted to specific statutory goals.  Most are not targeted 
specifically for brownfields, meaning brownfields activities must compete for limited funds and 
follow federal rules, terms, and conditions.  Meeting these requirements and conditions often 
limits the flexibility of states and localities seeking to use the programs for particular projects.  
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Nevertheless, in an environment in which funding for brownfields redevelopment is scarce, 
redevelopers must explore the potential of federal programs.  EPA is trying to make this easier 
by identifying and publicizing programs throughout the federal government that  have the 
potential to fit into brownfields initiatives.  Further coordination is necessary.  Use of the 
following federal programs for brownfields redevelopment must be explored. 
 
 
I. Federal Resources  
 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) 
 
HUD programs play a critical role in local economic development and have great potential for 
use in brownfields.  Cities and towns use HUD resources to support a variety of financial 
assistance programs to help spur economic revitalization and growth.  These resources play an 
important role in state and local strategies to encourage renovation and reuse of older industrial 
facilities.  HUD has several assistance programs, including Community Development Block 
Grants, Section 108 Loan Guarantees and BEDI grants. 
 
Community Development Block Grants (“CDBG”) 
 
The CDBG program provides eligible metropolitan cities and urban counties and states with 
annual direct grants for use on behalf of neighborhood revitalization, expansion of affordable 
housing and economic opportunities, and improvement of community facilities and services.  
These activities are targeted for the benefit of low and moderate income families, the elimination 
of slums and blight, and/or the fulfillment of other urgent community development needs. 
 
HUD distributes approximately seventy percent of the block grants directly to approximately one 
thousand of the largest local governments in the country.67 The legislation gives broad flexibility 
to these localities.68   Traditionally, cities and urban counties have used CDBG funds primarily to 
create additional supplies of affordable housing, and by states primarily for creation of public 
facilities.  Increasingly, there has been a trend toward use of the funds to promote business and 
job opportunities for low- and moderate-income families and neighborhoods. 
 
There has also been a recent trend among some communities toward use of CDBG grants for 
brownfields development.69 This trend has been accelerated by changes to the CDBG program 
that have increased its flexibility at the local level and made it more suitable for projects that 
involve environmental problems and site reuse activities.70  According to the revisions made by 
in the law by HUD,  proving the occurrence of “economic disinvestment” due to environmental 
contamination qualifies an area for designation as “blighted,” making it eligible for CDBG 
assistance.  HUD also significantly eased documentation requirements that made it difficult for 
localities to show that a project assists low and moderate income people.  Finally, HUD 
determined that eligible expenses include both the costs of environmental reviews and the costs 
of actual cleanup of hazards. 
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Given the new flexibility in CDBG, the amount of funding available, and the relative autonomy 
of localities in using allocated funds, the CDBG program appears ideal for use in brownfields 
projects.  Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions, even the significant allocations provided by the 
program have been insufficient to keep up with demand.71  Many ongoing projects, such as local 
development and community service organizations, have received allocations for years, making 
it difficult for new programs, such as brownfields redevelopment projects, to break in without a 
fight.  As a result, many brownfields project managers have been frustrated in their attempts to 
obtain HUD monies.  Several brownfields stakeholders interviewed for this report indicated that 
waiting times for approval of HUD applications is lengthy  and that it is often not worth the 
trouble.  In one case, HUD  approved funds for a city, but took more than 6 months to release 
them, delaying a project considerably. 
 
In order to further accelerate the direction of CDBG funds toward brownfields projects, some  
combination of the following will have to occur:  (1) persuasion of local officials to place greater 
emphasis upon brownfields projects; (2) appropriation of additional CDBG funds; (3) federal 
designation of a subset of CDBG funds for brownfields purposes (see BEDI below); (4) 
imposition of limits on the number of years a project or program may consecutively receive 
CDBG funds, to ensure some turnover. 
  
 Section 108 Loan Guarantees 
 
Many redevelopment projects are too large to be financed by a single year’s grant from the 
CDBG program.  Section 108 enables states and local governments participating in the CDBG 
program to borrow against future CDBG funds and obtain federally guaranteed loans large 
enough to pursue such projects. 
 
Section 108 permits eligible localities—CDBG entitlement communities (principally larger 
cities) and, more recently, non-CDBG entitlement communities (smaller cities) that are 
sponsored by their state—to issue debentures. To do so, they must pledge their annual CDBG 
funds (or, in the case of small cities, their state’s) as collateral.  The debentures are underwritten 
and sold through public offering by a consortium of private investment banking firms assembled 
by HUD.  HUD guarantees each obligation, providing the full faith and credit of the US 
Government.  As a result of this guarantee, private creditors receive sufficient security to provide 
localities with very low interest rates, comparable to those that the US Government receives 
when borrowing through the US Treasury.  The localities may then use their annual CDBG 
allocations, as well as any income generated by the financed project, to pay off their obligation 
 
Section 108 loans are subject to some limitations. HUD will not guaranty a loan amount that is 
more than five times the community’s (or state’s) most recent CDBG allocation. The maximum 
loan term is twenty years, and, with limited exceptions, the loan must be secured by more than 
CDBG funds alone.  
 
Permitted uses of the proceeds of Section 108 loans are also limited.  All use must fulfill the 
goals of the CDBG program, benefiting low and moderate income families, preventing or 
eliminating slums and blight, and/or meeting other urgent community development needs.  In 
addition, all use must fall within the scope of one of a list of authorized activities.  Eligible 
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activities include property acquisition; rehabilitation of publicly owned property; housing 
rehabilitation; economic development activities; acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or 
installation of public facilities; and public works and other site improvements.  This list permits a 
variety of potential brownfields redevelopment usage, including property acquisition, clearance 
or rehabilitation of obsolete structures, public improvement constructions (e.g. construction of 
water and sewage systems), and site improvements (e.g. removal of hazardous wastes and toxic 
substances).  
 
Although nominally restricted, Section 108 is highly flexible.  HUD makes preliminary 
determinations of  the eligibility of applications and then negotiates formal guarantee agreements 
with the selected localities.   The negotiations settle issues such as the nature and amount of 
security required, the specific permissible uses of the loan funds, and the repayment schedule. 
 
Because Section 108 significantly stretches the capital available to localities, it has been cited as 
among the most potent and important public investment tools that HUD offers to local 
governments.72  Moreover, Section 108 loans lead to major increases in public expenditures, 
which in turn inspires more private investment.  Although cities have extensively and 
successfully used Section 108 loans, they have been slow to tap these funds for brownfields 
purposes.  Chicago recently became one of the first cities to make significant use of Section 108 
for a brownfields redevelopment project, applying $50 million in guarantees to remediation of a 
multi-acre urban site in preparation for new industrial uses.73  Almost no states have accessed 
Section 108 funds for their small cities despite the fact that these communities generally lack 
resources and are in dire need of such assistance.    
 
Cities have made limited use of Section 108 in brownfields development.  Despite being backed 
by federal guarantees, Section 108 loans are not risk free to communities and states.74  Each must 
place their future CDBG allocations in some degree of jeopardy in order to obtain a loan.  While 
experience shows that properly planned projects generally pay for themselves and cost 
communities and states nothing or next to nothing, local governments frequently shy away from 
taking any risk with their CDBG allocations on environmental projects.  
 
The reluctance of local communities to use Section 108 for brownfields projects must be 
addressed.  Section 108 represents a prime source of large amounts of working capital that can 
be accessed on very favorable terms.  The program’s objectives fit very well with those of most 
brownfields redevelopment projects.  To the extent that localities are simply unaware of the 
program or its potential application to brownfields, education is necessary.  Beyond that, great 
efforts should be taken to convince local officials that proper planning will eradicate most risks 
associated with the use of these funds for environmental projects.   
 
Brownfields Economic Development Initiative (“BEDI”) 
 
HUD has created one brownfields specific program:  BEDI, also known as the Brownfields 
Redevelopment Initiative (BRI).  BEDI provides funds and loan guarantees to clean up and 
redevelop brownfields.  The program seeks to attract private financing for brownfields cleanup 
and redevelopment efforts by providing important "start-up" funds.  It is the lack of these funds 
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to cover  start up costs such as site assessment that numerous individuals interviewed for this 
report identified as a major barrier to brownfields redevelopment.   
 
BEDI brings together four different types of existing HUD assistance that communities can use 
to clean up and revitalize potentially contaminated sites.  It offers annual formula grants 
allocated to states and local governments through Community Development Block Grants, lower 
interest loan guarantee authority available through the Section 108 Loan Guarantee program, 
competitive grants through the Economic Development Initiative program, and competitive 
grants provided through the Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control program.  
 
It earmarks a certain portion of the funds of these programs to brownfields redevelopment 
activities.  In FY 98, $25 million in BEDI funds and $4 million in Lead-Based Paint Hazard 
Control grants were allocated to brownfields activities (not including awards made for other 
brownfields projects funded pursuant to the normal operation of these programs, CDBG and 
Section 108).75  BEDI is administered by the Office of Block Grant Assistance in HUD’s Office 
of Community Planning and Development (CPD), the same office that oversees each of the four 
individual component programs.   
 
To qualify for assistance from BEDI, a locality must meet the CDBG fund eligibility 
requirements.  Funds acquired through the BEDI program must be used in accordance with the 
rules of the program(s) from which funding is derived.  The programs supporting BEDI permit 
activities such as acquiring brownfields sites, demolishing existing buildings, installing needed 
infrastructure (such as water lines, roads, and sewers), rehabilitating or constructing housing, 
conducting job training, providing business loans, creating public facilities (such as day care 
centers, medical facilities, and community centers), and attracting or starting small businesses in 
the area.  
 
The advantage of BEDI (as opposed to CDBG) is that it does not compete with a multitude of 
non-brownfields initiatives for a limited pool of resources.  While tiny compared to the CDBG 
program, BEDI funds are directed with certainty to brownfields projects. In 1998, HUD awarded 
BEDI with $22 million in grants and $130 million in loan guarantees.76 In fiscal year 1999, HUD 
directed $25 million to its Brownfields Economic Development Initiative grants.77  But the 
current limited size of the BEDI program means the program has been unable to meet demand.  
Only 21 out of 60 cities competing for BEDI grants received them. Yet for those cities, the funds 
were in many cases crucial in undertaking projects.  In King County, Washington, for example, a 
$300,000 BEDI grant, together with a BEDI loan guarantee of $1 million, launched a $6.5 
million project to redevelop an industrial park that otherwise was to be scrapped due to cost.78  
 
Despite its modest resources, the BEDI program offers significant hope for brownfields 
redevelopment.  It represents a recognition by HUD of the important role its programs can play 
in brownfields redevelopment, and the need to ensure that such use of the programs takes place.  
Continued development and increased funding of the BEDI program  should ensure that 
brownfields redevelopment activities continue to grow across the country. 
  
Economic Development Agency 
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The Economic Development Administration (EDA) was established under the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act of 1965  to generate new jobs, help retain existing jobs, and 
stimulate industrial and commercial growth in economically-distressed areas of the United 
States.  EDA assistance is available to rural and urban areas of the U.S. experiencing high 
unemployment, low income, or sudden and severe economic distress.  
 
EDA awards these grants to states, political subdivisions of a state, Indian tribes, special-purpose 
units of state and local governments, and public or private nonprofit organizations.  Priority 
consideration is given to projects that, among other factors, create or retain jobs, benefit low-
income residents of the grant area, improve opportunities for business establishment or 
expansion, fulfill a pressing need in the area and demonstrate adequate local funding and 
commitment. 
 
As with Community Development Block Grants, EDA’s Title I public works grants fit neatly 
with brownfields redevelopment projects.  The program can provide significant assistance to 
redevelopment initiatives; between 1995 and 1997, the program’s annual budget ranged from 
$165 million to $195 million, with individual grants averaging approximately $1 million.79 
 
The city of Birmingham relied on EDA funds to identify the redevelopable industrial properties 
within the city.  The initial survey of the city’s industrial properties was financed by a grant from 
EDA.  A second EDA grant of $50,000 financed the assessment of six industrial properties.  
Based this assessment, the city targeted a site north of the city for redevelopment. A third EDA 
grant of $185,000 was used to pursue planning activities at the site, including the development of 
a Master Plan and a marketing survey.     
 
The Oregon Mill Site Conversion Project relied heavily on EDA funds to finance initial 
redevelopment activities. In 1994, the Project received a $366,000 grant from EDA to implement 
a program of redevelopment in seven rural mill communities.  In addition to providing the grant, 
EDA joined the Conversion Project as a redevelopment partner. Seven sites are selected to 
participate in the program, and RDI conducts Phase I site assessments at all seven sites, 
including wetlands delineation and flood plain evaluation. In 1995, EDA committed an 
additional $300,000 to the Conversion Project.  These funds are earmarked to develop a set of 
generic development remedies that can be applied to timber mill sites.  The intent is to speed the 
clean up process, lower costs, and facilitate development.   
 
As with all other potential avenues of brownfields project funding, efforts need to be made to 
ensure that interested parties are aware of the EDA program.  Expansion of the program and 
earmarking of a portion of the funds for brownfields purposes should also be explored. 
 
Small Business Association (SBA) 
 
SBA provides long term financing to small enterprises that lack access to other funds.  The 
agency is authorized by Congress to offer several financial assistance programs, each designed to 
provide access to loans with terms of six or more years.  Interest rates on the resulting loans vary 
by program; some are subsidized, others are prime plus one or two points.  Most agency 
assistance has taken the form of loan guarantees.  Approximately ninety percent of all SBA 
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financial assistance was delivered through the following two programs: Section 7(a) and Section 
504. 
 
 General business loan guarantees – the Section 7(a) program.   
 
Section 7(a) is the largest SBA program, guaranteeing over $7 billion in private loans annually.  
This program permits small businesses to gain access to capital to finance plant construction, 
conversion, and expansion, as well as acquire equipment, facilities, materials, and supplies.  This 
is accomplished by a federal pledge to lenders to cover most of the outstanding loan balance in 
the event of default by a small business. SBA can guarantee up to ninety percent of loans less 
than $155,000, and eighty-five percent of loans between that amount and the program cap, now 
$500,000.  Depending on how the loan is used, terms range from seven years at prime plus 2.25 
percent (for working capital) to 2.75 percent (for building construction or acquisition). 
 
This program was devised to reduce the underwriting risk that often makes financial institutions 
reluctant to lend to small businesses.  It worked well in attracting financial institutions to make 
loans of between $100,000 and the loan cap.  But in the past, documentation requirements 
dissuaded  many institutions from making smaller loans. SBA responded with a spin off of the 
Section 7(a) program called the Low Documentation (LowDoc) program.  LowDoc streamlines 
the application process by using a single page SBA form, ensuring rapid response from the 
agency – usually just a few days.  Based on the immediate success of the pilot, SBA elevated 
LowDoc to full program status in December 1994.   
 
Although the Section 7(a) and LowDoc programs put working capital in the hands of many small 
businesses for development projects, use on behalf of brownfields redevelopment has been 
extremely limited.  Small scale brownfields projects could significantly benefit from the 
program.  SBA has not only failed to specifically target brownfields redevelopment as a goal of 
the program, but it has declined to support many brownfields projects that have been submitted.  
Many private parties have complained that SBA officials are more rigid regarding contamination 
and environmental liability concerns than private lenders themselves.  Until this attitude changes, 
the significant potential of Section 7(a) to assist with brownfields redevelopment will go 
untapped. 
 
Suggestions have been made to link the SBA programs with state voluntary cleanup programs in 
order to provide SBA with comfort regarding liability.  Of course, to the extent that comfort on 
liability is obtained, the need for SBA assistance is reduced.  A Congressional earmark of certain 
SBA funds for brownfields-related loan guarantees may be more directly useful. 
 
 Development Company Guarantees – the Section 504 program. 
 
SBA’s Development Company Guarantees help small businesses obtain capital to finance 
expansion and improvements of their fixed assets (e.g. land, buildings, etc.).  Through the law, 
SBA licenses local certified development companies to provide investment capital to small 
businesses.  These firms debentures that are one hundred percent backed by SBA guarantees.  
The guarantee reduces investors’ risks, which in turn lowers the debenture’s rate of interest and 
attracts purchasers.   
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Proceeds from the debentures are directed to small businesses that qualify, up to forty percent of 
a qualified project’s total cost, no higher than a $750,000 maximum SBA share. A private 
financial institution must provide fifty percent of the project’s financing in return for which the 
lender obtains a priority security interest.  The CDC secures the ten percent balance of project 
funds, with the funds themselves generally coming from the borrower as equity, or from a non-
federal economic development program.  The capital provided by Section 504 is generally long 
term capital; debentures issued pursuant to the program may have maturity dates that extend 
twenty years.  
 
The Section 504 program succeeds because it significantly improves a small company’s 
creditworthiness by lowering the amount and percentage of capital that a private lender must 
invest in a given transaction while  giving the private lender a first claim on fixed assets in the 
event of a default by a borrower.  As with the Section 7(a) program, however, use of Section 504 
for brownfields projects has been limited to date.  As discussed above, SBA officials need to be 
convinced to accept the risk of brownfields projects and consideration should be given to 
earmarking certain resources for brownfields use. 
 
Superfund Trust Fund 
 
As part of CERCLA, Congress created a federal trust fund dedicated to cleaning up hazardous 
waste sites and chemical spills.  The fund is principally financed by federal taxes on corporations 
and feedstocks.  It operates as a revolving fund and its revenues are supplemented by recoveries 
from parties defined as responsible for site contamination by CERCLA.  Collections from 
responsible parties, collection of other CERCLA-imposed fines, and interest on its assets have 
produced for the trust fund a multi-billion dollar excess over those funds obligated for particular 
uses under the statute.  
 
Since its creation in 1980, the trust has spent approximately $1.4 billion per year on authorized 
cleanup activities.80  Expenditures of trust funds are limited by law to cleanups of severely 
contaminated sites that qualify for EPA’s National Priority List (NPL).   As a result, despite the 
excess funds, brownfields sites go unassisted by the Superfund Trust Fund. 
 
A number of proposals exist to relax restrictions on the use of Superfund Trust Fund resources to 
permit a portion of the excess funds to be directed toward brownfields site assessments and 
remediations.81 Such proposals offer a variety of potential mechanisms for  directing trust funds 
toward brownfields programs and leveraging these funds so that they can have maximum impact.  
Such mechanisms are similar to many of those used in other federal programs discussed in this 
paper. They include credit enhancements, such as loan guarantees and bond insurance; standard 
loans at favorable rates; revolving loan funds; and direct outlays. 
 
 Superfund Trust Fund monies have recently been applied to brownfields redevelopment efforts 
through pilot projects.  For example, in Wilmington, Delaware, the state Department of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Control sought federal assistance in financing site assessment of 
seventy older industrial properties along the waterfront and the regional EPA office responded 
with “Pilot Dollars” under the Delaware-EPA Superfund Cooperative Agreement.  Since 
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authorization of the project, EPA has committed $250,000 to $350,000 per year for brownfields 
site assessment work.82  Superfund Trust Fund monies have also been used to fund brownfields 
national demonstration pilots as part of USEPA's Brownfields Economic Redevelopment 
Initiative.  These strategies for tapping the  Trust Fund to fund brownfields redevelopment can be 
expanded for additional projects. 
 
The long term viability of any and all programs using trust funds for brownfields purposes 
depends upon the future of Superfund.  Superfund reauthorization is pending.  A key issue is 
whether or not the Superfund tax that generates much of the trust fund’s revenue stream will be 
extended.  Superfund reauthorization also represents an opportunity to specifically authorize use 
of trust funds for brownfields purposes.   
 
Direction of Superfund Trust Fund resources towards brownfields makes sense, especially since 
brownfields properties are subject to CERCLA standards. Obviously, the Trust Fund possesses 
significant resources.  It appears these could be enlisted on behalf of brownfields cleanup 
without impeding other Superfund cleanup efforts. 
 
Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities program 
 
Created in 1993, the federal Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Program seeks 
to promote redevelopment of economically distressed urban and rural communities by offering 
developers incentives to undertake such redevelopment projects.  The EZ/EC Initiative uses tax 
incentives, performance grants, and loans to designated low-income areas, called Empowerment 
Zones (EZs) or Enterprise Communities (ECs), to create jobs, expand business opportunities, and 
support people looking for work.  
 
To date, the government has designated seventy-two urban areas and thirty-three rural 
communities for benefits.83  These sites average thirty-six percent poverty rates, and fourteen 
percent unemployment.84  The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 authorized HUD to designate fifteen 
new urban EZs, and USDA to designate five new rural EZs.85 These EZs will receive slightly 
different treatment from the original sites.   
 
The original EZ/ECs have received more than $1.5 billion in performance grants and more than 
$2.5 billion in tax incentives.  Each designated urban EZ is provided with $100 million, each 
rural EZ is granted $40 million, and each EC is granted $3 million in social service grants 
annually.86 Employers in EZs are eligible for wage tax credits, worth $3,000 for every employee 
hired who lives within EZ boundaries.87  EZ businesses are also eligible for increased tax 
expensing for equipment purchases.  All EZ/ECs are eligible for tax-exempt bond financing that 
offers lower rates than conventional financing for business property and land, renovations, or 
expansions. HUD provides funds from its Economic Development Initiative (EDI) program.  
 
New benefits for EZ/ECs are being introduced.  Among these are benefits that specifically focus 
upon brownfields redevelopment.  The original 105 EZ/ECs are now eligible for a Brownfields 
Tax Incentive to clean up and redevelop contaminated industrial sites and the twenty new EZs 
will be eligible for a special Brownfields Tax Incentive (these are discussed at length elsewhere 
in this paper).  The original EC/EZs may also take advantage of expanded financing (allowing a 
 52
broader range of businesses to qualify for special tax-exempt, private-activity bonds to promote 
commercial investment) and a tax credit for school renovation tied to the improved education 
standards and programs for job-skilled youth.  The new EZs will be eligible to receive enhanced 
private-activity bonds permitting them to receive $60 to $230 million in flexible bond authority 
above the cap set by their states, in order to subsidize job creation and business expansion.   
Additional Section 179 expensing allows them to receive $20,000 in additional Section 179 
investments in capital and equipment to promote commercial investment.88  
 
These benefits give distressed communities a variety of tools to create jobs and economic 
growth.  As brownfields problems are often a critical problem in urban and regional poverty, 
federal incentives can and should include brownfields redevelopment projects. Efforts should be 
made to ensure that affected communities understand and leverage EZ/EC benefits.  This 
requires educational efforts and procedural reviews.  
 
ISTEA/DOT 
 
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 marked a departure in 
federal transportation policy, as it created programs to encourage a multi-modal national 
transportation system rather than a highway-centric system.  The Act also marked a recognition 
that transportation spending, while having brought benefits, has also led to problems such as air 
and water pollution, scenic degradation, loss of open space, and fractured communities.  As a 
result of this recognition, the Act created the Transportation Enhancement Program (TEP).   
 
This initiative sets aside ten percent of each state's Surface Transportation Program funds for a 
variety of environmental needs, including landscaping and scenic beautification, mitigation of 
water pollution caused by highway runoff, rehabilitation of historic transportation facilities, and 
removal and control of outdoor advertising.  ISTEA was recently reauthorized by the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. 
 
The impact of TEP has been great. Over its first six years, the program has channeled over $2.6 
billion into sidewalks, bike paths, trails, and other transportation enhancements.  This compares 
to only $40 million in total expenditures on the same items during the eighteen year period 
preceding  TEP.89 
 
Both TEP and general ISTEA funds can be immensely useful to brownfields redevelopment.  
TEP funds can assist cleanup efforts themselves; general ISTEA funds can finance renewals of 
highway, road infrastructure and mass transit to serve brownfields redevelopment areas.  
 
 Department of Transportation (“DOT”) 
 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has signed on to support the federal brownfields 
initiative.  Secretary Slater has pledged to use DOT’s financial and technical assistance programs 
in support of brownfields redevelopment projects.  As part of this effort, DOT will encourage 
state and local transportation agencies to coordinate their improvement programs with local 
brownfields redevelopment plans and projects.  DOT will also encourage transportation agency 
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sponsors to consider brownfields properties when siting projects as part of their redevelopment 
efforts.  
 
Principal DOT support for brownfields efforts will proceed through the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA).  FHWA is responsible for and provides funding for projects in six 
categories: (1) construction and improvement of roads formally designated as scenic byways; (2) 
interstate maintenance, for repair and improvements to the Interstate Highway System; (3) 
interstate completion, for completion of parts of the Interstate Highway System not yet 
completed; (4) repair of deficient bridges; (5) construction of highways on public lands such as 
national parks; and (6) ferry boats and terminals to facilitate movement of people and goods 
across inland and coastal waterways. In addition, FHWA discretionary funds are awarded by the 
Secretary of Transportation following requests from states for projects that meet criteria 
established by federal law and DOT regulations and procedures.  
 
FHWA has revised its existing policies to fulfill DOT’s pledge to support brownfields 
redevelopment. It has begun to provide support for improved transportation access to 
brownfields redevelopment projects.  It also now encourages state and local officials to include 
brownfields redevelopment in their improvement plans.  This guidance replaces previous 
directives to avoid contaminated properties entirely.  FHWA headquarters office has also begun 
to advise field offices on the current brownfields pilot communities and the EPA's list of 
brownfields showcase communities. The headquarters disseminates information on 
transportation-related brownfields success stories to field offices and presents it on EPA's 
Brownfields Internet Homepage and FHWA environmental website. 
 
Over the next few years, FHWA plans to continue to develop working partnerships with a broad 
range of institutions, including environmental, state, local and private sector organizations, as 
well as other Federal agencies such as HUD and EPA.  FHWA plans to work with states to 
identify state laws and procedures that can be modified to brownfields-supporting projects. A 
compendium of best practices will be prepared to support State and local exploration of 
transportation strategies for supporting brownfields redevelopment.  FHWA will also provide 
technical assistance as needed to communities considering brownfields redevelopment programs 
regarding how to use Federal-aid highway funds.  
 
DOT funding was the catalyst for the redevelopment of the Gateway area in Salt Lake City. The 
Gateway District is a 650 acre site located three blocks away from the city’s Main Street and  
adjacent to Interstate 15.  The site is characterized by a number of  railroad tracks, highway 
ramps and overpasses, and industrial properties.  It is also characterized by a number of different 
business and residential districts. Prior to World War I, the Gateway was a vibrant area 
comprised of several ethnic neighborhoods, close knit communities, and economic activity. After 
WW I, the area’s ethnic neighborhoods are gradually replaced by industrial processes.  Interstate 
15 was constructed, running through part of the area, creating a barrier to traffic and mobility 
within the Gateway.   
 
To redevelop the site, project managers knew it was essential to make the site more visible, 
increase access to businesses located in the Gateway and attract new businesses.  DOT grant 
money is financing the reconstruction of I-15 and the shortening of several viaducts that will 
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promote the accessibility of the site. In addition, DOT funds can be spent on the roads and 
infrastructure immediately surround the reconstruction.  
 
In addition to federal programs to fund and encourage brownfields activities, a number of 
initiatives have emerged from the private sector, as well. 
 
II. Public and Private Financial Institutions 
 
Private Banks 
 
Private banks are a principal source of third party financing for economic development in the 
United States.  Banks are also highly risk averse. While banks will apply conservative financial 
analyses to any loan application, for many years, their risk aversion to financing capital for 
brownfields has been particularly pronounced.  Changes in federal laws affecting lender liability 
at contaminated sites made in 1996 have lowered the risk and somewhat increased the capital 
involvement of banks.  Banks are still reluctant to invest in brownfields projects.  In fact, 
economic studies have suggested that private banks go so far as to double count environmental 
risk factors in their appraisals of contaminated or potentially contaminated properties.90 
  
Without access to bank capital, large numbers of potential redevelopment projects will never 
occur.  This is particularly true for projects that might otherwise be performed by small 
businesses or community development corporations (CDCs).  Governments and private 
foundations can pick up some of the financing burden, but their resources are limited.  Therefore, 
great efforts must still be made to address issues that restrain banks and other lenders from 
making loans on brownfields properties.  Governments and foundations, to the extent that they 
seek to assist with the financing burden, should explore ways to promote bank comfort in giving 
loans. 
 
Banks do not have a distinct process for brownfields loans.  A loan application for a project 
involving brownfields is subjected to standard evaluation.  As part of that evaluation, banks must 
adhere to detailed sets of federal and state regulations, including limitations on the risks that they 
may take.  The banks also seek to make profits, further limiting their tolerance for risk.  The 
evaluation process involves an assessment of the character, cash flow, liquid assets, fixed assets, 
and external conditions of the borrower.  Each institution will have its own definition of a 
“creditworthy” borrower.  As a general rule, banks prefer large commercial real estate deals 
(over $10 million) backed by strong, well established borrowers such as corporate retailers, real 
estate development companies, and other large companies.  Banks will also seek to ensure that 
the loan structure of an application meets their individual policy guidelines.  Repayment sources 
must be clearly defined and adequately underwritten.  Generally, banks will require two, if not 
three, sources of repayment.  Another important consideration for a projects’ financing is 
whether the potential borrower has an existing relationship with the bank. 
 
In a commercial real estate loan transaction, the real estate collateral is generally the major  
security for the lender.  Evaluation of the real estate collateral is obviously a key part of the 
application process.  Loans secured by commercial real estate are generally not permitted to 
exceed seventy five percent of the value of the real estate.  For loans on brownfields properties, 
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the acceptable loan-to-value ratio is often lower.  A contaminated or potentially contaminated 
property poses major valuation problems for banks, thus chilling loan activity on projects 
involving brownfields.  The primary complication is the potential liability imposed by CERCLA 
and state equivalents that hold any party in the chain of property ownership responsible for the 
full cost of environmental cleanup, whether or not they created the contamination.  Traditionally, 
this potentially huge liability dissuaded most financial institutions from becoming involved with 
brownfields at all.   
 
The 1996 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 
significantly curtailed lender exposure under CERCLA and RCRA, opening the door to more 
bank involvement in brownfields.  Whereas lenders were previously exposed merely by holding 
a security interest in real property, the act provides an exception from liability for any party that 
“without participating in the management of a facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect the person’s security interest in the facility.”   
 
The amendments to CERCLA and RCRA, which parallel changes to many state statutes, ease 
lenders’ legal risks, but do not eliminate them.  Banks must still be wary of legal liability for 
“participating in management” and legal liability after foreclosure.  To the extent that banks are 
deemed to have “participated in management” of a site, they can no longer avail themselves of 
the exception created by the 1996 amendment.  A few federal courts have suggested that a 
lender’s unexercised ability to control the waste disposal activities of its borrower represents 
“participation in management,” meaning normal and prudent lending activities, including a due 
diligence investigation of a property’s environmental conditions, could subject banks to 
exposure.   
 
EPA has gone to great lengths to try to defuse the impact of these court decisions.  Its first 
attempt, a regulation that, in effect, rejected the statutory interpretation of the federal courts, was 
struck down by the courts as beyond the scope of the agency’s authority.91  EPA responded with 
a statement of policy designed to give lenders undertaking normal lending practices comfort that 
these would not be treated by EPA as “participation in management” in the agency’s 
enforcement practices.  Some states have gone so far as to revise their statutes to clarify that this 
activity will not subject lenders to liability.  However, lenders must remain concerned about 
liability under the federal law as the result of actions brought by private parties or others not 
constrained by  EPA policy. 
 
Banks must also be concerned about liability in the event of foreclosure.  Recent federal court 
decisions suggest that a lender who forecloses on a contaminated property becomes the “true 
owner” and thus loses the lender exception to CERCLA liability.92 EPA’s announced policy does 
not fully reject this interpretation, leaving even EPA treatment, let alone the treatment of federal 
courts, potentially risky.  Some states have gone much further to give lenders comfort.  
Amendments to state Superfund laws provide that a lender does not become liable when it 
forecloses, provided that it undertakes certain activities and is able to dispose of the property 
within five years of the foreclosure.  
 
The exposure still faced by lenders despite revisions to CERCLA has a significant impact upon 
bank willingness to loan on brownfields projects.  Lenders must account for the exposure they 
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face in valuing the underlying asset; as banks are risk averse, any uncertainty with regard to 
exposure works against the borrower.  In many cases, lenders are forced to conclude that they 
cannot foreclose upon the underlying property in the event of default on the loan, undercutting 
much of the value of the collateral and forcing the bank to charge dramatically more for the loan. 
 
Even if the bank is able to foreclose without facing liability itself, to the extent that cleanup is 
statutorily required, the previous owner’s CERCLA liability takes precedence even over the 
bank’s first lien on the property, as CERCLA grants Superfund a superpriority lien.  Thus, the 
bank will not be able to recoup the full value of the collateral to pay off the defaulted loan.  In 
practice, this will lead banks to either heighten the financial requirements for any potential 
borrower—ensuring the borrower has the ability to both repay the loan and remediate an 
environmental problem if an active cleanup is required—or charge the borrower more up front 
for the loan. 
 
Because of the risk that environmental liability poses, banks also require loan applicants to 
provide highly detailed reports regarding property condition and regulatory status. At least one 
prominent association of bankers has declared that a bank cannot “reasonably” use contaminated 
or potentially contaminated property as collateral unless real or perceived contamination is first 
confirmed, denied or otherwise quantified.93 The process of determining information required by 
the bank is difficult, time consuming and expensive.  Many banks continue to refuse to provide 
loans for environmental site assessment, requiring borrowers to conduct site assessment as part 
of the pre-application process.  
 
If remediation is required, a bank may require that the borrower obtain regulatory approval of the 
remediation plan prior to the loan.  In some of these cases the construction part of the loan is held 
in escrow until remediation is completed.  Other banks also go so far as to seek official 
declarations from regulatory agencies that either release the owner from liability or otherwise 
establish some risk reduction or statements of cleanliness from environmental consulting firms 
before approving any loan.  
 
Even after a potential borrower has complied with all the background requirements for receiving 
a loan, the true nature of environmental exposure is often highly uncertain.  Generally, most 
lenders lack the expertise to accurately determine the impact of contamination on property value.  
As banks are conservative, the uncertainty involved with brownfields once again works against 
the borrower. 
 
Within the Gateway Project area in Salt Lake City, borrowers are struggling with this problem.  
Mike Picardi is a local business owner who wants to redevelop a parcel directly adjacent to his 
current business.  The parcel is the former site of the Utah Pickle Factory that Picardi plans to 
redevelop into a design center. But due to lack of financing, and difficulty dealing with strict 
zoning regulations, his efforts have been blocked.  “Local banks are lining up for the big projects 
with big developers, but the small businesses can’t get loans,” stated Picardi.  “The Salt Lake 
City Redevelopment Agency is trying to be helpful, but banks are not working with the city.” 
Picardi spent a year and a half looking for financing, to no avail (as of March 1999, he was 
getting ready to try again). Tax Increment Financing (TIF) does not help cover up front 
assessment and development costs, he does not qualify for SBA money, and the city has offered 
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him a loan, but  only after he gets the rest of his financing in place.94 “If I could get the rest of 
my financing in place, I wouldn’t need the loan,” declared Picardi.  He believes in and supports 
the Gateway project, but feels there are holes in the overall plan.  There is a danger in Gateway 
that small business owners will be forced out by larger, better funded enterprises if the private 
financial sector continues to be so risk averse regarding these loans.  
 
Despite all the above, and with some trepidation, a number of banks have increased their 
willingness to loan on real estate projects involving brownfields under the right conditions.  
Surveys show that banks have responded to some degree to the revisions to CERCLA and, in 
particular, respond to state initiatives involving state declarations of approval of cleanup and/or 
no further action letters.  Major banks that have been active in lending on brownfields properties 
include:  Bank of America, NationsBank, CoreStates, Barnett, Wells Fargo, Union Bank, Bank 
of the West, LaSalle Bank, American National Bank, Comerica, Home Savings of America, 
Sanwa Bank, Mellon Bank, Chemical Bank, First Union Bank and NBD.  Many have been 
proactive in seeking to become more familiar with brownfields issues.  In Chicago, a group of 
bankers met together with representatives from developers, insurance companies, local 
government, community and environmental advocacy groups, and other concerned groups as the 
Chicago Brownfields Forum and generated model loan documents for commercial lending 
secured by lesser contaminated property. 
 
Many banks have also sought to hire staff with expertise on environmental issues.  In general, 
banks have staff capable of dealing with contaminated properties once they become problems; 
however, many do not have staff capable of evaluate environmental risks up front in order to 
make determinations as to whether to underwrite remediation loans.  Banks that do have 
personnel capable of professionally evaluating underwriting decisions on environmental risks 
include Bank of America, Wells Fargo Bank, Union Bank of California, Comerica Bank, Bank 
of the West, Home Savings Bank, Sanwa Bank.  But even these banks do not make great efforts 
to make loans on contaminated properties and do not make such loans on a large scale. Clearly, 
the right set of incentives have not yet been developed to draw these institutions further into the 
redevelopment process, and their lack of participation remains an obstacle to successful 
brownfields projects. 
 
To further promote the availability of bank financing for brownfields projects, further efforts 
need to be made to define potential liabilities in a more precise manner.  The limitations on 
lender liability captured in EPA policies and certain state statutes, if enacted by the federal 
government, would go a long way toward encouraging banks to be more active in brownfields 
projects.  This and other liability-clarifying actions should ideally be undertaken by 
governmental institutions; statutes and regulations can prevent painstaking and expensive 
clarification through the courts. 
 
Even with such amendments to the law, better provision for financing for site assessments and 
remediation are necessary.  These up front costs are prohibitive for many projects.  If banks 
cannot be convinced to loan money for these efforts, alternative sources need to be identified.  
Foundations and, perhaps, government can play an important role here.  Projects that provide 
“start-up” funds will go a long way to making banks more amenable to providing loans as 
projects will enjoy more diversified support. 
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Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)  
 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 12 U.S.C. 2901, represents one potential means of 
convincing private banks to make additional loans to brownfields projects.  CRA was enacted in 
1977 to require banks, thrifts, and other lenders to be socially responsible within their 
communities.  Banks are directed to make capital available in low and moderate income urban 
neighborhoods within their service area in order to help halt the decline of these communities.  
All loans must be made in accordance with safe and sound banking operations.  
 
A government-wide brownfields action agenda was launched during 1995 to encourage a 
cooperative approach by EPA, lenders, and prospective purchasers to ease fears of financial 
liability and regulatory burdens. As part of that program, EPA has coordinated with the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency to create incentives within CRA regulations for economic 
revitalization and development.  
 
Concern over potential environmental and financial liability for cleaning up these sites has made 
lenders, developers, and property owners reluctant to finance redevelopment of these properties. 
Rather than reuse former urban industrial sites, businesses have instead moved to suburban or 
rural "greenfields," which carry fewer perceived risks to development.  A footnote was added to 
CRA regulations that includes  “loans to finance environmental cleanup or redevelopment of an 
industrial site as part of an effort to revitalize the low or moderate income community in which 
the property is located.” 
 
Nevertheless, use of CRA to produce additional funding for brownfields projects has been 
limited.  Banks continue to be highly concerned with the liability issues discussed above. 
Moreover, CRA incentives are limited, since CRA regulations limit the types of brownfields 
projects that banks can participate in while receiving CRA credit.  To qualify for CRA credit, 
bank-assisted projects not only must remove contamination, they also must lead to 
redevelopment activities (eliminating projects for open space, or sites being remediated simply to 
remove a health threat from a community). 
 
Proposals have been made to revise CRA to widen the scope of brownfields projects eligible for 
CRA credit.  Specifically, some have suggested that lenders be permitted to demonstrate CRA 
compliance by lending on brownfields projects involving cleanup only or by contributing capital 
to a loan pool or revolving fund or local development company that operates in distressed 
areas.95 By  expanding the scope of activities offered CRA credit and resolving some of the 
liability problems discussed, banks will be encouraged to use loans to brownfields projects as a 
primary means of satisfying CRA requirements. 
 
Community Development Financial Institutions 
 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are private financial institutions 
dedicated to community development.  CDFIs are generally established in order to fill financing 
gaps left by conventional financial institutions.   
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CDFIs take many forms.  Most are specialized, focusing upon a particular gap in the financing 
market. They use a variety of business structures, including community development banks and 
intermediaries, community development loan funds, community development credit unions, 
microenterprise funds, community development corporation-based lenders and investors, 
housing funds, and community development venture funds. Others are unregulated nonprofit 
institutions that gather private capital from a range of social investors for community 
development lending or investing.  Often CDFIs will provide technical assistance, as well as 
capital, to underserved communities.   
 
These alternative financial institutions have had to develop expertise in adapting lending 
guidelines to the needs of their borrowers and accepting unconventional collateral for loans.  
They have also learned to provide education, training, and assistance to potential borrowers. 
In 1994, Congress passed the Community Development Financial Institutions Act, which 
included the creation of a CDFI Fund at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  This fund awards 
$30-50 million per year in grants and loans to approved CDFIs, stimulating expansion in the 
CDFI industry.96  The CDFI Coalition today includes 350 CDFIs representing each of the fifty 
states. 
 
These CDFIs, together with potential new ones, offer tremendous potential to brownfields 
redevelopment. As financial institutions, they can leverage and deliver a variety of public and 
private incentives, capital and financial outreach services to brownfields sites.  As individual 
institutions and as a group, CDFIs have extensive experience in developing communities, 
addressing the credit and capital needs of low and moderate income  communities, partnering 
with traditional financial institutions to serve low and moderate income communities, and taking 
new, alternative approaches to loans and funding.  Moreover, many of these institutions have 
won the trust of the residents of distressed areas and understand their special needs and concerns.  
 
CDFIs generally remain small, under-capitalized institutions that frequently rely heavily on 
public subsidies.  Efforts to buttress their resources will need to be made before they can 
effectively address large numbers of brownfields projects.  Expansion of the CDFI Fund and 
other fundraising efforts, with targeting of funds toward brownfields, would be highly useful.  In 
addition, efforts should be made to coordinate various CDFI efforts through networking, 
collaboration, education and other joint programs whereby CDFIs can assist one another’s efforts 
and expertise.  Done on a broad scale, these actions could have a huge impact on brownfields 
redevelopment, placing CDFIs in a position to lead the movement. 
 
Local Initiative Support Corporation 
 
The Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) was established by the Ford Foundation and 
six community groups in 1979 in order to support the efforts of community development 
corporations (CDCs) throughout the country.  
 
CDCs are non-profit organizations managed by citizens dedicated to the redevelopment of their 
home communities. The focus of individual CDCs varies widely—from housing to social 
services to economic activity—yet all are committed to community revitalization. LISC seeks to 
promote CDC efforts by mobilizing public-private partnerships to help local people rebuild 
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distressed communities and rural areas, and by providing funding and technical know-how to the 
CDCs serving these areas.  Upon an invitation from local leadership, whether from corporations 
or foundations or community residents or ministers or lenders,  LISC will focus upon building 
the financial and technical capacity of a community. 
 
LISC has enlisted the help of over 1,400 corporations, foundations and public agencies, and has 
increased the level of individual support of CDCs.97 Through these efforts, LISC has raised over 
$2 billion to support grassroots community revitalization, ninety-seven percent of it from private 
sources.98  With assistance from LISC, individual CDCs have leveraged the money received 
thorough LISC’s efforts to more than $2.9 billion from local sources.99  LISC is the nation's 
largest community development support organization, with thirty-five local programs working in 
over 100 cities and urban counties across the country.  It also works in neglected rural 
communities, supporting sixty-eight CDCs in thirty-nine states and Puerto Rico. 100 
 
LISC provides grants in a variety of forms.  CDCs may receive funds directly, but usually no 
more than $50,000 for capacity building or for special costs associated with project start-ups.101 
Sometimes, LISC will purchase services directly from a third party vendor in support of CDC 
initiatives. LISC provides loans, generally at six to eight percent with a term of approximately 
seven years, and usually for no more than $500,000.102 Guarantees are provided for bank 
financing in order to induce banks to lend to certain projects.  Most guarantees are partial, 
requiring the bank to take some risk.  
 
In addition to its revenue-generating activities and grants, LISC operates an extensive set of 
technical assistance programs designed to help CDCs to translate their local expertise into 
results.  These technical assistance programs include: 
 
• Jobs and Income Program:  This program includes job training assistance for community 
residents and a set of initiatives designed to reconnect neglected areas to the regional 
economic mainstream. 
 
• Social Community Development Program:  This broad-based program focuses upon assisting 
communities to develop and strengthen critical social services.  It helps CDCs with programs 
to combat crime, achieve suitable child care and affordable and available health care, and 
assists CDCs in their efforts to build their capacity to own and manage residential real estate 
in order to expand suitable low income housing.  This program also concerns itself with park 
and garden clean-ups, career counseling programs, neighborhood watches and community 
centers.  
 
• Creative Solutions to Mobilizing Capital Programs: In order to mobilize the maximum 
amount of capital for community based development, LISC has founded three affiliates to 
help community groups take advantage of opportunities in the public and private sectors.  
 
National Equity Fund (NEF):  NEF organizes partnerships between CDCs and Fortune 
500 corporations interested in investing in affordable housing. In return, NEF investors 
receive Low Income Housing Tax Credits, which can be applied against their federal 
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income taxes. In eight years, NEF has raised over $1.7 billion to create more than 33,000 
affordable homes for individuals and families across America.103  
 
Local Initiatives Managed Assets Corporation (LIMAC):  LIMAC makes the process of 
community development lending more efficient while minimizing risk by pooling loans, 
providing credit enhancement and converting loans into securities which are then sold to 
institutional investors.  
 
The Retail Initiative, Inc. (TRI):   TRI, a national commercial equity fund, is designed to 
help CDCs respond to the urgent need for quality retail goods and services in low-income 
communities. TRI helps CDCs navigate the commercial development process.  Activities 
include putting together partnerships between communities and shopping center 
developers, attracting retailers to community sites, identifying economic development 
incentives and physically developing sites.  
 
The many LISC efforts have had a profound impact upon redevelopment efforts throughout the 
United States.  As brownfields redevelopment fits neatly with the LISC’s programmatic 
objectives, the opportunity to coordinate the two is significant.  Brownfields redevelopment 
could easily and effectively become one of the LISC’s Jobs and Income  and Social Community 
Development programs.  In particular, LISC could help CDCs to identify jobs created by 
brownfields projects, the necessary job skills, and  what types of training the local community 
would need to do those jobs.  LISC could then work with CDCs and local job providers to  
establish environmental  job training programs, or link  CDCs to already existing job training 
programs.104   While research has not revealed cases in which LISC funds have been specifically 
directed towards brownfields to date, this is an avenue that brownfields redevelopment advocates 
should aggressively pursue. 
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III.  Financial Intermediaries/Land Recycling Companies 
 
Land recycling companies and financial intermediaries are organizations dedicated to facilitating 
brownfields redevelopment projects that would otherwise be unlikely to occur.  Most of these 
organizations are 501(c)(3) non-profit corporations that provide one or more of the following 
services: 
 
• Information dissemination: Due to the large number of issues and problems presented by 
brownfields, an information clearinghouse that collects, stores, and effectively disperses 
information on subjects ranging from financing sources to cost effective remediation 
techniques to regulatory burdens can be invaluable.   
 
• Neutral Third Party:  A neutral organization with no financial interest in a prospective project 
and with a trustworthy reputation can play a number of important roles. It brings essential 
parties together, provide independent scientific verification  of remediation plans and long 
term risk based land use; provide dispute resolution and mediation between parties; and 
sponsor effective community education of the science and risks involved in a project.  
 
• Central planning:  Sometimes, a land recycling company is better placed than a private 
developer to make a project happen.  In such cases the company may work with various 
community interests—city government, redevelopment agencies, community, and 
environmental organizations and private interests—to put together an economically feasible 
plan for  cleanup and reuse.  In such cases, the company may either self-finance and 
own/manage the project itself or may work together with a third party purchaser. 
 
• Financing:  land recycling companies and financial intermediaries may also directly finance 
brownfields assessment and cleanup activities.  
 
Land recycling companies have the potential to provide dramatic benefits for brownfields 
redevelopment efforts.  They can provide invaluable institutional knowledge and experience, and 
develop ties that permit them to access other public and private resources.  Their sole limitation 
is the level of their resources.  Some examples of brownfields intermediaries include: 
 
 Rural Development Initiative, Inc. 
 
The Rural Development Initiative, Inc. (RDI) is a private, nonprofit development corporation  
that provides assessment, training, and technical assistance to rural communities by working  
with communities directly and with other organizations that support rural communities. RDI is 
funded through a combination of grants from private foundations and public agencies, fees and 
Oregon Lottery funds.105 
 
In 1993, in response to a rash of mill closing in the wake of the decline in the American timber 
industry, the federal government created the  Northwest Adjustment Initiative  to provide 
assistance to communities dependent on the timber industry. Later that year, a group of diverse 
organizations,  come together to form the Oregon Mill Site Conversion Project.  The primary 
goal of this organization is  to redevelop closed timber mills. The group consists of RDI, 
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PacifiCorp (a utility company), U.S. Bank of Washington, and the law firm of Stoel, Rives, 
Boley, Jones and Grey.  RDI takes the lead role in managing the project.   
 
RDI selects seven sites to participate in the program, including Astoria, Coquille, Grants Pass, 
Myrtle Creek, Philomath, Sweet Home and Merlin. Mill owners enter into a formal 
Memorandum of Understanding with RDI, establishing the rights and responsibilities for each 
party.  In the event that a mill owner withdraws from the program after assessment reveals 
contamination, the owner will not be subject to state regulatory action.  RDI then serves as a 
financial intermediary, securing funds from federal agencies and private organizations and 
channeling them into the sites.  
 
In selecting the projects, RDI aimed for sites in the middle of the development spectrum. They 
did not want those sites that were so ideally located and readily developable that the private 
market would address them.  Nor did RDI want those sites so poorly located and contaminated 
that  tremendous resources would be needed.  RDI selected sites that were generally moderately 
contaminated, well located, with a skilled workforce nearby. In addition,  “We were looking for 
willing landowners who understand the link between community participation and 
redevelopment,” explained Hanan Bowman of RDI.  
 
RDI conducts Phase I site assessments at all seven sights, including wetlands delineation and 
flood plain evaluation.  Varying degrees of contamination are revealed, as well as varying 
acreage of wetlands, at each site. In addition, RDI helps each community form a Local Action 
Committees (LAC).  LACs are comprised of local business leaders, residents, municipal 
government representatives, and other interested parties, and they solicit input from the 
community and develop a set of possible end uses for their site.  
 
“The best model, from the standpoint of RDI, is to position the site for sale,” explained Bowman.    
That is, complete the assessment process, work with the owner to market the site for sale through 
the Oregon Prospective Purchaser program, and then find a purchaser who will complete the 
remediation and redevelop the site.  In addition, RDI intended to develop a set of “generic 
remedies” that could be used to clean up sites faster and cheaper. 
 
Phoenix Land Recycling Company 
 
The Phoenix Land Recycling Company (“Phoenix”) is a Pennsylvania-based nonprofit 501(c)(3) 
corporation that was established by Clean Sites, Inc., a respected, national environmental 
organization, with funding support from the Vira I. Heinz and Howard Heinz Endowments, as 
well as other philanthropic organizations.  Phoenix is dedicated to promoting brownfields 
redevelopment by seeking to address one of the principal roadblocks to redevelopment:  the up 
front costs of site assessment and remediation planning.106 
 
The theory behind Phoenix is that  numerous brownfields sites are never developed  because of 
the time and expense involved in assessing and planning necessary cleanup together with 
uncertainty regarding the scope of cleanup that will be found.  Phoenix works with local 
economic and industrial development agencies, commercial realtors, and developers to identify 
locations with significant potential for economic reuse.  It then uses its own resources and 
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expertise to conduct comprehensive assessments and develop remediation plans for these sites.  
Phoenix reviews its proposals with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
and, where necessary, enters into binding agreements with DEP to memorialize these cleanup 
decisions.  These agreements provide for the transfer of their terms to new owners or occupiers 
of the properties.  
 
In undertaking these activities, Phoenix shoulders the time and cost of analysis and reduces or 
eliminates the uncertainty associated with prior site activities.  With cleanup requirements and 
costs reasonably quantified, a developer evaluating a potential development project can directly 
compare brownfields sites with other properties. Phoenix markets its sites to prospective 
purchasers.  Through this process, it continues to work closely with local development agencies 
and developers, as well as representatives from the involved communities.  Phoenix attempts to 
recoup its investment in each site from the sale of the property to the new owner.  
 
Although Phoenix’s primary efforts are in the state of Pennsylvania, it has undertaken projects 
throughout the Northeastern United States.  It provides a useful model of a Land Recycling 
Company that has successfully identified and filled a niche, tackling one of the barriers to 
brownfields redevelopment. 
 
Consumers Renaissance Development Corporation 
 
The Consumers Renaissance Development Corporation (“CRDC”) is a Michigan-based non-
profit corporation founded in 1996 by Consumers Power Company in order to promote the 
redevelopment of brownfields properties in Michigan. “CRDC has two components,” explained 
Kelly Fennelly of CRDC. “Education to assist stakeholders in understanding the brownfields 
redevelopment process in Michigan and what new opportunities exist for stakeholders.  And   
facilitation, working with communities one-on-one to help them manage their project.  We serve 
as a moderator between all the involved parties.” CRDC has received outside funding primarily 
from the Michigan Job Commission, state community block grant programs and the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality.107    
 
CRDC offers general guidance on process, strategic and policy issues, legal counsel, technical 
training and referrals on any issue concerning brownfields development.  It identifies its 
principle functions as: 
 
• Conducting training workshops for local government officials and economic developers.  
• Distributing practical and user-friendly information on the technical, legal, financial, and 
political aspects of brownfields redevelopment.  
• Completing pilot programs showing "how to" implement brownfields redevelopment 
projects; and  
• Providing assistance and information to qualifying local governments and communities on a 
one-on-one basis. 
 
In its two year history, CRDC has produced and distributed a brownfields training manual, 
conducted a number of successful pilot projects in which it took the lead on activities ranging 
from negotiation to site assessment to marketing to legal work.  It provides education and job 
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training and serves as an information clearinghouse on environmental regulations, cleaning 
issues, legislative issues concerning how to work through the redevelopment process and the 
authorities.  It also conducts numerous studies and publishes reports on brownfields 
redevelopment. 
 
CRDC offers a useful model of a Land Recycling Company dedicated to facilitating brownfields 
redevelopment by shepherding interested parties through the various brownfields related issues 
they might face. 
 
The Development Fund 
 
The Development Fund is a San Francisco based, not-for-profit organization devoted to 
economic and social development projects.  The Development Fund focuses upon creating 
innovative private-sector financing mechanisms for a range of community development 
activities.  Its programs have collectively generated $700 million of private-sector financing 
from over 200 financial institutions and corporations representing eight states.108   
 
In January 1997, the Development Fund launched a research and feasibility study for the creation 
of a financial intermediary—the Financing Initiative for Environmental Restoration (FIER)—
dedicated to the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields and other impaired lands in the state 
of California.  FIER would provide a financially sound investment vehicle that permits 
corporations and financial institutions to comfortably participate in the redevelopment of 
brownfields.  In doing so, FIER hopes to create a model that can be used throughout the country 
to access large scale private investment for brownfields redevelopment.  The Development 
Fund’s research concluded in February 1998; it is now in the process of attempting to implement 
its plan. 
 
The Development Fund’s research led it to certain conclusions.  First, it found a significant gap 
in financing for many viable projects, particularly when the following characteristics are 
involved: 
 
• Smaller and less established property owners without sufficient collateral and other 
resources to qualify for conventional financing; 
• Smaller projects in which the transaction costs required to underwrite the deal, including 
environmental due diligence, are relatively high; 
• Projects with low or marginal returns, which represent positive cash flow but are not 
sufficient to interest conventional financing sources;  
• Projects that require special attention because of their complexity or location, including 
projects that need multiple layers of financing sources to become viable, sites with unusual 
contamination issues, and properties in low income and minority areas which involve actual 
or perceived uncertainty. 
 
The FIER design is intended to fill some or all of these gaps by addressing issues such as project 
risk, low returns, transaction costs, and regulatory/legal liability.  The FIER structure is designed 
to take into account the following conclusions from the Development Fund’s research: 
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• The creation of an independent and pooled financing entity (either for profit or nonprofit), 
separate from the sponsoring companies, allows a greater degree of flexibility and helps the 
entity to serve a broader range of market needs; 
• There are essentially three models for administering the financing program:  creating in-
house staffing capacity, working through formal partnerships or joint ventures, and 
outsourcing.  Each of these has advantages and disadvantages; individual programs often 
employ a mixture of these methods; 
• Strategies for sourcing projects include working through real estate industry contacts, 
corporation referrals, financial institutions involved in defaults and workouts, publicly 
available data sources and private data companies, and local public agencies; 
• Investment capital from the sponsoring companies can come in the form of up front 
commitments or on a project by project basis; it can be structured as long-term or short-term 
capital.   
• Project financing can be targeted in three ways: financing a current owner or developer; 
financing a new purchaser; or self-financing to take a direct role in the land recycling.  The 
project financing can be in the form of debt, equity, or some combination of the two.  
Incorporating a variety of features in the new vehicle’s product line would allow for 
maximum flexibility. 
• It is important for any market entrant to carefully design a strategy for risk and liability 
management, including centralized and/or expedited regulatory approvals, liability shields, 
and insurance products.  
 
 It is too early to determine the level of success achieved by FIER.  The experiences of the FIER 
should provide extremely valuable lessons to future financial intermediary efforts. 
 
Clean Land Fund 
 
The Clean Land Fund is a private sector, non-profit environmental organization that serves as a 
collaborative effort by businesses, communities, and environmentalists on behalf of brownfields 
redevelopment.  It is structured as a sustainable, leveraged revolving fund that makes loans for 
financing the acquisition, remediation, and reuse of brownfields properties.  It is frequently 
willing to provide 100 percent financing and offer a single repayment plan at loan maturity to 
qualified brownfields owners or developers.  It  will also manage the environmental and financial 
risks posed by these properties for owners and developers. 
 
The Clean Land Fund has only recently begun operations, but  can benefit from the experiences 
of numerous state and local revolving loan funds dedicated to brownfields. It is financed by 
capital contributed from various private and local governmental sources and then leveraged by 
debt capital. The Fund has begun to provide loans throughout the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic.  
Loans will be directed primarily to creditworthy small to medium size companies and 
municipalities that might otherwise have difficulty obtaining financing.  The Fund provides 
favorable loan terms; however, it must set rates high enough to cover its interest costs on its debt 
capital. 
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This organization represents yet another model for a private effort to facilitate brownfields 
redevelopment.  It demonstrates that governmental efforts—such as revolving funds—can be 
duplicated in the private sector  without many of the administrative and bureaucratic restrictions. 
 
It would be difficult to name all the intermediary organizations currently involved in brownfields 
redevelopment.109  The list of participants is growing year by year, as new organizations emerge 
to fill niches in the brownfields market. Support of these organizations should be a top priority of 
philanthropic efforts.  
 
IV. Tax and Development Incentives  
 
A number of tax and other development incentives are offered by federal, state, and local 
governments to encourage private parties to redevelop brownfields sites.  These incentives 
typically involve mechanisms that have been applied in other policy contexts to induce socially 
desirable economic behavior. So although application of the incentive programs to brownfields is 
still new, the effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms is relatively well established. 
 
Together with insurance and some of the other programs discussed elsewhere in this report, tax 
and development incentives can leverage significant private investment in brownfields.  
Although, like other brownfields programs, this result is accomplished at some cost to the 
government (and taxpayers), in many cases this cost may represent a worthwhile public 
investment. These incentives can lead to increases in the future tax base, offset economic costs 
by indirectly reducing crime, homelessness, and substance abuse created by improved 
community conditions, and tangible social goods that outstrip the economic costs of various 
projects.  
 
Tax Increment Financing 
 
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is a common and effective mechanism used by local 
governments to provide incentives for commercial and industrial development.  In effect, TIF 
uses part of the projected growth in tax revenues to be derived from increases in property values 
created by redevelopment projects to pay to permit the projects to be undertaken. 
 
TIF funds are generally applied only to projects that would not occur but for the TIF incentives.  
Once it approves a project, a local government will issue bonds to finance part of the 
redevelopment effort.  The local government and/or TIF administrator will fix property 
assessments for the project site at pre-development values.  As property values for the project 
site increase, the local government and/or the TIF program will direct the additional tax revenues 
realized on the difference between the pre-development values and the post-development values 
toward payments of the obligations on the bonds.   
 
TIF has been used for years by local governments in connection with a wide variety of economic 
development projects.  It was developed as a means for raising the local share or match required 
for urban renewal projects.  It works particularly well for economic development projects that 
provide specific, measurable benefits to a select, well defined group of taxpayers.  Localities 
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often use TIF to pay for infrastructure development, including the creation of streets, sidewalks, 
water, and sewer lines.   
 
Surveys indicate that TIF is used in the majority of states throughout the country.110  It has only 
recently been directed toward brownfields redevelopment.  However, a number of analysts have 
suggested that TIF fits perfectly with brownfields needs and objectives.111  The City of 
Cleveland, Ohio, has moved aggressively to use TIF for brownfields purposes and many others 
are pursuing its use, as well.  Minneapolis, Dallas and Pittsburgh have all established TIF 
districts to encourage and finance the redevelopment of brownfields sites.   
 
Although experience in the context of brownfields redevelopment is limited, the success of TIF 
for other uses bodes well for its use as a tool in the redevelopment of brownfields.  It is very 
flexible in application, with local government—probably the best situated decision-maker in 
terms of site familiarity and public interest motivation—making decisions and setting priorities. 
TIF also makes development self-financing as redevelopment projects pay for themselves 
through the value they create.  To the extent that  the projects fail to create the projected 
increases in property values, bondholders rather than taxpayers bear the risk. 
 
TIF has little downside.  It is occasionally criticized for directing tax revenues to private 
developers rather than to traditional public institutions like schools and municipal services.  This 
argument neglects the significant public interests promoted by redeveloping contaminated 
property. Because TIF is based upon property assessments, it is necessarily a local mechanism.  
This hampers national implementation strategies.  However, as national brownfields initiatives 
progress, policy makers must seek to encourage local government use of TIF directed at 
brownfields redevelopment.  
 
Low Income Tax Credits 
 
In 1986, Congress created the federal low income housing tax credit to encourage private 
investment in the acquisition, rehabilitation, and new construction of low income rental housing.  
It is currently the largest federal program dedicated to the promotion of creation and maintenance 
of affordable housing construction for low to moderate income households. It was permanently 
extended by Congress in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. 
 
Under the program, the federal government grants tax credits to state jurisdictions that then 
allocate the credits to the developers and investors of local low-income housing developments. 
The tax credits may be taken annually for ten years by investors in qualified low-income housing 
projects to offset federal income taxes.  To qualify for the credits, rental housing developments 
must reserve either twenty percent of their units for persons making below fifty percent of the 
area median income or forty percent of their units for persons making below sixty percent of the 
area median income.112  The targeted units must be reserved for the target populations for fifty-
five years.  Twenty percent of the tax credits are reserved for rural areas and ten percent for non-
profit sponsors.113  Some states, such as California, have supplemented the federal program with 
their own state low-income tax credits.  State low income tax credits are generally provided only 
to those who qualify for the federal credits. 
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Like all tax credits, the low income tax credit provides a dollar for dollar reduction in taxes 
owed.  It consequently represents a significant investment by the community—which directly 
surrenders dollars it would otherwise add to its resource base—and serves as a powerful 
incentive for developers, who, in effect, receive public revenues for their projects.     
 
Results from a recent GAO study show that the program "has stimulated low-income housing 
development."114  The program sponsored the creation of 4,100 low-income housing projects 
from 1992 through 1994, providing private sector developers and investors with tax credits worth 
over $6.1 billion during that period.115  Most of the projects were apartments; the average cost of 
construction was approximately $60,000, and the average monthly rent of the units created was 
$435.116  The average income of the household residents was about $13,000. 117 
 
The program is not directed specifically toward environmentally contaminated properties and 
contains no incentives to select such sites for the development of low income housing.  However, 
the low income tax credit can be used in conjunction with a subset of brownfields redevelopment 
projects that qualify for the credits.  Brownfields sites are often  located near or in economically 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Many of these sites  have little or no commercial or retail 
potential.   The low income tax credit will permit developers to more readily turn these sites into 
affordable housing for the urban poor. 
 
The Circle F project in Trenton utilized a wide variety of funding sources, including an 
allocation of Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, state capital subsidy funds, and city 
funds.  In addition, Lutheran Social Ministries, the non-profit developer,  paid upwards of 
$500,000 of its own money for assessment and remediation activities.  LSM also teamed up with 
NatWest Bank, who provided $4 million in construction loans.  The two entities  formed a 
“limited partnership” that would be eligible for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.  As general 
partner, LSM maintains control over the project, which was awarded a total of $8 million in tax 
credits over a period of 10 years.118 
 
Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997 
 
On August 5, 1997, President Clinton signed the Taxpayer Relief Act (HR 2014/PL 105-34).  
The Act contains a major new tax incentive to spur the cleanup and redevelopment of 
brownfields in distressed urban and rural areas. This provision permits redevelopers to fully 
deduct environmental cleanup costs for properties in targeted areas in the year in which cleanup 
occurs.  Federal tax law generally requires that those expenditures that increase the value or 
extend the useful life of a property, or that adapt the property to a different use, be applied to 
capital accounts.  For tax purposes, the costs are then amortized over the life of the property.   
 
The change in the law means developers can take a much larger tax write off in year one, 
significantly reducing the up front cost of embarking on a brownfields cleanup.  The deductions 
are subject to recapture as ordinary income upon sale or other disposition of the property. 
 
The incentive applies to properties that are held by the taxpayer incurring the eligible expenses 
for use in a trade or business or for the production of income, or as part of the taxpayer's 
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inventory; contain or potentially contain hazardous substances; and are situated at “qualified” 
sites.  Qualified sites include:  
 
• Sites located within an Empowerment Zone or Enterprise Community (and any 
supplemental zone designated on December 21, 1994); 
• One of the seventy-six EPA Brownfields Pilot areas designated prior to February 
1997; 
• Sites within Census tracts in which twenty percent or more of the population is below 
the poverty level; 
• Sites within Census tracts that have a population under 2,000, have seventy-five 
percent or more of their land zoned for industrial or commercial use, and are adjacent 
to one or more census tracts with a poverty rate of twenty percent or more. 
 
Both urban and rural sites may qualify for the deduction if they meet the above geographic 
criteria.  Sites on the National Priorities List are not eligible.  Before taking the deduction, a 
taxpayer must obtain from the appropriate State environmental agency a statement that the 
property is in a targeted area and is eligible for the clean-up deduction due to release or disposal 
of hazardous substances at the property. 
 
The Brownfields Tax Incentive enacted by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 sunsets after three 
years.  It thus applies only to eligible expenditures incurred before January 1, 2001. During its 
three years of operation, the federal government estimates that the Brownfields Tax Incentive 
will provide deductions worth $1.5 billion.119  This public investment is expected to leverage 
$6.0 billion in private investment, leading to the return of an estimated 14,000 brownfields to 
productive use.120 
 
The Brownfields Tax Incentive was initially proposed as a permanent offering by the Clinton 
Administration, but was limited to three years during balanced budget negotiations.  If the law 
produces results, lawmakers should give serious consideration to making it permanent.  
 
Industrial Development Bonds 
 
Industrial development bonds are offered by many state and local governments. Through these 
programs, governments provide grants or loans on attractive terms to developers to assist efforts 
to improve properties to make them suitable for industrial use.  Bonds are just one form of 
support for such programs, which also receive funding through special property and other taxes, 
authorizations of unappropriated government surpluses, and proceeds from government sale of 
real estate and other property.  The programs are generally run by government economic 
development agencies; however, many are supervised by special-purpose authorities or 
corporations.   
 
Efforts should be made to more systematically tap industrial and economic development funds as 
a significant brownfields redevelopment resource.  To the extent that particular funds or agencies 
are concerned about dealing with contaminated properties, the creation of separate brownfields-
focused industrial development funds should be explored.  The establishment of such entities 
and/or their funding may require legislation.  Although the funds and agencies are necessarily 
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state and local enterprises, federal legislation could establish incentives such as matching funds 
to promote creation.  
 
EZ Facility Bonds 
 
As part of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress created the federal Empowerment 
Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Program.  This program, discussed at length elsewhere in 
this paper, is designed to promote redevelopment of economically distressed urban and rural 
communities and offers developers incentives to undertake such redevelopment projects.  One of 
the incentives created by the program is a new category of tax-exempt private activity bonds for 
use in the designated EZs and ECs, entitled “Qualified EZ Facility Bonds.” 
 
The federal program enables state and local governments to issue EZ Facility Bonds in order to 
assist “enterprise zone businesses” with the purchase, rehabilitation, and redevelopment of 
"qualified zone property."  The principal attractiveness of EZ Facility Bonds and the cause of 
their effectiveness in raising funds is their tax exempt status.  In order to retain this tax exempt 
status, the bonds must be issued in accordance with general federal guidelines for tax exempt 
bonds as well as specific program guidelines. 
 
In issuing EZ Facility Bonds, states must abide by restrictions on the aggregate value of bond 
issuance.  The aggregate amount of all private activity bonds, including EZ Facility Bonds, may 
not exceed $50 per capita or $150 million total (the “volume cap”).121  In addition, no more than 
ten percent of the debt service on the bonds may be derived from, or secured by, a trade or 
business.122  If states fail to adhere to these guidelines, the bonds lose tax exempt status.  In 
addition, EZ Facility Bonds must meet requirements imposed by the EZ/EC program.  At least 
ninety-five percent of the net proceeds from the bonds must be used to finance activity by an 
enterprise zone business on a qualified zone property, and certain uses related to such activity 
(for example, land where the business is located and a parking lot for customers and 
employees).123  An enterprise zone business may not use more than $3 million in EZ Facility 
Bonds for any one EZ or EC, and may not use more than $20 million in EZ Facility Bonds in 
aggregate no matter how many EZ or EC sites are involved. 124 
 
The program defines an “enterprise zone business” eligible to participate as a corporation, 
partnership, or sole proprietorship that meets certain criteria in the relevant tax year.  The 
requirements for eligibility as a “enterprise zone business” are relaxed during the start up of the 
business; it may be granted eligibility for the program so long as it shows bona fide efforts 
toward meeting all requirements and good prospects for achieving them. Also, an outlet of a 
national business that is located in a zone or community may be treated as an enterprise zone 
business if the local outlet would meet all qualification requirements were it a stand alone 
corporation.  Other requirements are also relaxed in the early stages of a project.  For bonds 
issued after July 30, 1996, a property that the owner reasonably expects will meet the qualified 
zone property requirements by a pre-specified “initial testing date” will be treated as qualified 
zone property prior to the testing date.  In addition, a property that meets certain substantial 
renovation requirements may be deemed qualified zone property even if it was not acquired by 
the owner after the EZ or EC designation went into effect and/or if the owner is not the first 
person to use the property in an EZ or EC.    
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Although a powerful tool for use within EZs and ECs, the EZ Facility Bond incentive is limited 
in its effectiveness due to its limited scope.  There are only six fully operative EZs—Atlanta, 
Chicago, Baltimore, Detroit ,Wayne County, New York, Philadelphia and Camden, NJ—plus a 
few additional cities moving toward full operation.  While there are sixty ECs, most of the 
country is left ineligible for participation in the EZ Facility Bonds program.  Moreover, the 
operation of state volume caps reduces the effectiveness of EZ Facility Bonds even in the areas 
in which they apply, as states must be wary of using too much of their private activity bond value 
allotment.   
 
EZs and ECs generally contain many brownfields sites.  All developers considering potential 
brownfields redevelopment projects should consult the EZ and EC lists to determine whether or 
not they can avail themselves of the benefits of the EZ Facility Bonds incentive.  Meanwhile, the 
federal government should consider whether  to expand the geographic reach of the program or 
grant it full or limited relief from application of the state volume cap limits in order to magnify 
the present effectiveness of the EZ Facility Bond program.  
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are investment funds that make pooled investments in 
real estate.  REITs are generally organized as corporations or other limited liability vehicles, and 
may be publicly or privately traded.  The corporations specialize in buying, improving, managing 
and selling real estate properties.  They act as the primary investor in the real estate properties, 
shielding individual investors from liability.  REITs often focus on a subset of the real estate 
market, such as residential housing, industrial properties, general commercial properties, or 
shopping centers. 
 
REITs account for a significant segment of real estate market activity.  Since their advent in the 
1960s, hundreds of REITs have been created throughout the country.  REITs invest in virtually 
all forms of real estate, and are the dominant investment force behind the growth of certain 
segments of the real estate market, such as apartment housing and shopping centers.  In 1992, 
REITs accounted for $6.5 billion of real estate investment.125 
 
As established vehicles for real estate investment, REITs offer promise to brownfields 
redevelopment.  Established REITs have significant expertise in analysis and planning of 
redevelopment projects—not to mention financial wherewithal—and should be encouraged to 
apply these resources to brownfields.  In general, the REIT model is a useful one for 
brownfields, as it offers a limited liability structure and the means to reduce risk through pooled 
and diversified investments. Brownfields initiatives ought to focus on encouraging REITs to add 
brownfields sites to their portfolios and on fostering the creation of brownfields or EZ/EC 
focused REITs. 
 
Revolving Loan Funds 
 
A revolving fund is a source of money that provides loans to specified parties.  Parties receiving 
loans reimburse the fund for the loans, often with interest.  As repayments are made, the funds 
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are automatically rededicated to the same authorized purposes, becoming available for additional 
loans.  So long as repayments are made, the fund will continue to have resources. 
 
Capitalization of revolving funds may come from private trust funds or from government 
authorizations of public monies.  There are many existing governmental revolving loan fund 
programs, including the wastewater state revolving funds (SRFs), the emerging drinking water 
revolving funds and a number of state transportation revolving funds.  In some cases, the U.S. 
government provides money to states on the condition that they establish and manage revolving 
funds according to certain federal requirements.  In other cases, the programs are entirely state 
government initiatives.  Both state and federal government programs typically involve loans with 
subsidized interest rates and otherwise generous repayment terms. 
 
A number of commentators have suggested that surplus dollars from the federal Superfund could 
be used either to capitalize a revolving loan fund at the federal level or to provide capitalization 
to the states to establish state revolving loan funds for brownfields activities.  Dedication of only 
ten percent of the surplus funds could provide $440 million for loans.126  Alternatively or in 
addition, state Superfund programs could set aside funds for state revolving loan funds.  Some 
state revolving funds capable of assisting brownfields redevelopers already exist.  All fifty states 
currently operate successful revolving loan programs for financing local wastewater treatment 
facilities, nonpoint source pollution control activities, and estuary program activities.   
 
In addition, a number of local governments have set up revolving loan funds to finance local 
infrastructure projects. The Economic Development Administration and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency are supporting the creation of revolving funds in cities across the nation to 
finance economic development and brownfields cleanup projects respectively. In 1997, EPA 
awarded  Dallas with a $350,000 Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund Pilot.  The city 
matched this grant, bringing the fund’s total to $700,000.   
 
On Capitol Hill, Reps. Ralph Regula (R-OH) and Peter Visclosky (D-IN) introduced a bill to 
establish a revolving fund to provide states with voluntary cleanup programs with funds to 
support local cleanup and redevelopment projects, with states repaying the funds five years after 
receipt.  Privately funded revolving loan funds such as the Clean Land Fund also offer hope for 
brownfields redevelopment.   
 
Either type of government program would provide significant assistance to brownfields 
redevelopment efforts.  According to many sources, a large number of brownfields projects stall 
due to lack of access to financing [need a citation here].  As discussed in other sections of this 
report, financial institutions often look warily upon brownfields projects, both because they have 
yet to become fully comfortable in fixing liability exposure and because insurance coverage is 
often not put into place (more on that later).  Revolving funds dedicated to loans for brownfields 
projects will create a pool of capital to meet the needs for loans that financial institutions often 
pass on serving.  The favorable loan repayment terms often included in revolving fund loan 
agreements will further serve to induce parties to undertake projects. 
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The Role of Insurance in Brownfields 
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The function of insurance is to permit the transfer and redistribution of risk.  One party—the 
insured—pays consideration to another party—the insurer—and in return the insurer assumes the 
insured’s risk and distributes it across a group of similarly situated parties that have each 
transferred their risk to the insurer through similar transactions.  Ideally, insurance should benefit 
the insurer and the insured. 
 
Insurance can thus make transactions happen that otherwise would not, and, in doing so, can 
benefit society.  Yet to do so, it must operate in practice as effectively as it does in theory.  
Policies must be available to consumers, they must cover the proper scope of risk, and they must 
be priced so that the insurance transaction leaves both the insurer and insured better off.  
Principally, this requires the elimination of imperfections that interfere with the smooth 
operation of the market.  To the greatest extent practicable, risks must be accurately and 
precisely quantified. 
 
The Role of Insurance in Brownfields Development 
 
Brownfields pose risks.  Virtually any party that takes a role in the redevelopment of a 
contaminated or potentially contaminated property faces potential economic loss.  Exposure can 
be great and is widely distributed, as statutes such as the federal Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”) and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and their state equivalents impose exacting standards 
and define responsibility expansively. 
 
To date, much brownfields activity has been deterred by the magnitude and unpredictability of 
the risks that brownfields sites pose.  However, the real estate market—which regularly accounts 
for contingencies such as changes in market conditions and interest rates and unpredictable 
occurrences such as fire and natural disasters—should be capable of adjusting to the risks posed 
by brownfields.  The key is construction of an operative third party environmental insurance 
market. 
 
Parties already use many traditional means to shelter themselves from risk, including 
government-issued “covenants not to sue” and “no action letters,” indemnification agreements, 
adjustments in land sale prices, and “self-insurance.”  However, as with other types of risks, third 
party insurance is a crucial component of effective brownfields risk management planning. It 
best permits land owners and operators to fix their costs so that they can acquire property and/or 
proceed with redevelopment with comfort. In addition, it is capable of covering all the parties 
relevant to brownfields redevelopment.     
 
As noted above, brownfields can inflict significant losses upon many parties.  The potential 
economic losses generally flow from three risks associated with responsibility for a brownfields 
property:  the risk of being forced to clean the site to comply with government-imposed 
standards; the risk of liability for impairment to property values caused by the brownfields 
property; and the risk of liability for personal injuries resulting from the contamination on the 
brownfields property. 
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Remediation poses certain risks.  During the 1970s and 1980s, society became more cognizant of 
dangers posed by environmental contamination.  In response, federal, state, and local 
governments crafted laws imposing rigorous standards of environmental cleanliness and making 
property owners (and certain other parties) responsible for compliance.  The result is that 
statutorily-responsible parties may be liable for the costs of any mandated cleanup to a federal 
and/or state government or to a private, third party that either shares the risk of cleanup liability 
or is potentially harmed by existing site contamination.  The costs of clean-up that may be borne 
by a responsible party are wide-ranging, including the cost of assessing and remediating a site, 
the cost of overruns, and the cost of  any  legal fees stemming from liability actions. 
 
Even following a cleanup, the risk of residual liability for further cleanup remains.  A 
responsible party remains at risk for compliance with regulatory changes that occur after 
approval or completion of remediation.  Moreover, additional remediation may be required upon 
recontamination or the post-remediation discovery of additional contaminants.  A party may not 
even fully rely upon a governmental release, which is typically provided in the form of a 
“prospective purchaser agreement,” “covenant not to sue,” “no action letter,” or  “comfort letter” 
that, under specific terms and conditions, purports to release a party from potential liability to the 
government and/or clarifies a potentially disputable legal or factual issue.  These releases do not 
release the potential claims of third parties.  Moreover, a government will generally carve out 
from a no further action letter or covenant not to sue the government’s rights to bring an 
enforcement action for contamination knowingly not addressed by the approved cleanup action 
or for later-discovered contamination that was not disclosed to the state. 
 
In addition to being wide-ranging in scope, remediation risks potentially apply to many parties.  
Potentially responsible parties under CERCLA and similar statutes include:  (1) present owners 
and operators of a Superfund, even if they did not contaminate the property; (2) past owners and 
operators of the facility where hazardous substances were disposed of improperly; (3) persons 
who arranged for the treatment, disposal, or transportation of hazardous substances at the site; 
and (4) persons who transported hazardous substances to disposal or treatment facilities that they 
selected.  Moreover, liability is joint and several, meaning each potentially responsible party is 
potentially liable for all cleanup liability.   
 
Major participants in brownfields redevelopment—including redevelopers and their financial 
backers—also face the risk of third party lawsuits for property damages caused to neighboring 
sites. As with remediation exposure, a party cannot extinguish its exposure to third party 
property-damage lawsuits through a well executed site cleanup.  For one thing, spill-over 
contamination and stigma may linger beyond a cleanup.  Moreover, no legal mechanism exists at 
either the federal or state level whereby a redeveloper can insulate itself from third party 
lawsuits; government has no right to release a party from liability to third parties under CERCLA 
or applicable state laws.127  
 
A party involved in the redevelopment of a brownfields site also faces risk that, if site 
contamination exists, it will bear the costs of lawsuits stemming from bodily injury caused by 
contamination existing on-site or migrating off-site.  For the same reasons outlined above, a 
party cannot extinguish exposure to third party claims via a thorough property cleanup.  
Environmental insurance is designed to meet the distinct needs of each relevant party. 
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Property Owners and/or Property Sellers 
 
Although an owner of brownfields property faces significant exposure from that property 
whether or not it decides to redevelop or sell the property, the owner to some extent increases 
exposure by pursuing redevelopment.  Activity on a property will call more attention to it.  
Activity may lead to the discovery of new contaminants.  Remediation can spread existing 
contaminants, lead to neighborhood nuisance, and/or business interruptions.   
 
Property owners can manage their existing and prospective risks before undertaking brownfields 
activity through insurance policies that include: pollution cleanup, owner-controlled insurance, 
pollution and remediation legal liability, remediation stop-loss, contractor’s pollution legal 
liability (as owners and operators will be jointly and severally liable for such),  and consultant’s 
environmental liability (as owners and operators will be jointly and severally liable for such).  
Most likely, a comprehensive policy covering all of the above types of insurance will make 
sense. 
 
Property Purchasers 
 
A prospective purchaser that has not previously been involved with a site has the most to lose, as 
it  acquires full responsibility for all liability stemming from past contamination of the site.  Even 
if the purchaser factors costs associated with known contamination into the purchase price, it will 
be at risk for any residual contamination that remains due to improper cleanup or any new 
contamination that is discovered during the remediation process.  It also will be responsible if the 
remediation process leads to the migration of contamination and/or creates any third party 
property damage or personal injury.  The purchaser will also be responsible for future cleanup 
necessary due to changes in governmental standards. The purchaser will need to rely on 
insurance to cover all of the risks discussed above as it will be responsible for each and may well 
demand that insurance be in place before completing the purchase transaction. 
 
Contractors, Project Managers, Consultants, and Lawyers 
 
Contractors, project managers, consultants and lawyers may be directly responsible to third 
parties under CERCLA, RCRA and analogous statutes as parties who arrange for the treatment, 
disposal, or transportation of hazardous substances at brownfields sites; and transport hazardous 
substances to disposal or treatment facilities that they select.  Contractor, manager and consultant 
activities also have the potential to aggravate existing contamination, lead to its migration and 
lead to additional contamination expenses, making contractors directly liable to injured parties 
under common law tort principles.  All third party professionals can also be liable to site owners 
and operators for any professional malpractice.   
 
Contractors which take part in brownfields redevelopment will want, at a minimum, to have 
contractor’s pollution legal liability insurance and to ensure that the owner/operator of the site 
has adequate insurance to cover other risks for which they can be jointly and severally liable.  
Consultants will want consultant’s environmental liability insurance.  Lawyers will want legal 
malpractice insurance. 
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Financial Institutions 
 
Until recently, financiers that lent money to owners or operators of brownfields sites had little 
ability to control their exposure to brownfields-related risks.  Courts found that lenders were 
directly liable for cleanup costs and damages (including personal injuries and property-damage 
costs) under CERCLA and CERCLA-like statutes if they had the capacity to participate in the 
management of a polluting business or contaminated site, whether or not they actually 
participated in management or held the polluted property as a collateral.  To the extent that a 
lender foreclosed upon a site held as collateral, it automatically became an owner of the site, 
subject to strict and joint and several liability.   
 
As noted earlier in this paper, CERCLA was amended in 1996 in order to limit lender exposure.  
Lenders are now insulated from liability under CERCLA unless they become active managers of 
a brownfields property in which they hold a security interest.  Lenders are now also permitted to 
foreclose upon property without losing liability protection.   
 
Still, the CERCLA amendment does not fully protect lenders.  Lenders must still be concerned 
with a number of risks: 
 
• the ability of borrowers to repay loans since borrower’s ability to do so may be jeopardized 
by cleanup costs;  
 
• the diminution of the value of their collateral, since, if they do foreclose, buyers will fear 
environmental problems;  
 
• the danger that despite the legislation they may still be liable under CERCLA, especially if 
after foreclosure they are forced to get involved in removing hazardous substances from their 
sites;  
 
• the danger that they could still be liable under twenty-five other federal statutes and a myriad 
of state laws;  
 
• the danger that irrespective of protections from liability they may be named as defendants by 
other private parties looking to tap financial “deep pockets” to recoup cleanup expenses. 
 
Insurance can protect lenders against the risks that borrowers will be unable to make loan 
repayments and the risk that they will themselves acquire direct legal liability.  Lenders will 
almost certainly require that creditors have full insurance in place as a prerequisite to any loan. 
 
Economic Development Agencies 
 
Economic development agencies seek to foster development and redevelopment, often focusing 
upon locations that would otherwise be unserved by the free market.  Yet despite a public 
interest point of view, economic development agencies cannot ignore economic realities.  
Discovery of environmental issues on the site may make redevelopment out of reach financially, 
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especially when exposure to brownfields liability risks are considered.  An economic 
development agency, just like a private, for-profit entity, must shelter itself against the full risk 
of environmental statutes and regulations. 
 
Environmental insurance has the power to facilitate brownfields redevelopment that would 
otherwise not occur.  Under existing law, a variety of participants in brownfields 
redevelopment—owners/sellers, buyers, contractors, project managers, consultants, lawyers, 
financial institutions, economic development agencies and municipal and state governments—
are all exposed to potential financial ruin upon the development of greater-than-expected 
environmental problems on a brownfields site with which they are involved.  Insurance provides 
a risk management tool whereby these parties can set their environmental liability risks and 
transfer them to another party.  In return for premium payments and/or payment of a set 
negotiated deductible amount, the insureds acquire protection against unanticipated costs, third 
party claims, the acts or omissions of other parties, and impairment of property values.  
 
Other risk management techniques exist.  Indemnification and hold-harmless agreements 
contractually allocate risk among parties. However, they are only as strong as the indemnifying 
party since upon that party’s default the joint and several nature of liability permits third parties 
to sue the indemnified party.  Government releases through “covenants not to sue” and the like 
are limited in effectiveness since they cannot release the claims of third parties.  Parties can only 
take so much comfort in competent, thorough site assessments and due diligence.  Adjustments 
in sale prices to reflect environmental liability cannot accurately account for as-yet-undiscovered 
contamination.  Given the magnitude of potential environmental risk posed by brownfields, self-
insurance (set asides to cover risk) is satisfactory only to the deepest of pockets.  In short, 
complete transfer of risk to third parties is far and away the most satisfactory means by which a 
brownfields participant can eliminate or reduce the uncertainty that exists for all parties involved 
in a brownfields property transaction.  
 
The Availability of Coverage 
 
A number of formal and informal surveys have been conducted to determine the availability of 
environmental insurance for use by brownfields participants.128 Do policies exist, are they widely 
offered, and are they broad enough to cover all relevant risks? 
 
In general, the results of the surveys are encouraging.  Analysts have found that insurance is 
available through major insurance companies.  Policies exist that focus upon all of the major 
financial risks posed by brownfields, including pollution cleanup, pollution and remediation 
legal liability, remediation stop-loss, contractor’s pollution legal liability, and consultant’s 
environmental liability. The environmental insurance market is not yet fully mature. Actuarial 
data, customer knowledge, and competitive pricing for all segments of the market are still 
developing. But interviews indicate that the insurance industry is becoming ever more 
comfortable with the risks posed by contaminated or potentially contaminated property and its 
ability to quantify them.  Ultimately, there is every reason to believe that environmental 
insurance is becoming widely available and capable of meeting many of the risk transfer needs 
of brownfields participants. 
 
 80
Major Insurance Companies Offer Policies 
 
Environmental insurance covering the risks posed by brownfields is offered by a number of 
major insurers.  Two of the largest such companies are American International Group (AIG) and 
Zurich-American Insurance Company, both AAA rated insurance companies.  Among other 
companies writing environmental policies are ECS, a subsidiary of Reliance National Insurance 
Company and an A- rated insurer), and United Coastal Insurance. 
 
Numerous environmental insurance underwriters, brokers and environmental insurance 
consultants also exist.  Among those often cited are J&H Marsh & McLennan Inc., ECI Inc., 
National Environmental Coverage Corp., LandBank, Environmental Warrantee, Lohman 
Insurance, BC Environmental Insurance Brokers, Inc., The Eric Group, Willis Corroon 
Environmental Risk Management Services.  
 
A wide variety of policies are offered, mixing and matching types of coverage.  The most 
common types of coverage are: 
 
Pollution Cleanup 
 
Pollution cleanup coverage protects potentially responsible parties against the financial risk that 
they will have to pay to remove presently unknown and/or not-yet-existing contamination in 
order to comply with government-imposed cleanliness standards.  Insurance permits potentially 
responsible parties to set costs related to such potential cleanup.  Complete coverage will account 
for the broad nature of cleanup responsibility imposed by CERCLA and CERCLA-type statutes.  
 
Owner-Controlled Insurance 
 
Owner-Controlled Insurance provides an owner of a site, a business operating on a site, or firms 
engaged in mitigation or removal and transport of the hazardous materials found on a site with 
protection against third party damage claims.  This includes coverage against claims for 
demonstrable health damage, for effects such as income losses associated with inability to use a 
site, and for so-called “diminution of value,” reduction in the value of the property or 
adjacent/nearby properties.   
 
Pollution and Remediation Legal Liability (PARLL) 
 
PARLL effectively encompasses both pollution cleanup and owner-controlled insurance 
coverage, combining coverage for first-party (on-site) cleanup and third-party pollution legal 
liability (bodily injury, property damage and cleanup costs).  It covers unknown, pre-existing 
contamination, current and future operational and environmental exposures, as well as the costs 
of an investigation, adjustment or defense of claims.  Defense coverage, which provides 
coverage for the costs of legal defenses, is generally optional, although often incorporated into 
liability coverages.  
 
Remediation Stop-Loss/Cleanup Cost Cap 
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Stop loss coverage protects an insured against a cleanup project that runs substantially over 
budget.  Before undertaking a brownfields redevelopment project, a party must set its budget, 
allocating funding to the cleanup of contamination and/or the cost of mitigating exposure risks 
on the property.  The party generally must also set aside funds for cost overruns and other 
uncertainties related to cleanup.  At some level, cost overruns will be intolerable.  Stop loss 
insurance helps reduce the risk of crippling cost overruns.  
 
Contractor’s Pollution Legal Liability (CPL)/Contingent Contractors Coverage 
 
CPL coverage provides protection against accidents resulting from contractors remediation 
activities.  It covers both sudden and gradual pollution conditions that result from covered 
operations performed by the insured.  It thus provides protection against third-party bodily injury 
and property damage claims as well as cleanup and defense costs. Under CPL policies, the 
insureds' clients may be covered as additional insureds. 
 
Consultant's Environmental Liability (CEL) 
 
CEL policies combine CPL coverage, discussed above, with environmental professional liability 
coverage.  The professional liability component of a CEL policy will generally cover “errors and 
omissions” related to environmental issues made by project consultants, project managers and 
engineering and legal firms.  Professional liability insurance is available not only as a component 
of a CEL policy, but also in a stand alone form for each type of professional (e.g. lawyer’s 
environmental malpractice insurance) or in an aggregate form for property owners or operators.  
 
Comprehensive Policies 
 
Comprehensive policies are available that shield brownfields participants from all risks that 
accompany brownfields activity, including remedial action, cost cap coverage, and coverage for 
post-remediation liabilities. These policies provide coverage for first party (on-site), third party 
pollution legal liability, and unexpected and unanticipated cost increases incurred during an 
approved site clean-up (remediation stop loss).  The comprehensive policy can be transferred by 
an insured owner along with the property, facilitating sales of brownfields properties.   
 
Environmental insurance has developed significantly over the last few years as insurers have 
become more comfortable with their ability to evaluate environmental risks.  Today, industry 
analysts categorize environmental insurance as a “buyer’s market.”129  The major trend in the 
environmental insurance market has been an increasing comfort level felt by insurance 
companies regarding the risks at issue.  In general, more companies are entering the market and 
offering more products.   
 
Insurance companies are also becoming increasingly flexible in their willingness to combine 
coverage’s and vary the amount of coverage in different elements of a combined policy, and 
have moved away from fixed ratios to tailored mixes.  Insurers offer both off the shelf and 
customized policies, providing flexible and responsive products that permit brownfields projects 
to proceed.130   The trend toward more flexibility in policy offerings in many cases permits 
consumers to more efficiently find and purchase coverage.  Consumers do not have to purchase 
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broader coverage than they want or need and do not need to purchase multiple policies to stitch 
together the full range of coverage that they want. 
 
Another recent development has been a trend toward longer terms being offered for many 
policies.  Many policies now offer coverage extending for ten years, whereas the previous 
maximum was three to five years.  The longer tail is highly significant, as it lets parties satisfy 
medium- and longer-term cost-benefit planning goals. 
 
The trends in the marketplace have made virtually full coverage of environmental risks possible.  
Coverage for certain types of risks remains tough to find, such as insurance costs incurred in 
defending rare but potential “private enforcement action” suits filed by private citizens to impose 
cleanup programs on property and/or, to pay damages for harm caused to animals, aquatic life, or 
entire ecosystems.  However, for the most part, effective insurance of otherwise activity-
deterring risks is now relatively easy to achieve.  Many experts now predict that environmental 
insurance is on its way to becoming as standard and integral a part of commercial real estate 
transactions as title insurance.131  
 
Cost of Coverage 
 
The fact that insurance is available to cover all the risks posed by brownfields redevelopment is 
only half of the story.  The insurance must also be available at reasonable prices relative to the 
risks it covers in order to best facilitate brownfields redevelopment. 
 
To date, there have been two major barriers to reasonable pricing:  (1) insurer uncertainty 
regarding the risks posed by brownfields, and (2) significant set costs in pricing any policy that 
increase the relative cost of coverage for small, less lucrative projects, often making the cost of 
insurance prohibitive. 
 
Because insurance companies are themselves conservative and risk averse, their reaction to 
uncertainty regarding the risks posed by a potentially insurable event is to either not write 
coverage at all or set the price of coverage high enough to protect themselves from high levels of 
exposure.  In practice, this led insurance companies to price most prospective environmental 
projects out of feasibility for a number of years as they attempted to learn the true nature of the 
risks posed by contaminated and potentially contaminated sites.  
 
Recently, insurers have become more familiar and thus more comfortable with environmental 
risks.  As a result, in general, the price of insurance has dropped. Typical coverage ranges from 
$2 to $10 million per policy, but overall policies range in coverage from $100,000 to $40 million 
per policy, with minimum coverage falling in the $100,000 to $1 million range and maximum 
coverage ranging from $10 million to $40 million per policy, depending on the insurance 
company.132  Premiums on these policies now range from $5,000 to $1 million, with widely 
variable deductibles; typical environmental insurance premiums average $5,000 per $1 million of 
coverage , but a fraction of the cost of the same coverage just a few years ago.133   These cost 
decreases may result in more brownfields projects carrying insurance. 
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However, some problems relative to coverage for smaller projects remains.  To some extent, this 
problem applies generally to the insurance industry.  All policies require some amount of 
administrative time and expense on the part of the insurer.  These costs, of course, are passed 
along to the insured.  With huge policies, the administrative costs are dwarfed by the coverage 
costs and thus are so spread out over the total costs of the insurance that they are hardly felt.  
However, proportionate to the cost of the coverage itself, administrative costs are far greater for 
small policies.  Hence, the smaller insured pays relatively more for the same unit of insurance.   
 
The small insured problem is exacerbated in the environmental insurance context.  One 
significant reason is that the risks posed by a particular site are highly unpredictable absent the 
collection of detailed project and site specific data.134  This data requires extensive, expensive 
surveys and assessments to determine the risks involved and the appropriate level of the 
coverage fee.  These expenses are recouped through a policy, or underwriting, fee, which is a 
fixed charge to all insurance applicants regardless of the amount of coverage sought (and 
regardless of whether insurance is obtained).  Insurers may also require a substantial up-front 
premium payment and set substantial deductibles, on all policies issued, again regardless of the 
coverage amount. These fees can raise the total cost of coverage to an uneconomical level for 
small projects or those with relatively low projected site cleanup costs and similarly limited 
liability risks.  
 
A survey conducted by the EPA revealed that the small insurance problem has kept the volume 
of sales of insurance policies low industry-wide.  Eight major companies in the environmental 
insurance industry confirmed that policies focus on the “high” end of the market; parties other 
than large, well-financed corporations often do not qualify for insurance and find it too 
expensive for their needs in any event.  As a result, insurance is rarely bought by such parties and 
many potential redevelopment projects are never undertaken. 
  
Recently, insurance companies have attempted to ameliorate the small insured problem (and sell 
more insurance) through the pooling of risks into portfolio or pooled coverage.  One insurance 
application can apply to the risks borne by multiple parties, or multiple risks borne by the same 
party.  Through this mechanism, some economies of scale are acquired, and the price of 
insurance for each smaller insured can be reduced.     
 
The small insured problem will never be completely solved; it is one of the inefficiencies of 
doing business on a smaller scale (which, in certain contexts, can be offset or more than offset by 
certain efficiencies of doing business on a smaller scale).  However, additional efforts to create 
mechanisms such as pooling that can reduce some of the relative burden on small insureds will 
undoubtedly occur and should further reduce costs.  Likewise, additional experience with 
environmental insurance will further reduce insurer uncertainty and lower insurance costs.  As 
the price at which an insurer can make a profit of an insurance contract goes down, more parties 
will purchase insurance and more brownfields will be redeveloped. 
 
Mechanisms to Encourage Use of Insurance 
 
As has been detailed above, insurance plays a vital role in plans to redevelop brownfields, just as 
it does in all types of real estate projects.  Overall, it appears that environmental insurance is on 
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the right track. Some developers maintain that the availability of insurance has been more 
important than state legislation in limiting their liability.135  Many brownfields projects are using 
insurance and proceeding to create economic benefits for private and public parties. The 
challenge is to continue to make cost-effective insurance more available to more parties so that 
brownfields redevelopment can go forward.  The market is already moving in that direction.  The 
only question is how far and how fast it will go.    
 
A review of relevant studies and prognoses suggests three broad types of activity that could 
enhance environmental insurance market operation and accelerate greater availability of cost-
effective coverage: 
 
Precise Definition of Risks  
 
Based upon the principle that insurers react to uncertainty by overpricing coverage, it follows 
that activities that help define relevant risks with precision have the potential to reduce the cost 
of coverage. Greater information and improved underwriting tools and methodologies would 
help to better determine potential risks in brownfields projects. 
  
Even complete information on issues relevant to risk will have a limited ability to define risks so 
long as legal liability application standards are not well defined.  Federal and state hazardous 
waste laws must be further refined or amplified so that parties can better predict when and how 
much they will be liable.  Enforcement and application of law should not be arbitrary.  If 
government makes environmental liability standards clear, insurance and other costs will 
accurately reflect considered policy determinations, and economic cost-benefit analyses and 
resulting behavior will proceed accordingly.   
 
Adjustment to Market Imperfections 
 
Economic markets never operate perfectly.  As was discussed above, in the context of insurance 
generally and environmental insurance particularly, one significant imperfection is the relatively 
greater cost of insurance for smaller, less lucrative projects.  The administrative cost of writing 
the insurance, rather than the cost of coverage reflecting the risks involved, may make many 
otherwise sound projects unsound economically.  Additional beneficial brownfields 
redevelopment will occur to the extent that adjustments can be made to offset some of the 
inefficiencies.  Possible strategies include: 
 
• Packaging and pooling risk: As was discussed above, some efforts to create efficiencies of 
scale through pooling of risk are already taking place.  To the extent that public and private 
activities can help smaller insureds and projects with potential for pooling find one another, it 
can assist these efforts. 
 
• Gap Filling Financing: Limited, directed assistance may help small parties and projects to 
pay for underwriting fees and other set charges.  Public interest entities may also lend 
guarantees that permit smaller parties and projects to take out insurance when they would 
otherwise be denied policies for lack of resources.  
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• Product Awareness Efforts:  Many surveys have revealed that potential insureds often do 
not possess adequate knowledge of potential environmental insurance products.  Hence, they 
do not explore insurance as a mechanism that can help them transfer risk that otherwise 
deters activity.  While dissemination of insurance information is clearly the responsibility of 
the insurance industry, public and private entities can assist brownfields redevelopment by 
aiding the dissemination process.   
 
Both the insurance industry and the commercial real estate industry are used to managing risks, 
often cooperatively.  While it has taken both industries a while to digest the new risks posed by 
environmental statutes constructed in the 1970s and 1980s, experience and comfort with 
environmental liability is growing.  Ultimately, the environmental insurance market should 
mature so that it operates as effectively as other insurance markets covering real estate related 
risks.  Some spot assistance could accelerate the maturation process.  Moreover, some market 
imperfections will always exist; spot assistance may overcome some of these imperfections and 
lead to more optimal levels of brownfields redevelopment.  
 
This report makes clear that many issues must be resolved in order redevelop tier two and three 
sites (those sites that will not be redeveloped strictly through the private market) and to move 
brownfields  forward.  Fear of liability, the stigma associate with contaminated properties, lack 
of financing, and lack of information must be eliminated through the joint effort of federal and 
state governments, the private and non-profit sectors and philanthropic institutions. If these 
stakeholders commit themselves to meaningful brownfields support and funding, the number of 
successful brownfields projects will increase dramatically.   
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In the past few years, stakeholders in a growing number of urban neighborhoods and rural areas 
have come together to make brownfields redevelopment work. These stakeholders recognize the 
economic and environmental potential of brownfields redevelopment and are committed to 
dismantling the barriers that continue to stymie redevelopment activity.   The case studies 
examined in this report are proof that innovative, effective solutions to the many obstacles facing 
redevelopment projects can be found.  From our case studies and research we know that 
brownfields redevelopment will thrive under the right conditions.  And conditions are favorable.  
As the U.S. economy continues its record-breaking expansion, generating higher tax revenues, 
corporate profits, and consumer spending, public and private institutions have new flexibility to 
invest in these complex and challenging projects.  In numerous cities, brownfields and related 
development efforts have flourished, spurring new job creation and business investment in once 
crumbling urban cores.  While cities still face major problems, the record of the last decade is 
clear that smart redevelopment can become an anchor for sustained, substantial growth. 
 
Our challenge is to create the policy and practice environment brownfields stakeholders need to 
move redevelopment projects forward.  This chapter outlines major recommendations that are 
needed to catalyze brownfields redevelopment.  The first set of recommendations address those 
areas where timely, strategic investment by the non-profit sector would be the most effective 
intervention. The second set of recommendations suggest policies the federal government should 
consider. While brownfields stakeholders continue to work with government to address the many 
public policy issues, the non-profit community should implement the following 
recommendations immediately and aggressively.  
 
1. Increase the Capacity of Community Development Corporations and Other 
Community-based Organizations to Participate in Brownfields  
 
Public and private efforts could have a particularly positive influence on brownfields by 
increasing the capacity of community development corporations and other community-based 
organizations.  Non-profit organization, philanthropic institutions, and local governments should 
make a significant financial commitment to this endeavor. 
 
As discussed previously, CDCs play an essential role in community-friendly brownfields 
redevelopment.  We also noted that CDCs are seriously under funded and under equipped to deal 
with the complexity of redevelopment.  Non-profits and philanthropic institutions, particularly 
those with a focus on urban revitalization and community building, would make an ideal partner 
for CDCs by  providing support to finance a whole range of activities, including: 
 
•  Planning activities, such as community meetings, design charettes (an intense effort to 
address design issues within a limited time), and economic and market studies. These 
activities can culminate in a comprehensive master plan for the site.  In addition, support 
could be provided to help communities develop a comprehensive neighborhood plan that 
would articulate the goals of the community and provide a blueprint for community wide 
growth and development. Philanthropic institutions could provide pilot planning grants to 
joint local government-neighborhood groups to develop a vision for neighborhood 
redevelopment that include remediation of brownfields and improving neighborhood 
quality. 
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•  Neighborhood outreach  to assess the needs of the community and to keep local 
residents informed of  project progress. 
 
•  Hire professional brownfields staff to assist with project management.  Staff would 
include technicians to assist on assessment and remediation, brownfields financing, or  
regulatory requirements.  The ideal brownfields professional would be familiar with all 
these aspects of brownfields redevelopment.  
 
•  Mediation/neutral third party  services, to help CDCs negotiate and work with other 
project partners when necessary.  The mediator would be in charge of  addressing areas 
of conflict and developing strategies to resolve the issue. The mediator would facilitate 
meetings, take notes, perform necessary follow up activities, form agendas and negotiate 
conflicts.   This allows the CDC (and other partners) to spend time on other facets of the 
project while conflict issues are being resolved. Once agreement is reached, the mediator 
would then make sure that all parties stick to the agreement. By addressing conflict in this 
way, the mediator would ensure that all parties are considered in the dispute, and prevent 
conflicts from escalating to the point that the project is derailed 
 
•  Develop and implement long term institutional controls over cleanup standards and end 
use.  Many states and localities now allow developers to tailor cleanup according to end 
use, capping or containing contaminants on site.  It is important that, over the long term, 
end use continues to be compatible with the conditions at the site, to ensure that 
conditions are safe for residential areas.  Ideally, these controls would be monitored by 
the community or municipality, not the developer or owner (trustworthy though they may 
be).  With support, CDCs can develop ways to ensure that the long term safety of local 
residents is maintained. 
 
•  Provide job training to local residences so that they can take advantage of employment 
opportunities created by the redevelopment.  Non-profit organizations such as the Local 
Initiative Support Corporation (LISC), philanthropic organizations or local governments 
could provide pilot job training grants to CDCs and community-based organizations. 
These grants can be used for a wide range of activities that: identify the types of jobs the 
project will create, the types of skills required, and the training local residents will need 
to fill these jobs ; find or establish training programs targeted to the identified jobs;  assist 
local residents in enrolling in training programs and accessing other job training services, 
such as career counseling, resume writing and interviewing skills; work with providers of 
environmental and construction services and end users to match local residents with job 
opportunities and create on-site learning opportunities. 
 
In short, public and private entities can offer CDCs the support they need in order to fully 
participate in the brownfields process. They can accomplish this by  creating a specific 
brownfields program area, or by incorporating brownfields into existing urban revitalization, job 
training, and community development program plans.  Either way, they should commit 
significant resources to provide the  support that CDCs desperately need.  With this support, 
CDCs will be playing on a level field with developers, municipalities, and other brownfields 
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stakeholders.  By partnering with CDCs and other community based organizations, non-profits, 
foundations and local governments can increase exponentially the capacity of local residents to 
participate in the growth and redevelopment of their communities. 
 
2. Create a Nationwide Group of Brownfields Development Corporations 
 
Non-profit organizations and philanthropic institutions should fund the creation of brownfields 
development corporations.   
 
Most of the financial intermediaries that currently work on brownfields and brownfields-related 
issues have a  regional or local focus.  Philanthropic institutions and other non-profit 
organizations should create a nationwide group of intermediaries to stitch the various local and 
regional efforts together, giving them greater coherence, stature and resources. 
 
A few such corporations exist in the private sector. For example, Brownfields Realty, Ltd., is a 
Pennsylvania company that provides comprehensive services to the owners of  environmentally 
impaired properties.136  According to company literature, Brownfield Realty “will assume 
regulatory responsibility for the environmentally compromised property, provide funds for 
efficient remediation, provide environmental insurance and/or secure agency approvals necessary 
to return the property to profitability.”  The company will also buy contaminated properties, at 
which point it  “provide a full indemnification to the owner for all environmental liability.” The 
company recoups its investment through redevelopment and sale or lease of the property.   
 
Likewise, the Brownfields Recovery Corporation (BRC) also buys and redevelops brownfields 
properties.137   BRC, a New England based company,  is a partnership between  Environmental 
Reclamation, Inc. (ERI) of Cape Cod, a remediation firm, and Mugar Enterprises, Inc. of Boston, 
a commercial realty firm. BRC buys contaminated properties, with ERI providing the technical 
expertise and Mugar Enterprises addressing real estate issues.  And like Brownfields Realty, 
BRC provides a solution to liability and financing issues plaguing many brownfields sites.   
 
The creation of non-profit brownfields development corporations will provide a vehicle for the 
participation of many brownfields stakeholders that have not been helped by current federal and 
state level programs. The corporations would offer services to both publicly and privately owned 
sites, services that include financing, technical expertise, and regulatory assistance.  The 
corporations would  work in partnership with relevant state and federal regulatory agencies to 
ensure full compliance with regulatory requirements.  
 
The development corporations would agree to hold the parties harmless in the event the parties 
faced future liability not caused by their direct actions, and the liability would be assumed by the 
corporations themselves.  Such contracts should be relatively easy to draft and should be very 
attractive to the parties to whom they are offered. 
 
Insurance coverage would be essential to cover the risk absorbed by the brownfields 
development corporation.  The purchase of insurance would guarantee that the development 
corporation would have the resources to meet any future obligation. With insurance, the risk 
assumed by publicly created brownfields development corporations can be controlled and shared.  
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Without it, or some other mechanism to replace insurance, the risk is too high, for a public 
corporation or a private one. 
 
The non-profit sector should make a major investment in developing  brownfields redevelopment 
corporations. A significant investment of philanthropic capital would  result in  well-capitalized 
entities able to tackle the legal, financial, and environmental complexities of redevelopment for a 
wide range of products.  Such an approach would provide the opportunity to address the 
brownfields liability issues in innovative ways that would allow for a solution within the context 
of current laws.     
 
3. Support Existing Brownfields Intermediaries 
 
Philanthropic organizations, state and federal governments, and the private sector should fund 
and support existing brownfields intermediaries. Intermediaries have the ability to provide a host 
of specialized services not currently available to brownfields stakeholders.  As such, they have 
the potential to play a major role in future brownfields redevelopment efforts. 
 
Significant gaps exist in current brownfields funding and support structure.  The most obvious is 
a shortage of financing for the “up front” costs of assessment and remediation.  In addition, many 
brownfields projects are stymied because developers cannot find reliable information regarding 
cleanup regulations, sources of financing or effective redevelopment techniques.   Some projects 
have both the necessary financing and the technical know how, but struggle with dissension 
among the redevelopment partners over how to proceed. And there are those sites that will never 
attract private investment until they are assessed and remediated and have received the necessary 
regulatory approval.  These sites require a party that is willing to shoulder the cost and 
responsibility of readying parcels for the private market.   
 
Non-profit brownfields intermediaries such as the California Center for Land Recycling, the 
Development Fund, and the Consumers Renaissance Development Corporation play an 
invaluable role in filling gaps left by current brownfields initiatives, including: 
 
• Information Dissemination:  Due to the large number of issues and problems presented by 
brownfields, an information clearinghouse that collects, stores and effectively disperses 
information on subjects ranging from financing sources to cost effective remediation 
techniques to regulatory burdens can be invaluable.   
 
• Neutral Third Party:  A neutral organization with no financial interest in a prospective project 
and with a trustworthy reputation can play an important role in bringing essential parties 
together, verifying remediation plans and long term risk based land use; providing dispute 
resolution and mediation between parties, such as developer and community; promoting 
effective community education of the science and risks involved in a project; and gathering 
community concerns and aspirations for the purpose of finding common ground with 
proposed projects.  
 
• Central Planning:  Sometimes, a land recycling company is better placed than a private 
developer to make a project happen.  In such cases the company may work with various 
 91
community interests—city government, redevelopment agencies, community and 
environmental organizations and private interests—to put together an economically feasible 
plan which results in cleanup and community enhancing reuse.  In such cases, the company 
may either self-finance and own/manage the project itself or may work together with a third 
party purchaser. 
 
• Financing:  land recycling companies and financial intermediaries may also directly finance 
brownfields assessment and cleanup activities.  
 
Non-profit brownfields intermediaries exist in a number of states, and their activities generally 
have a state or regional focus. These organizations were formed in response to a particular set of 
local needs, be it lack of information, financing or technical assistance.  As a result, they are best 
able to assess the needs of local brownfields stakeholders and facilitate  brownfields 
redevelopment in their area. But as non-profit organizations, most of these organizations operate 
with limited financial resources.  The range of activities they can engage in, and the number of 
stakeholders they can serve, are similarly limited by financial constraints, regardless of how 
critical their services.  To expand the power and ability of these organizations to facilitate 
brownfields redevelopment, resources should be directed toward supporting existing 
intermediaries.  
 
Both the public and private sector should make a major financial commitment to brownfields 
intermediaries.  This funding is critical if the more marginal brownfields sites are to be 
redeveloped, as brownfields intermediaries are particularly sensitive to the smaller, more 
polluted, underfunded brownfields projects. Only a small portion of brownfields projects receive 
EPA or other federal assistance.  Another small portion of sites are redeveloped by the private 
sector.  These sites are often lightly contaminated, well located properties that require little or no 
outside assistance.  But the remainder of the sites require some level of subsidy if they are to be 
redeveloped and returned to productive use. Brownfields intermediaries offer these sites the 
assistance they need.  
 
4. Create a Brownfields Information Network 
 
To increase the amount of information available to brownfields stakeholders, non-profit 
organizations should fund the creation of a comprehensive brownfields information network.  
 
Although several Internet sources provide a great deal of brownfields information and education, 
no site has assembled a  comprehensive collection of brownfields resources. We have identified 
lack of information as a barrier to redevelopment, and it is crucial that more information be made 
available to all brownfields stakeholders, including lenders, developers, community 
organizations, project managers, and land owners.  Unfortunately, federal and state governments 
are not particularly adept at creating such systems.  Government agencies tend to be too slow, 
too bureaucratic, and subject to political pressures.  Instead, the network should be funded by one 
or more non-profit or philanthropic organizations and  housed in a non-profit or university 
setting.  A relatively modest investment could create and maintain an on-line resource that would 
contain publications, information on insurance products, regulatory requirements, and funding 
options, consultants, engineers, lawyers and developers, and present models, best practices and 
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case studies of successful brownfields redevelopment.   Links should be established to all useful 
brownfields resources, and the site should feature interactive functions such as discussion 
forums, chat rooms, “Ask the Experts,” and other mechanism to allow brownfields stakeholders 
to share their knowledge and experience. 
 
This report makes clear that money and support is available for brownfields developers and 
stakeholders.  But it also makes clear that these resources are fragmented, poorly organized, 
poorly publicized and, therefore, not easily accessible. The case studies in this report provide ten 
models of innovative brownfields projects.  What is needed are more models of successful 
brownfields redevelopment that demonstrate how to make things happen in the real world, 
models that can be replicated by other brownfields stakeholders.  In particular, lending 
institutions and the private sector need models of how to manage the complex liability issues that 
pose the greatest barriers to widespread redevelopment.   With a relatively modest investment, 
non-profits can study and publicize on the Brownfields Information Network examples of 
successful brownfields redevelopment. 
 
In addition, non-profit organizations should fund community education programs. Stigma and 
liability are issues that often impede brownfields cleanups. There are many brownfields 
education programs  in the U.S, but few are targeted to the grass-roots and the community, 
particularly, faith-based and local citizens groups. The programs currently in operation are small 
in scope and fail to reach youth and fail to set up ways in which members of a community with 
similar problems can meet and exchange ideas. 
 
Non-profits could make a major contribution by funding  the development of an education 
program that talks about how brownfields redevelopment could improve neighborhood quality, 
lead to jobs, and increase public health. Developing a high quality  program, including the 
development and distribution of educational materials, would require a relatively modest 
investment.  Program information  would also be  made available on the brownfields information 
network. A carefully thought through educational program created for brownfields and 
neighborhood redevelopment would substantially expand the education efforts in place today by 
placing brownfields redevelopment in the context of larger neighborhood, economic and social 
issues. 
 
5. Improve the Environmental Information Available to Insurance Companies  
 
The private and non-profit sector should assist insurance companies in improving the 
underwriting  methodologies they use by increasing and improving the  environmental 
information available to them. 
 
The key to giving mainstream financial institutions further comfort, and thus to accessing 
significant additional funds for brownfields projects, is insurance.  Insurance can protect lenders 
against the risk that borrowers will be unable to make loan repayments and the risk that they will 
themselves acquire direct legal liability.  Lenders will almost certainly require that creditors have 
full insurance in place as a prerequisite to any loan. 
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As has been detailed previously, it appears that, overall, environmental insurance is on the right 
track.  Many economic brownfields redevelopment projects are already employing insurance and 
proceeding to create economic benefits for private and public parties.  The challenge is to 
continue to make more cost-effective insurance available, so that more brownfields 
redevelopment can go forward.  The market is already moving in that direction, although the use 
of environmental insurance on brownfields projects is still limited.  The question now is how 
environmental insurance can reach a broader audience and how fast it will go.    
 
Three broad types of activity have the potential to enhance and accelerate greater availability of 
cost-effective coverage:  precise definition of risks; adjustments to market imperfections; and 
improvement of market awareness of products. 
 
Based upon the principle that insurers react to uncertainty by overpricing coverage, it follows 
that activities that help define relevant risks with precision have the potential to reduce the cost 
of coverage.  Such activities will certainly relieve imperfections in the market and make it 
operate more efficiently.  In order to achieve this result, emphasis should be placed upon 
improving the environmental information available to insurance companies and the underwriting 
tools and methodologies they use. 
 
While the insurance companies are best placed to refine tools and methodologies, these can only 
be as useful as the data fed into them.  Thus public and private efforts to create comprehensive 
data banks containing community and site specific contamination information, liability histories, 
lender/creditor policies and reports, and other information pertinent to assessing risk, will help 
insurance companies better understand the true nature of risks for any given site, reduce costs, 
and promote wider availability of insurance. 
 
6. Break the Logjam of Sites Mothballed by Corporate Deep Pocket Owners 
 
A number of people interviewed for this report stressed the issue of mothballed sites as a 
problem that must be solved.  They articulated a unique role for philanthropic institutions:  to 
help Deep Pocket corporate land owners to return idled sites to active use.  As discussed 
previously in this report, the prevalence of sites mothballed by, typically, Fortune 500 
corporations that fear being held liable for contamination on their property, or want to avoid the 
expense of cleanup, is a barrier to brownfields redevelopment. Yet these properties may be 
located in a residential area, posing a health threat and contributing to neighborhood blight.  Or it 
may be a property that a local municipality needs as part of a larger redevelopment (one mayor 
of a small New Jersey city has sued a large corporation over mothballed sites, arguing that one 
third of the entire city is stigmatized by the massive unproductive facility).  Even if better end 
uses for the site are identified, redevelopment cannot take place unless the owner agrees to 
relinquish  or redevelop the property.   
 
Many philanthropic organizations, because of their resources and prestige, are in a position to 
address mothballed sites.  For a modest sum, philanthropic organizations  could  fund an analysis 
that looks at the distribution of mothballed sites. That analysis would lead to the identification of 
locations where it is in the interest of the local government and the company to redevelop all or 
part of the site.  A few widely trumpeted success stories-publicized on the brownfields 
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information network-could stimulate more companies to return properties to active use, and 
could encourage Congress to unblock the legal barriers to redevelopment that lead to 
mothballing in the first place.   
 
As large an undertaking as some of the above recommendations may seem, none are so daunting 
as the task of  changing the federal laws that govern the cleanup and redevelopment of 
brownfields and Superfund sites.  Despite successful efforts at the state level to resolve liability 
and move redevelopment forward,  the specter of federal liability still hangs over private lenders, 
property owners, and prospective purchasers.  Its effect is chilling, and private lenders and 
prospective purchasers will continue to shun brownfields redevelopment until the federal 
government orchestrates a major restructuring of brownfields law.   
 
Federal Government Recommendations 
 
Amend Federal CERCLA (Superfund) Law and Pass Comprehensive Federal 
Brownfields Legislation 
 
1. REFORM SUPERFUND AT LAST 
 
For the most part, mainstream private financial institutions are not willing to invest in or make 
loans to brownfields properties.  This is due primarily to fear of being held liable for 
contamination, and paying the extra costs associated with assessing and remediating a 
brownfields property.  Most mainstream banks do not have the staff or technical expertise to 
adequately assess the risks of redeveloping contaminated, or potentially contaminated, 
properties. 
 
Legal liability is a key factor in environmental cleanup.  All parties—current owners, past 
owners, lenders, developers, or others involved in environmental cleanups or prospective 
cleanups—are affected by liability issues. 
 
The private financial industry is reluctant to take on the liability of a contaminated site because  
the potential downside cost is so enormous.  Insurers are unwilling to insure; developers are 
unwilling to commit money; lenders are unwilling to lend.  While joint and several liability is 
intended to allow for recovery from multiple guilty parties for “inseparable” harm, conservative 
legal advice when joint and several liability is involved is constantly the same: don’t get 
involved because you could become responsible for everything, even if it happened years or 
decades before you got involved.  The result of the application of joint and several liability is 
often simply an unwillingness to participate in a transaction where environmental cleanup is 
required. 
 
It should not be the case that such a liability standard creates insurmountable problems.  All 
parties are worried about being forced to pay for unforeseen future, expensive cleanup because 
they become part of an effort to cleanup and develop a site.  However, businesses and individuals 
face many types of potential catastrophic loss in their everyday dealings, and such possibilities 
are rarely permitted to paralyze their activities.  In virtually every context, parties are capable of 
constructing mechanisms to control the risk posed by potential catastrophic circumstances.  
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There is no reason that CERCLA liability, any more than other forms of potential catastrophe, 
should pose an insoluble obstacle.  If the threat of liability for future cleanup can be controlled, 
then the predominant threat to cleanup can be removed. 
 
A number of major financial institutions have become involved with brownfields redevelopment, 
albeit on a rather small scale.  The 1996 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit 
Insurance Protection Act, which amended CERCLA in order to limit lender exposure, has gone 
part way toward allaying liability concerns.  Lenders are now insulated from liability under 
CERCLA unless they become active managers of a brownfields property in which they hold a 
security interest, with “active management” being determined by reference to a clearly 
articulated list of types of action that give rise to exposure.  Lenders are also permitted to 
foreclose upon property without losing liability protection so long as they follow the steps set 
forth in the 1996 amendment 
 
Yet the amendment to CERCLA does not fully protect lenders.  Lenders must still be concerned 
with:  (1) the ability of borrowers to repay loans since borrower’s ability to do so may be 
jeopardized by cleanup costs; (2) diminution of the value of their collateral, since, if they do 
foreclose, buyers will fear environmental problems; (3) the danger that despite the legislation 
they may still be liable under CERCLA, especially if after foreclosure they are forced to get 
involved in removing hazardous substances from their sites; (4) the danger that they could still 
be liable under twenty-five other federal statutes and a myriad of state laws; and (5) the danger 
that irrespective of protections from liability they may be named as defendants by other private 
parties looking to tap financial “deep pockets” to recoup cleanup expenses. 
 
Mainstream financial institutions need more comfort in investing in and loaning on brownfields 
properties so that brownfields redevelopment projects can access significant additional resources.  
For this to occur, the risks facing financial institutions must become more clearly defined, more 
circumscribed and more manageable.   
 
In nearly every Congress, numerous liability reform proposals, often dozens, are submitted and 
fail to get out of committee.138 While many, if enacted, would have a significant impact on the 
pace and course of brownfields redevelopment, they are inevitably abandoned.139  This frustrates 
many analysts, and has led to a proliferation of law review articles and other opinion pieces 
which propose comprehensive theoretical federal reform packages. Just as inevitably, in every 
Congress a new round of reform bills are submitted by members of Congress and the cycle 
renews. 
 
The sticking point in reauthorization of CERCLA is who pays for the cleanup of contaminated 
sites. Without liability, insufficient funding will exist for cleanups of contaminated sites, a result 
that DOJ, EPA, environmental activists, and a pro-environment electorate will not tolerate.  The 
only alternative to private liability would be governmental funding of cleanups, and such an 
enormous financial undertaking by the federal government is not possible in the current political 
climate.  Conservatives will not accept federal responsibility and no one will accept the tax 
burden. Those with knowledge of the political situation agree that the cycle will not be broken 
any time soon.  
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Nonetheless, the 106th Congress is attempting to resolve questions over Superfund once again.  
In the Senate, Frank Lautenberg  sponsored S.20, the Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup 
Act of 1999. Among other provisions, it calls for amendments to CERCLA to exempt innocent 
landowners, prospective purchasers and contiguous property from federal liability.  Numerous 
people interviewed for this report, in both the private and public sector, indicated that liability 
relief for these categories of property owners is urgently needed.  They do not call for the 
wholesale abandonment of joint and several liability: the chain of title will still dictate who is 
considered a potentially responsible party.  
 
Liability relief for innocent landowners, adjacent landowners, and, in particular, prospective 
purchaser, will increase the number of property owners, developers and lenders willing to invest 
in brownfields redevelopment.  This, in turn, will dramatically increase the amount of private 
capital available to brownfields stakeholders.  
 
2. EXPAND FINANCING FOR ASSESSMENT AND REMEDIATION 
 
Securing adequate financing for a project is a core challenge for many brownfields project 
managers and developers.  They face limitations on the types of funding available, and 
restrictions placed on those funds that are available.  In particularly short supply is financing to 
cover the costs of assessment and remediation.   
 
Governments—state, federal, and local—have limited resources.  They are capable of providing 
financing assistance in a number of forms, including grants, loans, and tax incentives.  Yet the 
assistance provided to any objective must both fit within limited budgets and compete with a 
multitude of other projects for the available funds.  A variety of public financing programs exist 
that either currently or potentially benefit brownfields redevelopment efforts.  These programs 
bridge the gap for up front costs such as assessment and remediation.   
 
As of March 1999, the federal government had provided a  total of over $46 million to fund 250 
brownfields grants.140  According to the Clinton Administration, these grants have leveraged 
over $1 billion for redevelopment and created over 2,500 jobs.141  These numbers are 
encouraging, but more must be done to increase funding to brownfields activities. 
 
To increase funding for brownfields programs, efforts should be made to get federal and state 
legislatures to authorize more dollars.  Moreover, efforts should be made to obtain legislative 
and/or regulatory directives that funds from such programs be targeted directly to brownfields 
projects only.  Initiatives can take the form of including brownfields redevelopment within 
existing general programs and/or establishing subsidiary or similar, new programs with a 
brownfields-only focus.   
 
For instance, the federal government, in partnership with state governments, should create a 
well-funded brownfields state revolving loan program. 
 
As part of the Clean Water Act, the federal government authorized the creation of state  
revolving funds (SRF) to aid cities and local communities in their efforts to protect drinking 
water and water quality. According to EPA,  states then make loans to communities, individuals, 
and others for high priority water-quality activities. As money is paid back into the fund, new 
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loans are made to other recipients that need help in maintaining their quality of water. 
Municipalities and other loan recipients realize financial savings because projects funded 
through this program cost less than those funded through the bond market.142 SFR’s in all fifty 
states and Puerto Rico finance agricultural, rural, and urban runoff control projects, and 
alternative  treatment technologies.143 Capitalization began in 1988; today total assets of the SRF 
program stand at more than $27 billion.144  
 
In FY 1997, EPA operated a Brownfields Cleanup and Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF), 
awarding twenty-four Pilots, each funded at $350,000.145 According to EPA the “purpose of 
these pilots is to test a model for a brownfields cleanup revolving loan fund.  Unlike EPA 
brownfields pilots, money from the revolving loan fund can be used for remediation and 
demolition activities, among others (EPA pilot grants are restricted to assessment, outreach, and 
planning activities).   
 
In FY 1998, Congress did not reauthorize funding for BCRLF, despite widespread approval of 
exactly this type of funding among many brownfields stakeholders interviewed for this report.  
In fiscal year 1999, Congress restored funding to the BCRLF program. As of October 1999, EPA 
has awarded 68 BCRLF pilots, of up to $500,000 each.146  
 
Many people interviewed for this report expressed strong support for BCRLF, mainly because  
of the broader range of activities for which these funds can be used.  BCRLF grants solve the 
problem of covering up front costs such as assessment, remediation, and demolition that are 
often the key to project success.  Yet BCRLF has its drawbacks.  Only those sites selected as 
EPA brownfields pilots or sites selected for targeted site assessment are eligible for BCRLF 
grants. 
 
In light of this fact, this report recommends that the federal government create a brownfields 
state revolving fund, funded at similar levels as the clean water fund.  Instead of awarding loans 
to individual projects, EPA would award seed money to each state to finance a brownfields SRF.  
A brownfields SRF will give non-EPA pilot project access to a greater pool of funds than 
currently available, and allow states more options in funding redevelopment projects.  Criteria 
should be established to ensure the greatest number of projects are eligible for SRF loans, and 
can be modeled after clean water SFRs currently administered by EPA.  A well funded, highly 
accessible revolving loan fund will go a long way towards solving the problem of financing for 
many brownfields stakeholders, and will be particularly helpful in financing the up front costs of 
assessment and remediation. 
 
Financing brownfields projects will also be easier if the federal government modifies and 
extends the Brownfields Tax Credit beyond year 2001. 
 
A provision in the Tax Payer’s Relief Act of 1997 permits developers to fully deduct 
environmental cleanup costs for properties in targeted areas in the years in which cleanup occurs.  
This means developers can take a much larger tax write off in year one, significantly reducing 
the up front costs of embarking on a brownfields cleanup.  Many people interviewed for this 
report cited this provision as the type of creative financing options that facilitates brownfields 
redevelopment.  Unfortunately, the provision sunsets after three years and thus applies only to 
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expenditures incurred before January , 2001. Three years is not enough time for this provision to 
be effective.147   
 
In 1999, the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials 
(ASTSWMO) conducted a survey of states on the use of the Brownfields Tax Incentive Program.  
They found that the brownfields tax incentive is not being widely used. “Nationwide, of a total of 
fifty-two applications for eligibility determinations had been received by seventeen states, for 
which twenty-nine eligibility certifications had been issued. At the time of the survey, half of the 
respondents (seventeen states) had not received a single request form.”148  According to 
ASTSWMO, many states feel that the tax incentive program is not being extensively utilized by 
developers because of the program’s narrowly defined eligibility requirements, a lack of 
awareness about the program, a lack of guidance on which costs the exemption covers, and the 
program’s limited value as a financial incentive.  In addition, states identified the program’s 
short time frame as problematic, that developers who are just now becoming aware of the 
incentive will not have time to take advantage of it before it sunsets.   
 
We recommend the extension of the Brownfields Tax Incentive for at least several more years, to 
give developers further opportunity to take advantage of the incentive, and increase the private 
investment that has been generated by the provision.  The federal government should also do 
more to publicize the availability of the tax incentive and promote its use. We also recommend 
modifying the terms of the incentive program to include a greater range of projects and activities 
covered under the exemption.  Many states have implemented tax incentive programs of their 
own, and states indicate that “their tax incentives are becoming important tools in their 
‘brownfields tool boxes,’ and suggest that Congress look to these programs as possible models if 
the federal tax incentive is extended.”149 
 
As part of any government redevelopment financing, federal and state governments should 
require community participation notification for all their brownfields grant and loan programs. 
For instance, as part of the brownfields pilot grants, EPA requires the grant recipient to meet 
certain community participation and notification criteria. Grant recipients conduct activities such 
as neighborhood surveys, public or town hall meetings, and design charettes to solicit input and 
support for the project.   This ensures that the local community is aware of the development plan, 
and has an opportunity to participate in the decision making process.  
 
All federal brownfields funding programs should include similar community notification and 
participation requirements for projects that will affect local residents.  In addition, private 
financial institutions, private developers, and corporations involved in brownfields 
redevelopment should be encouraged to inform and involve local residents.  Though a valid 
question can be raised over how much public input should be allowed into a private development 
transaction, residents have the right to participate in projects that affect their community.  In the 
end, having a good working relationship with the affected community will minimize conflict and 
facilitate successful development. 
 
Finally, it is critical that comprehensive information regarding brownfields financing options is 
made accessible from a centralized location (such as EPA’s brownfields web pages) including 
eligibility requirements, qualified activities, and application assistance.  
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This information could also be compiled and organized as part of the brownfields information 
network, with the assistance of federal and state government officials.  This would be a relatively 
inexpensive initiative, but will be useful to those stakeholders applying for public funds.  
Increasing financing options and expanding federal programs related to brownfields will be 
useless if people do not know what is available or how to access it. 
 
3. CLARIFY AND COMMUNICATE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INSURANCE 
 
Even when risks are precisely defined, economic markets never operate perfectly.  One example 
is the relatively greater cost of insurance for smaller, less lucrative projects.  The administrative 
cost of writing the insurance, rather than the cost of coverage reflecting the risks involved, often 
makes otherwise sound projects unsound economically. New approaches to this are problem are 
essential to spur additional brownfields development. These approaches include packaging or 
pooling risks of small insureds, and expanded public and private efforts to provide gap filling 
financing.  Limited, directed assistance may help small parties and projects pay for underwriting 
fees and other charges that cover the difference between a party’s ability to pay for the costs of 
coverage and its inability to pay for the cost of coverage plus administrative costs. 
 
Finally, many surveys have revealed that potential insureds often do not possess adequate 
knowledge of environmental insurance products.150  Even when potential purchasers are aware of 
insurance covering brownfields risks, they may lack knowledge needed to feel comfortable in 
purchasing such policies.  Because coverage has evolved toward customized policies, the range 
of issues and options has proliferated to the point where medium and small size purchasers often 
do not have the resources to easily navigate the purchasing process.151 As a result,  insurance that 
could launch or solidify a redevelopment project goes unpurchased.   
 
Public and private efforts to educate potential purchasers of insurance would aid brownfields 
redevelopment.  While dissemination of insurance information is clearly the responsibility of the 
insurance industry (which should benefit from it), public and private entities can assist 
brownfields redevelopment by aiding the dissemination process.   
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In an ideal world, their would be no brownfields.  Corporations and industry would always 
practice environmentally sound and non-polluting operations while strictly adhering to 
regulatory requirements.  Zoning regulations would never allow residential areas to be adjacent 
to industrial processes that pose a health threat.  Low income or minority communities would 
never have to bear a disproportionate share of that threat. States and municipalities would 
discourage greenfield development, promote redevelopment, and build markets for former 
industrial properties, all incorporated into overall regional land use planning.  Unfortunately, in 
many areas, it is still more cost-effective to develop open space or farmland, and leave urban and 
rural brownfields properties languishing. 
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Brownfields redevelopment has the power to change that equation. By redeveloping former 
industrial sites, cities and communities will create new jobs and new housing, generate economic 
activity, and protect public health.  At the same time, chemical contaminants will be removed 
from the environment, and options other than development of open space will be available.  In 
short, cities will be creating more livable communities for local residents.   
 
To accomplish this, brownfields stakeholders must develop strategies to improve the regulatory 
and economic climate for investment, create the tools and incentives to be used by investors, and 
make strategic interventions in specific circumstances.  The successful implementation of these 
brownfields strategies will require continued interest by state and local government to keep 
building  strong public-private partnerships and develop markets for brownfields. Brownfields 
redevelopment is still a complex, often difficult process. However, environmental issues are 
becoming the easy part; financing, liability, education  and community outreach are the new 
challenges.   
 
The case studies outlined in this report represent successful models of brownfields 
redevelopment.  They highlight both the challenges of redeveloping brownfields, and the 
rewards. The case studies show that although barriers can be significant, even daunting, the right 
combination of stakeholders, financing, and planning can make redevelopment work.  The case 
studies show that well executed projects can clean up contaminated property, create jobs, and 
build communities. 
 
The recommendations outlined in this report will address the challenges to brownfields 
redevelopment.  Increasing the participation of philanthropic institutions and non-profit 
organizations such as LISC will provide much needed financing and assistance to brownfields 
projects, as well as build the capacity of CDCs and community based organizations to participate 
in brownfields redevelopment.  Creating models of  successful brownfields redevelopment will 
help ease the fear of liability experienced by lenders, property owners, buyers and sellers, and 
developers.  It will also help erase the stigma associated with environmentally contaminated 
properties and reduce the fear of the unknown regarding levels of contamination, threats to 
public health, and cost of cleanup that plagues redevelopment efforts. Creating a brownfields 
information network will centralize brownfields information and make it more accessible to 
brownfields stakeholders.  Finally, increased funding will help sites overcome related economic 
development barriers, such as lack of skilled workforce or obsolete infrastructure.   Taken 
together, this call to action creates a comprehensive strategy to address the environmental, 
economic and social barriers to brownfields redevelopment.   Implementing these  
recommendations will catalyze brownfields redevelopment and dramatically increase the number 
of successful projects.   
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